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This dissertation critically analyses the role of disclosure in strengthening corporate 
governance and accountability to determine whether a prescriptive system of disclosure is 
of greater efficacy than a voluntary regime. The research undertaken has been done on a 
qualitative and theory building basis. The purpose of the study is to examine how current 
and future legal reform can curb corporate governance shortcomings and contribute to a 
new more dependable mode of corporate governance. 
This requires a comparative analysis of the South African and English models which are 
voluntary ('comply or explain') regimes compared to the prescriptive American model of 
corporate governance ('comply or else'). The foundational basis, definition and 
jurisdictional evolution of corporate governance is examined and analysed to ascertain 
the role of disclosure in relation to good governance. To facilitate this investigation a 
critical review of the legislative framework and reforms enacted locally (and offshore 
where applicable) is also undertaken. 
Disclosure as a concept is probed in terms of both a mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure regime to determine the more prudent mode of dissemination and how it 
impacts the efficacy of corporate governance and accountability. 
To ensure a holistic VIew of the role of disclosure is comprehensively critiqued its 
influence on corporate social responsibility is embarked upon. It is contextualized against 
the shareholder (contractarian) theory of governance versus that of the stakeholder 
(communitarian) theory of governance. This will involve a study of the competing 
requirements of disclosure in terms of these two theories and its impact on securing 
accountability. 
The tenuous relationship between shareholders and directors is considered to determine 
whether corporate governance regimes safeguard shareholder rights and how these 
measures contribute to strengthening governance. The codified role of directors in 
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enhancing disclosure to shareholders is also undertaken. To exatrune the interplay 
between these concepts corporate governance failures are dissected to determine the 
shortcomings of disclosure practice. 
The recommendation of this dissertation is that a mandatory disclosure regime is of 
greater efficacy in strengthening corporate governance and accountability but to remedy 
recurring corporate governance shortcomings a disclosure regime that is holistic and 
principles based is required. It should also be supported by a dedicated and empowered 
regulatory system with sufficient penal measures to curb fraudulent behaviour but 
sufficient flexibility so as not to curtail industrial fortitude. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTROI)UCTION 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
What has emerged via the highly publicized international debate on the topic of corporate 
governance and disclosure is that a theoretical commitment to the principles of 
transparency and accountability is not sufficient to provide legitimacy to a corporation 
nor does it emphatically diminish a company's vulnerability to a fmancial and 
concomitant legal crisis. 1 This dissertation will therefore seek to analyze the role of 
disclosure in strengthening corporate governance and accountability and seek to 
determine whether a prescriptive system of disclosure is of greater efficacy than a 
vo luntary regime. 
This will essentially involve a comparative analysis of the South African and English 
models of governance to the American model of corporate governance. It shall also seek 
to critically examine and analyze the current legislative reforms being enacted both 
locally and offshore to strengthen the existing framework of disclosure controls; so as to 
determine whether a prudent disclosure regime is the panacea it is intended to be. 
The integrity and relevance of information released by corporate entities will also be 
critically examined in terms of the role of the board of directors and their accountability 
to shareholders. To achieve the latter an evaluation of the role of non-executive directors 
in promoting disclosure will also be pursued. Moreover the role of disclosure as a 
regulatory measure in promoting a more explanatory transparency of executive 
remuneration will be considered. 
I M A Byong & J Halligan Reforming Public and Corporate Governance: Management and Market in 
Australia, Britain and Korea 2ed (2002) 55. 
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The epicenter of corporate governance is corporate social responsibility. An evaluation of 
the role of disclosure in strengthening corporate social responsibility and ipso facto 
corporate governance will also be embarked on. It will however, be contextualized 
against the shareholder (contractarian) theory of governance versus that of the 
stakeholder (communitarian) theory of governance. This will involve an analysis of the 
competing requirements of disclosure in terms of these two theories and its impact on 
securing accountability. 
1.2 Methodology 
The methodology employed in undertaking this research has consisted of referral to 
textbooks, published articles and case law pertinent to the issues of corporate governance. 
This has been the main source of data collection. Thus a qualitative and theory building 
approach has been adopted.2 It was decided to use the latter as it is a descriptive and 
interpretative approach. Furthermore it is holistic in nature as it aims to understand the 
processed legal systems to control the release of information thereby identifying the gaps 
and limitations in an attempt to propose a workable solution.3 
The purpose of this research is to propose a new model of corporate governance that is 
holistic incorporating meaningful, credible disclosure across legal, regulatory, ethical and 
sociological frameworks. 
1.3 An overview of the dissertation 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. 
In chapter one an overview of the dissertation and the foundational basis and definition of 
corporate governance is presented. Thereafter the current trends that typify corporate 
2 
A S De Vos et al Research at Grassroots 2ed (2002) 6. 
3 S Young and V Thyil 'A Holistic Model of Corporate Governance: a New Research Framework' (2008) 8 
Corporate Governance 94, 94. 
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governance are considered and the various forms of reform currently underway, which is 
accompanied by a critical slant on disclosure as a whole. 
Chapter two comprises an analysis of disclosure as a concept and an in depth analysis of 
both the mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure regimes is scrutinized on a 
jurisdiction specific basis. The research seeks to critically determine which is a more 
cogent and productive mode of disclosure and more importantly how it impacts on the 
efficacy of corporate governance and accountability. 
Chapter three embarks on an analysis of the epicenter of corporate governance which is 
the accountable and verifiable implementation of corporate social responsibility. The 
implementation of corporate social responsibility warrants a study of the shareholder 
focused approach of governance versus the stakeholder centric theory of corporate 
governance practice. As such chapter three will probe the disclosure practice associated 
with the aforementioned competing ideologies. 
Chapter four focuses on the nucleus of corporate governance which is the relationship of 
directors and shareholders and their role as conduits of disclosure for the benefit of the 
company. It asserts that the quality of fmancial disclosure depends significantly on the 
robustness of the fmancial reporting standards adopted by the company and the role of 
the board of directors in enriching the usefulness of disclosure to shareholders by 
providing further explanation and intellectual enhancement. To ascertain the accuracy of 
this assumption a critical analysis of the role and responsibilities of directors is 
undertaken in securing disclosure and whether their function in strengthening corporate 
governance could be enhanced by the codification of their duties. 
Chapter five presents a breakdown of modern day examples of corporate governance 
failures to ascertain whether disclosure can in fact lead to the effective implementation of 
governance policies. This involves an analysis of Fidentia, Enron, Worldcom, recent 
corporate governance fiascos and the current financial crisis. 
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Chapter S1X concludes the research by proposIng how governance practice can be 
improved in respect of disclosure. 
The intent is to assess the mandatory disclosure regime in securing diligent governance 
and whether a prescriptive process can in fact secure good practice. Each chapter seeks to 
juxtapose American jurisprudence pertaining to corporate governance against the South 
African corporate governance model with due and relevant regard to the English model 
of governance. 
1.4 Corporate Governance Defmed 
Corporate governance has been established as an important component of the 
international fmancial architecture but ironically the term 'corporate governance' did not 
exist in the English language until twenty years ago despite being a concept that has been 
practiced since the incorporation of corporate entities. 4 It has become a popular catch 
phrase in the last two decades and as such corporate governance5 issues have become 
important not only in academic literature but also in public policy debates6 and more 
recently in terms of international and local law reforms which seek to refine disclosure 
regimes. 7 
The latter has culminated in the new Companies Act8 (the new Act) which was signed 
into law by the President on 8 April 2009 and will come into force on a date to be 
proclaimed in the Gazette which may not be earlier than a year after its enactment. The 
4 RI Tricker Corporate Governance 4ed (2000) 18. 
5 The etymology of 'governance' comes from the Latin words gubernare and gubernator which refer to the 
steering of a ship and to the steerer or captain of a ship. The word governance has a rather archaic ring to it. 
It stems from the French word 'gouvernance' and means control and the state of being governed. 
6 A Berle & G Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 3ed (1932) 56. 
7 Chapter 2 defmes and analyses disclosure as a means of strengthening corporate governance and Chapter 
3 discusses legislative provisions pertaining to disclosure. 
8 Act 71 of2008. 
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new Act has not defmed 'corporate governance' but has sought to address the concepts of 
governance and transparency in terms of the purpose of the new Act. 9 
So what exactly is corporate governance? The definition of corporate governance stems 
from its organic link to the entire gamut of activities having direct or indirect influence 
on the fmancial health of corporate entities. The Nobel Prize winning economist, Milton 
Freidman, who has undoubtedly played a dramatic role in establishing the economic 
psyche of twentieth century America, expounded the following definition: 
'corporate governance is to conduct business in accordance with owner or shareho lder 
desires which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to 
the basic rules of the society embodied in law and local customs. ,10 
The concept of corporate governance and numerous definitions relevant to the concept 
have expanded over tirne as a result of a wide spectrum of economic phenomena and 
expanding corporate culture. As such, the foregoing discussion clearly underpins the 
notion that the term I; corporate governance' does not have a universally accepted 
definition.ll While some experts say that corporate governance means doing everything 
better, to improve relations between companies and their shareholders,12 the former 
president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, said that 'corporate governance is about 
promoting fairness, transparency and accountability. 13 
The often quoted statement by the esteemed James Wolfensohn is that 'the governance of 
the corporation is as irnportant to the world economy as the governance of countries' 14 
because modern cross border corporations are often larger than governments in terms of 
9 !bid Section 7 (b) (iii). 
10 M Friedman 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits' 1970 New York Times 
Magazine 32, 45 122. 
11 BR Cheffins 'Teaching Corporate Governance' (1999) 19 Legal Studies Journal 516, 520. 
12 E Fama & MC Jensen 'Separation of ownership and control' (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 
301,302. 
13http://web.worldbank.org (Last visited on 23 October 2009). 
14 Ibid. 
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economic power. Thus the quality of their governance has become a high level issue of 
social and political concern. This is consistent with the definition postulated by Shleifer 
and VishnyI5 that corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves a return on their investment. 
The single overriding concern of these experts is in the words of the Hampel 
Committee,I6 namely: 'the preservation and the greatest practicable enhancement over 
time of shareholders investments.' 17 Thus if the latter is to be taken as a comprehensive 
definition of corporate governance as used in relation to corporate governance reforms, it 
is clear that the performance of directors in a company will only be measured by the 
benefits that accrue to shareholders. I8 This is a narrow definition in terms of which 
directors ignore the interests of other stakeholders when exercising their corporate 
rationale. This is not consistent with the definition espoused by the King Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct as contained in the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa dated March 2002 (King 11).19 This advocates taking into 
account the interests of a wide range of stakeholders.2o 
The definition advocated by King 1121 would infer that a company's success is directly 
correlated to the interests of all stakeholders in the business such as suppliers, employees 
15 A Shleifer & R Vishny 'Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager Specific Assets'(1989) 25 
Journal 0/ Finance 123, 140. 
16 Hampe1 Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) was intended to be a revision of the corporate 
governance system in the United Kingdom (UK). The committee was to review the code laid down by the 
Cadbury Report (now found in the Combined Code). (See Chapter 1.5 and Chapter 1.6) It asked whether 
the code's original purpose was being achieved. Hampel found that there was no need for an overhaul of the 
UK corporate governance system. The report aimed to combine, harmonize and clarify the finding of 
earlier recommendations. 
17 Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) Final Report Paragraph 1.17. 
18 T Mongal0 Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings in 
South Africa led (2003) 246. 
19 The King Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) Paragraph 5.2. 
20 D Wood 'Whom Should Business Serve?' 2002 Australian Journal o/Corporate Law 5, 10. It must be 
noted that the term 'stakeholder' is one that has been plagued by controversy. Critics of the stakeholder 
theory highlight the breadth in the definition of a ' stakeholder' that is any person or group of persons who 
can affect or is affected by the activities of a company. A stakeholder may have different interests that may 
be weighed differently and can be ascribed multiple roles. 
21 The King Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) Paragraph 5.2. 
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and society at large.
22 
This is the so called 'triple bottom line' school of thought as 
opposed to the purist 'bottom line' school of thought. 23 This is significant in South Africa 
in context of our socio-political history. Moreover it is commensurate and consistent with 
modern corporate law which inculcates the ideals of responsible and accountable 
management. 24 This wider approach therefore focuses on the entire network of formal 
and informal relations that determine how control is exercised within companies and how 
the risks and returns from corporate activities are allocated. 25 This stakeholder centric 
approach has been further entrenched in the Report on Governance for South Africa 
issued in its final version on 1 September 200926 (King Ill). The report and the code 
highlight sustainability, ethics and stakeholder relationships emphasizing its inclusive 
nature. King III will corne into effect on 1 March 2010. 
A more comprehensive definition of corporate governance has come from the 
Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD): 
'as the system by which business corporations are directed and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as the board of directors, managers, 
shareho lders and other stakeho lders and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs.,27 
22 T Mongalo Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings in 
South Africa 1 ed (2003) 184. . 
23 J Elkington 1994 'Towards the sustainable corporation: Win-win-win business strategies for sustamable 
development' 362 California Management Review 36, 90, 96. . . 
24 M Painter-Morland 'Triple Bottom-line Reporting as Social Grammar: Integratmg Corporate SOCial 
Responsibility and Corporate Codes of Conduct' (2006) 15 Business Ethics: A European Review 352, 364. 
25 BR Cheffins 'Corporate Governance Reform, Britain as an Exporter, Corporate Governance and Reform 
of Company Law' Hume Papers on Public Policy 8 (2000) 10,28. . 
26 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 9. Downloaded from htpp://www.lOdsa.co.za (Last 
visited on 26 November 2009). 
27 htpp://www.oecd.org (Last visited on 27 November 2009). 
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By doing this, not only does corporate governance provide the structure through which 
the company objectives are set, it also provides the means of attaining these objectives 
d 
., c. 28 
an monltonng per 10rmance. 
These two approaches can be construed as the modern 'defmition' of corporate 
governance. Both approaches propound the value of corporate governance on a conscious 
level but do not focus on the practical imperatives that are required for its realization. A 
functional component would be disclosure of pertinent information by companies through 
their board to shareholders. In the absence of disclosure, transparency, accountability and 
fairness remains just a well intended objective. Corporate governance should also focus 
on the internal means by which corporations are operated and controlled. A more 
inclusive definition would be the internal processes to help directors discharge their 
duties and responsibilities as imposed by statute and the common law. 29 This would 
encapsulate the balancing of interests coupled with additional initiatives like appropriate 
disclosure regimes and accountable conduct.3o The defmition of corporate governance 
should be inextricably linked to a compliance regime. In fact King III states that it is 
wholly inappropriate to unhinge governance from the law31 yet the key tenets to its 
functioning remain largely undefined. 
It would follow that in ascertaining the manner, means and method of whether corporate 
governance has been implemented disclosure of key governance issues remains of 
paramount importance. Disclosure would also be relevant in ascertaining whether or not 
the interests of stakeholders and shareholders have been fully considered.32 
28 Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada' Where Were the Directors?' 
~uidel~nes for improved Corporate Governance in Canada, Guideline (12) (i), 1994 (DeyReport). 
M King The Corporate Citizen 1 ed (2006) 18. 
:~ D.Wood 'Whom Should Business Serve?' 2002 Australian Journal a/Corporate Law 5, 10. 
King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 7. 
32 M Pa~n.t~r-Morland 'Triple Bottom-line Reporting as Social Grammar: Integrating Corporate Social 
ResponsIbIhty and Corporate Codes of Conduct' (2006) 15 Business Ethics: A European Review 352, 364. 
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Disclosure can therefore be identified as an integral and definitive element in correctly 
defining corporate governance and in ascertaining the principles of responsibility and 
accountability. 33 
The King Committee endorses this reasoning as it attempts in King n34 and King 11135 to 
comprehensively deal with the responsibility of companies to deal with fmancial non-
financial reporting which is based on the interests of stakeholders including 
shareho lders. 36 
The aforementioned discussion confrrms that there is no single, universally appropriate, 
model of corporate governance. This principle has been recognized in King 11, which 
reiterates that: 
'companies are governed within the framework of the laws and regulations of the 
country in which they operate. Communities and countries differ in their culture, 
regulation, law and generally the way business is done. ,37 
Consequently, as the World Bank has pointed out, there can be no one, applicable 
corporate governance model. 38 Yet there are international standards that no country can 
ignore in the era of the global investor. Thus, international guidelines have been 
developed by the OECD, the International Corporate Governance Network and the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance. The four primary pillars of 
fairness, accountability, responsibility, disclosure and transparency are fundamental to all 
the international guidelines of corporate governance.39 It would therefore be more 
productive to define, elaborate and amplify the central pillar of disclosure than to attempt 
33 T Mongalo Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings in 
South Africa led (2003) 184. 
34 King Code on Corporate Governance (2002) Section 5 Chapter 2. 
35 King Report on Governance (2009) Chapter 7 and Chapter 9. 
36 King Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) Paragraph 6.2. 
37 King Code on Corporate Governance (2002) Section 5 Chapter 2. 
38 http://www.worldbank.org (Last visited on 21 October 2009). 
39 htpp: //www.worldbank.org{Last visited on 21 October 2009). 
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to ascribe a hard and fast definition to a concept like governance.
40 
The other key issue is 
whether the defmition or prescription of disclosure would be best achieved by a voluntary 
regime or a regulatory structure that is monitored and enforced. The guiding principle is 
that there are no degrees of corporate governance. A company either applies the 
principles of corporate governance or it does not. If one unties all the mental knots and 
ignores all the peripheral issues it is about doing the right thing at the right time for the 
right reason.41 This contemplates accountable and ethical conduct42 that supports both a 
prescriptive and a voluntary approach towards governance and disclosure. The evolution 
and success of these legal models are considered hereunder. 
1.5 Background to Corporate Governance 
As aforementioned disclosure, accountability and transparency are vital cogs of 
governance in terms of both a stakeholder and shareholder approach. Notwithstanding 
this assertion the ever lengthening litany of corporate malpractice scandals indicates 
something seriously defective in the functioning of disclosure, transparency and accurate 
financial reporting, the pillars of good corporate governance. 43 These scandals have led to 
a loss of credibility in financial reporting and legal structures.44 It is vital to restore 
credibility as reduced confidence in financial information and corporate disclosure 
produce an investor retreat and a reduction in the productivity of the economy.45 
The prima facie explanation for this has been the extensive deregulation in financial 
systems which allowed market forces to flourish. 46 This ensured corporate governance 
was catapulted to the top of business and political agendas and proved to be a stimulus to 
40 S 10hnson 'Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis' (2000) 58 Journal of Financial 
Economics 141, 186. 
41 This view recognizes that corporate governance is not only about procedural aspects, but also about 
mindset and moral attitude, which includes recognition by moral persons of the need to balance their own 
interests with the interests of others and reaching the conclusion that pursuing their own goals at the 
expense of others, is wrong. 
42 The King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 1.1. 
43 AG Monks & N Minow Corporate Governance 2 ed (2003) 2. 
44 http://www.kpmg.co.uk (Last visited on 29 October 2009). 
45 lB Barron & P 1 Miranti A History of Corporate Finance 2ed (1997) 18. 
46 RJ Daniels 'The Role of Interactive Coporate Governance' (1995) 83 California Law Review 45, 65. 
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legislative and non legislative reform across the globe.47 As a result the deregulation 
trend was quickly followed by extensive regulation in the fmancial and legal system. 48 
Since 1999 there have been at least forty new sets of principles or codes that have been 
published globally. These codes vary at one extreme from suggested practices whose 
adoption is entirely voluntary to rigid legal requirements wherein non-compliance and 
quantified breaches incur civil and criminal penalties. 49 
Implementing change and meaningful disclosure is a constant struggle because corporate 
governance is a vital ingredient not only for financial entities but for all entities 
particularly large conglomerates whose governance failure can have dire macroeconomic 
and sociological implications50 as evidenced by the demise of Enron,51 Worldcom52 and 
the recent fmancial crisis. 53 
Globally all corporate governance codes, guidelines and statutes share a number of 
common themes and vary more in the matter they emphasize rather than in principle. 54 A 
snapshot of corporate governance regimes in 2009 are as follows: the Anglo-American 
Model is a dichotomy of 'explain or comply' in terms of the English Model and a strict 
legislative response ('apply or else') in terms of the American model. 55 The former is 
47 http://www.eiu.com (Last visited on 15 November 2009). 
48 Ibid. 
49 T Wixley & G Everingham Corporate Governance 2ed (2005) 10. 
50 JP Hawley & AT Williams The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors can make 
America more Democratic 2 ed (2000) 34. 
51 K Eichenwald 'Corporate Governance' 28 May 2006 Business Times 23,23. 
52 L W Jeter Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at Worldcom led (2003) 156. 
53 http://www.fsa.co.uk (Last visited 21 April 2009) Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global 
banking crisis (March 2009). 'Financial Crisis' is a reference to the collapse and collective drop in share 
prices of Banks and Financial Institutions commencing September 2007 and the effects are still evident ~ 
2010. It has caused a global recession that has had a global impact and commentators have conceded that It 
can in part be attributed to the failure of coporate governance practices. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 
5.4. 
54 Ibid. 
55 htpp://www.pwc.com (Last visited on 26 November 2009). 
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characterized by the Cadbury Report56 and the Greenbury Report
57 
(collectively referred 
to as the Combined Code).58 The modus operandi underlying this code is that society is 
increasingly expecting higher standards of behaviour from companies and highlights the 
accountability of the board of directors and obligations on them to remain fully appraised 
of all issues peculiar to the company. 59 
The cumulative effect of these reports was the assertion that disclosure is a foundational 
element of a corporate governance framework because it provides all the stakeho lders 
with the information necessary to judge whether their interests are being taken care of 60 
The issue though is whether stakeholders or shareholders (given the corporate fiascos 
detailed in Chapter 5) can in fact rely on the disclosure made as a means of strengthening 
corporate governance and insuring accountability. 
The last effective and substantive corporate governance overhaul in the United Kingdom 
culminated in the Higgs Review61 in 2003 which focused on the issues of meritocracy 
56 A Cadbury 'Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance' (1992). The 
Cadbury Report sought to review aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial reporting 
and accountability in the United Kingdom and was the 'discussion document' for King I. 
57 The Greenbury Report (1995) sort to review and build on the principles outlined in the Cadbury Report 
with specific emphasis on executive remuneration. 
58 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998) sets out standards of good practice in relation to 
issues such as board composition and development, remuneration, accountability, audit and relations with 
shareholders. All companies incorporated in the United Kingdom and listed on the Main Market of the 
London Stock Exchange are required under the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules to report on how 
they have applied the Combined Code in their annual report and accounts. The Combined Code is updated 
at regular intervals the most recent being 29 June 2008. Note the UK governance regime as it applies to all 
corporate and listed entities remains unchanged but is under review as discussed in Chapter 1.4-1.6. This 
has culminated in the final report on the Combined Code review and consultation document of the revised 
UK Corporate Governance Code released for comments on 1 December 2009. 
59 The Turnbull Report (1999) was produced at the instance of the London Stock Exchange to provide 
further guidance for directors with regard to maintaining efficient "internal controls" in their companies, by 
way of audits and checks to ensure the quality of financial reporting and to detect fraud. 
60 http://www.rbi.org.in (Last visited 12 January 2009) Inaugural address delivered on 5 July 2003 by Shri 
Vepa Kamesan, Deputy-Governor, Reserve Bank of India, at the National Convention of Urban Co-
operative Banks. 
61 The Higgs review (2003) was a report on corporate governance that reviewed the role and effectiveness 
of non-executive directors and of the audit committee, aiming at improving and strengthening the existing 
Combined Code. Note the UK governance regime as it applies to all corporate and listed entities remains 
unchanged but is under review as discussed in Chapter 1.6. This has culminated in the final report on the 
combined code review and consultation document of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code released 
for comments on 1 December 2009. The current review is the Walker Review on Corporate Governance as 
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and diversity in English boardrooms and the vital role of the audit committee as espoused 
in the Smith Report.
62 
Derek Higgs rejected a legislative approach and recommended 
building on the aforementioned legacy of codified developments that embody the current 
framework of the English corporate governance regime which can be summarized as 
'comply or explain'. Of significant relevance is the prescribed business review which has 
been included in all operating reports of companies since July 2007. It is a mechanism to 
motivate companies to disclose information more innovatively and informatively. 63 
American reform cOlmnenced with the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC)64 on improving 
the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. Its recommendations that corporations 
should strive to be a viable attraction for capital, by ensuring disclosure and transparency 
of the company's true :financial performance as well as its governance practices were 
largely adopted by the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).65 
Notwithstanding these reforms, the American legislature responded even more decisively 
in terms of a legislative overhaul with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 200266 
(SOX or Sarbanes-Oxley). SOX is aimed at increasing corporate responsibility by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures underscored by a strict 
regulatory and disclosure regime for accounting firms that audit public companies. 
it applies to Banks and other Financial Institutions and the final document was published on 26 November 
2009 and is also discussed in Chapter 1.6. 
62 The Smith Report (2003) was a report on corporate governance that focused on concerns with the 
independence of auditors in the wake of the Enron scandal in the US in 2002. Its recommendations now 
form part of the Combined Code on corporate governance, applicable through the Listing Rules for the 
London Stock Exchange. It highlighted the duties of an auditor which include evaluating a company's 
corporate governance structun~ so as to provide safeguards to preserve an auditor's own independence. 
63 J V Carcello & TL Neal 'Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting' (2000) 75 The 
Accounting Review 453,455. 
64 http://www.nasdaq.com (Last Visited on 21 November 2009) Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) Report and 
Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) on improving the effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees as issued by the NYSE and Nasdaq. 
65 http://www.sec.gov (Last visited on 27 November 2009). 
66 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 (Pub.L. 107-204,116 Stat. 745) was enacted on July 30,2002. It is also 
known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 and is a United 
States (U.S) federal law. The Act does not apply to privately held companies. The Act contains 11 titles, or 
sections, ranging from additional corporate board responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires SEC to 
implement rulings on requirenlents to comply with the new law. The Act establishes a new quasi-public 
agency, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, or PCAOB, which is charged with overseeing, 
regulating, inspecting, and disciplining accounting firms in their roles as auditors of public companies. 
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Undoubtedly the corporate governance structures that we have today have been shaped 
by generations and centuries of legal, fmancial and social development. 67 While this rich 
background enables different approaches to be considered and examined, much of the 
most recent developments have been to formalize and create specific reporting and 
disclosure structures.68 
The more stringent requirements of the American model represent a clear challenge to the 
'light touch' regulation in London and the principles-based approach advocated by the 
King Committee in South Africa.69 This formed the impetus for corporate governance 
reform substantiated by King II and now King llI.70 King III has not deviated from this 
methodology but has expanded its ambit in that it now applies to all entities as opposed to 
listed companies.71 Its implementation will be enhanced and supported by the new Act. 72 
The central difference lies in the dilemma between those who see the company as a 
means to economic ends alone and those who see the company as a social actor. These 
tensions also result in varying degrees of disclosure. The challenge for meaningful 
corporate governance change is the achievement of an appropriate balance between the 
conformance and performance of the board. This should not only underscore the principle 
as to whether their companies comply with corporate governance principles but also to 
ensure greater performance of the company in a frank and transparent fashion while still 
being cognizant of all relevant shareholder and stakeholder interests. 73 
67 See Chapter 1.6. 
68 Ibid. 
69 T L Beauchamp & N E Bowie Theory o/the Modern Corporation 6ed (2001) 67. 
70 The King Report on Corporate Governance (1994); The King Report on Corporate Governance (2002); 
The King Report on Corporate Governance (2009). 
71 The King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 17. 
72 Section 7 (b) (iii) and Section 66 of Act 71 of2008 (see also Chapter 1.6). 
73 T Mongalo 'South Africanising Company Law for a Modern Competitive Global Economy' (2004) 121 
SALl104, 107. 
As Mongalo notes, merely concentrating on conformance will result in a box ticking mentality and as a 
result, the value of corporate governance reforms will be drastically reduced. Furthermore, a conformance 
predominated approach may lead to a lack of innovation on the part of a company's board of directors. 
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Given the past and current economic ignominies this could be construed as a seemingly 
insurmountable task notwithstanding burgeoning corporate governance reform. This 
assertion is based on the recurring corporate collapses worldwide which consistently 
point to inaccurate disclosure and clouded transparency. 
1.6 Current Trends in Corporate Governance 
It is self evident that corporate governance is widely held as a vital corporate and 
strategic imperative.74 This has been affIrmed by the plethora of global reform in the 
arena of corporate governance as such 2010 heralds a new dawn in this area of law. 
These new and innovative reforms with disclosure at its epicentre have been driven by 
global pressure for convergence in financial regulation and corporate governance. This is 
a particularly salient issue in emerging markets attempting to compete with established 
markets in developed countries. It is apparent from the aforementioned discussion that 
the 'one size fIts all' attitude to corporate governance is not suitable and instead an 
understanding of the socio-political and legal context of corporate governance is 
important to ensure cohesive regime change and transformation. 75 This is because each 
of the jurisdiction specific codes is intended to be a definitive guide for the intended 
audience. Taken together, however, the countless and varying approaches are anything 
but definitive. The fmdings of numerous separate nations and separate organizations, has 
culminated in a myriad of codes which in turn has inspired a vigorous and multifaceted 
discussion. The most pel1inent aspect of such a discussion has been the tireless debate 
b h .. f 76 etween t e two oppOSIng VIews 0 corporate governance. 
One is the need for diversity in business and the other is the push for stronger regulation. 
The regulatory approach tends to be prescriptive and reactive in nature, advising on 
solutions to situations after the crisis has occurred as clearly illustrated by the American 
74 B Holmstrom 'Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspective' (1999) 66 Review of Economic 
Studies 169, 172. 
75 FAllen & D Gale Comparing Financial Systems 2 ed (2000) 65. 
76 Ibid 67. 
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model. 77 The South African governance regime will be fortified by the new Act which 
asserts that corporate governance must be taken into account in managing the affairs of a 
company78 and the recommendations of King III.79 This indicates the forceful gravitation 
towards more regulation and mandatory disclosure.
8o 
In light of the financial crisis81 the pendulum will inevitably swing too far towards 
regulation, which will be as bad as too much deregulation. The reasons cited for such a 
crisis to date has been the degree of complexity associated with the various securitization 
transactions coupled with great opacity. Equally unsurprising has been the questions as to 
the role and responsibility of the board of directors of these banking and financial 
institutions. 82 
In its report to the United Kingdom (UK) parliament entitled 'The Run on the Rock,83 the 
Treasury Committee categorically pinpointed the directors of Northern Rock Plc as 'the 
principal authors of the difficulties that the company has faced since August 2007.' The 
report went on to state that 'the directors pursued a reckless business model which was 
excessively reliant on wholesale funding' this was followed by the strongly worded 
statement by the United Kingdom Financial Services Board that 'it is the responsibility of 
the board to test and challenge risky proposals from management'. 84 
77 htpp://www.sec.com (Last visited on 26 November 2009). R Romano 'What is the value of other 
Constituency Statutes to Shareholders' (1993) University o/Toronto Law Journal. 
78 Section 7 (b) (iii) and Section 66 of Act 71 of2008. There must also be disclosure of all information by 
the company and its directors that is material to the business of the company. 
79 King Report on Coporate Governance (2009) Chapter 2 and 9 which includes extensive obligations on 
the Board of Directors in terms of the combined assurance model and integrated reporting. 
80 Sections 29,30,31,122 of Act 71 of2008. 
81 See Chapter 5.3. 
82 Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009) downloaded from 
http: //www.fsa.co.uk (Last visited 21 April 2009). 
83 Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008 (24 January 2008). 
84 Australia Daniels v Anderson AWA (1995) (27) N.S.W.L.R 438 Directors are under a continuing 
obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation, but this requires general monitoring of 
corporate affairs and policies rather than a detailed inspection of day-to day activities. This was affirmed in 
the United Kingdom Official Receiver v Ireland (2001) 1 B.C.L.C 547 Each director owes duties to the 
company to inform himself about its affairs and to join with his co-directors in supervising and controlling 
them, a proper degree of delegation and division of responsibility is permissible and often necessary, but 
not a total abrogation of duties. 
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Thus a very prevalent trend in current corporate governance reform will be role of 
directors, more specifically that of non-executive directors, adequate monitoring of their 
independent status85 and disclosure of their contributory role in strengthening corporate 
governance. 86 In February 2009, Sir David Walker was requested by the Prime Minister 
to review (Walker Review) corporate governance in United Kingdom banks in the light 
of the banking system failure and the ensuing financial crisis. This culminated in a 
consultative document dated 26 July 2009 and a final version was produced on 26 
November 2009. 87 
Walker's fundamental analysis is that the financial crisis was not a failure of regulation 
but a failure of behaviour and the collective application of corporate governance. His 
recommendations are focused on the role of the board and directors in ensuring 
transparency and meaningful disclosure of relevant information pertaining to their 
decision making and remuneration policies. 88 A central theme bolstering this review is 
the recommendation that regulation is needed to re-enforce governance practice and 
disclosure methodology. 89 
In response to the Walker Review, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) also initiated a 
review of the Combined Code. The FRC confirms that: 'Many of Walker's 
recommendations complement the work the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and FRC 
is already carrying out and will publish a further consultation paper on governance which 
shall pre-empt the revised Combined Code in 2010.,90 
85 See Chapter 4.2. 
86 P Annstrong 'Directorship, the way we govern now!' 2003 Institute of Directorship 46,47. 
87 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries. Final recommendations. 
26 November 2009. Downloaded from htpp:llwww.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 26 November 
2009). 
88 Ibid Recommendation 6 and 14. 
89 Ibid Page 10 and 11. 
90 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (December 2009) Note it states that 'as important as 
governance; is the key detelminant to poor governance which is the behaviour of boards.' Page 6 
Downloaded from htpp:llwww.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 4 December 2009). 
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The final report of the review of the Combined Code (2008) was released on 1 December 
2009.91 It key fmdings was that the Combined Code should be referred as the 'UK 
Governance Code' to make clearer its status as the UK's recognized governance 
standards, introduction of new 'comply or explain' provisions relating to risk mitigation 
strategy to be implemented by the board and whether the 'apply or explain regimes' is 
sufficiently adequate and efficient. 92 It reported that although this regime was suitable for 
the UK market it was necessary to supplement this regime on the basis proposed by the 
Walker Review. 93 
It has culminated in a consultation document on the revised UK Corporate Governance 
Code which requires commentary by May 2010.94 The aforementioned Walker Review95 
confirms the commonly held view that the global business climate will become more risk 
averse as over-regulation of companies will stifle people's creativity.96 Corporate 
governance should be less about enforcing rules and more about encouraging the right 
attitude toward the rules. 97 What is needed is to strike the right balance between 
implementing hard rules in some areas and allowing flexibility in others. 98 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid Page 3. 
93 !bid Page 2 Note that the Walker Review recommends stricter regulation which has culminated in the 
Financial Services Bill (2009). 
94 Consultation On Revised Corporate Governance Code (December 2009) Downloaded from 
htpp:llwww.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 4 December 2009). It seeks to consult on governance in 
the UK based on the Walker Review with committees established to deliberate on whether the proposals 
made by the Walker Review should extend to all Listed Companies as opposed to just banks and financial 
institutions. A final report for deliberation will be circulated in May 20 I o. 
95 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other fmancial industries 26 November 2009 
Recommendation 4. 
96 M King The Corporate Citizen led (2006) 9. 
97 E Armour 'How Boards can Improve the Odds of Merger and Acquisition Success' (2002) 30 Strategy 
and Leadership 55, 57. 
98 F Easterbrook & D R Fischel 'Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors' (1984) 70 Val. L 
Rev 669,670. 
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The Walker Review proposes a culture and behaviourial change in boardrooms that 
warrants more disclosure in the interests of shareholders and stakeholders like bank 
customers. 99 
With the increasing reliance on market forces and by definition freer enterprise around 
the world, the quality of corporate governance and the nature of corporate responsibility 
will become even more important in building and sustaining public confidence in the 
legitimacy of commerce and industry. 
The current trend of the public policy focus is to maintain strong internal controls 
coupled with independent testing and reporting by external auditors. This encapsulates 
the intent of section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 100 It also sets out the current public policy 
directives. 101 High standards of objectivity, rigor and transparency in accounting 
standards and fmancial reporting are essential to good corporate governance and investor 
confidence. Unambiguous corporate fmancial reporting must be done to ensure full and 
complete compliance with the requirements of the relevant accounting standards and the 
applicable legislation pertaining to corporations. Effective enforcement of corporate law 
is essential under the auspices of an adequately resourced, independent single national 
corporate enforcement agency responsible for all aspects of corporate governance and 
law. 
In relation to the legal rnechanisms aimed at improving corporate governance La Porta 102 
has shown that the United States (US or USA) shareholders and creditors are among the 
99 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries 26 November 2009 Page 
10. 
lOO Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (note that there has been no governance reform in the US save for the 
recent Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) which established The Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, commonly referred to as T ARP a program of the United States government to purchase 
assets and equity from financial institutions to strengthen its financial sector. It is the largest component of 
the government's measures in 2008 to address the financial crisis. It is a reactive measure to a corporate 
governance crisis rather than corporate governance reform per se and has since been replaced by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of2009 (ARRA)). 
10 I A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries. Final recommendations. 
26 November 2009. 
102 R La Porta, et al 'Corporate Ownership around the World' (1999) 54 Journal o/Finance 471,501. 
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best protected in the world. 103 Notwithstanding this and stringent legal reform the 
financial crisis has proved devastating on global liquidity and the global economy. It has 
resulted in monumental losses for banks and fmancial institutions. 104 
Once agam, it has been followed by the predictable and anguished cry for more 
regulation as evidenced after the global debt crisis of the eighties, the savings and loan 
debacle in the US, the Asian debt crisis of 1987105 and the sovereign bond defaults in 
1999.106 Each crisis occurred despite regulations. These corporate catastrophes revealed 
certain weaknesses in corporate governance, disclosure practice and related aspects of the 
legal and regulatory foundations of our markets. 107 
1.7 Conclusion 
Corporate governance issues have moved to centre stage in the fmancial policy 
deliberation of most states and countries. Countries with deep capital markets were seen 
as robust and capable of dealing with their own problems with little official interference. 
This confident view of differential corporate governance definitions is being re-examined 
as indicated in terms of Chapter 1.6. The majority of corporate governance deliberations 
involve the closer examination of the role that market discipline, transparency and more 
stringent disclosure can and should play in strengthening corporate governance. The 
prima facie view is that disclosure constitutes a vast and feral concept which is best 
governed by a mandatory regime. 
This is most evident in the strides made globally to govern verifiable disclosure of 
information relevant to shareholders and stakeholders. The issue remains is whether 
103 This has been further strengthened by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. The South African 
corporate and insolvency regime is pro creditor. This will change, following the effective implementation 
of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of2008 and the Companies Act 71 of2008. 
104 Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009). 
105 S Johnson 'Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis ' (2000) 58 Journal of Financial 
Economics 141, 186. 
106 Ibid. 
107 J C Coffee 'Market failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors' (1994) 70 Val L Rev 717, 719. 
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prescribed and monitored disclosure as advocated by new governance codes and 
legislative inputs will strengthen accountability and governance. The prescriptive 
American model has not guaranteed good corporate governance in fact the compliance 
costs associated with this regime has stifled meaningful and substantive disclosure. 108 
Similarly voluntary governance regimes have fallen foul to boiler plate, unsubstantiated 
and vague explanations for non application of governance codes. 109 As such the role of 
disclosure in strengthening corporate governance and accountability although a central 
feature is not a guarantee to obviating governance failure. This can be attributed to the 
weaknesses in the models of governance under review, the porous and unreliable 
disclosure made by cOlnpanies or a combination of both. 
Legal reform should seek to refine the mandatory model by incorporating a definitive 
ethics regime. This means responsible leadership and doing business ethically rather than 
merely being satisfied with legal and regulatory compliance. llo The integrity of the 
information will in turn be positively impacted. Practically this would translate to 
supplementing existing governance regimes with controls like ethics policies, director 
training and penal measures for non compliance to ensure the gaps in the flow of 
information to shareholders and stakeholders alike are correctly bridged. Disclosure of 
information is not enough, the nature of information released needs to independently 
verified. Finally the o~rnership of this disclosure and concomitant responsibility should 
vest with the board of directors. The accountability of directors should be supported by 
appropriate legislation that is simple, accessible and easily enforceable. These assertions 
will be fortified in the ensuing chapters. 
CHAPTER 2: DEFINTI\fG THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN STRENGTHENrnG 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
\08 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 6. 
109 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other fmancial industries 26 November 2009 Page 
15. 
liD King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 20. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Disclosure is a broad and multifaceted component of any regulatory regime. This chapter 
seeks to analyze the merits of a mandatory regime of disclosure against the purported 
prudence of a voluntary regime of disclosure. The focal point of the analysis is to 
determine which regime obviates corporate abuse with greater efficacy thereby 
strengthening corporate governance and accountability. This is best achieved by 
analysing the American and English corporate governance models to determine the best 
suited model for South Africa. The jurisdictions chosen are on the basis of a pure 
legislative approach in America ('comply of else') as opposed to the 'apply or explain,111 
flexibility of the English model of governance. It allows a juxtaposition of two different 
approaches and the option for South Africa to cherry pick options that best suits its 
corporate landscape. The forgoing evaluation of disclosure practice seeks to analyse and 
ascertain what is best suited to South Africa. 
2.2 An evaluation of the forces that are causing the re-examination of disclosure 
practice 
Section 195 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa112 
emphasizes the fact that public administration must be fostered by providing the public 
with timely, accessible and accurate information. 
This is commensurate with the doctrine propounded by King II which states that 
stakeho lders such as the community in which a company and government operate, its 
customers, its employees and its suppliers need to be considered when developing the 
strategy of a company. 113 However, in terms of section 15A of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973,114 the registrar of companies has the power to condone non-disclosure if it was 
done for strategic reasons. It became a useful provision for disguising bad business 
I11 Kin R g eport on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 6. 
112 Act 108 of 1996. 
113 King Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) Paragraph 5.2. 
114 Act 61 of 1973. 
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performances and led to lack of transparency. This is in obvious conflict with the primary 
focus of corporate governance which is disclosure and accountability. The main principle 
behind accountability and disclosure is that directors should present a balanced and 
understandable assessment of the company's financial position and its future prospects. 1 IS 
There is no equivalent section in the new Act l16 and in fact section 29 of the new Act 1 17 
fortifies transparency and accountability of companies and the authenticity of financial 
statements filed. This is supplemented by the integrated reporting requirements of King 
III which seeks to ensure that the board makes full disclosure of both sustainability and 
financial information 118 and that the board complies with applicable laws and considers 
adherence to non binding rules, codes and standards. 119 
The value of disclosure depends on the independent verification of data and the detail of 
information being disclosed. A corporate governance commentator aptly described this 
phenomenon as: 'delivering information is easy but delivering credible information is 
hard. ,120 
In general, information being disclosed comprises two typologies, namely: accounting 
and non-accounting information. 121 
From an accounting perspective the company's financial reports which encapsulate the 
company's financial position, meet narrow technical requirements. They provide a 
glimpse of the compani's past performance, little is said of the future and hardly any 
115 A Keay 'Directors Duties to Creditors: Concerns relating to the Efficiency and Over Protection of 
Creditors' 2000 Modern Law Review 209. 
116 Act 71 of2008. 
117 Ibid. 
118 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 9.1. 
119 Ibid Principle 2.9. 
120 P E Fischer & P C Stocken ' Imperfect Information and Credible Communication' (2002) 39 Journal of 
Accounting Research 119, 126. 
121 Ibid 129. 
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information pertaining to the fIrm's capacity to innovate, train and enrich its human 
capital resources, or initiatives to enhance its corporate governance are mentioned.
122 
All these intangible assets, if reported at all, appear in a non-comparable format and are 
often in an inconsistent form. This is the reality even though the markets clearly signal 
the growing importance of such intangibles or non-accounting information as critical 
enhancements of value in the market place. 123 
The long term sustainability of corporations rests on a complex balance of factors. While 
fInancial viability is clearly vital so too are elements such as the ability to adapt in a 
changing market. 124 This is starting to change as many corporations seek ways of 
measuring their so-called eco-efficiency performance. 125 Moreover, it enables 
management to anticipate and exploit opportunities to strengthen the firm's market 
. . db 126 competItIveness an oost corporate transparency. 
Sustainability is one of the key themes of King 1II127 it is emphasized throughout the 
report and the integrity of sustainability reporting vests in the board. The board must 
ensure that stakeholders and shareholders can make an informed assessment of the 
company's economic value and future value creation. 128 
A strong disclosure regime is a pivotal feature of market-based monitoring of companies, 
which enhances the relationship between corporate governance and transparency. The 
latter goes directly to the market's ability to observe a corporation's performance. 
Without effective disclosure of financial performance existing shareholders cannot 
122 N Carcello & TL Neal 'Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting' 75 (2000) The 
Accounting Review 453,467. 
123 King Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) Paragraph 6.2. 
124 J Dennis 'The new numbers game in Accounting' 24 July 1989 Business Week 20, 21. 
125 L D DeSimone & F Popoff Eco-Efficiency the Business Link to Sustainable Development 2ed (2000) 6. 
126 Ibid 87. 
127 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 9. 
128 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 9.1 and Principle 9.2. 
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evaluate management's past performance and prospective investors cannot forecast the 
corporation's future cash flow. 129 
Shareholders and potential investors require access to regular reliable and comparable 
information in sufficient detail for them to access the stewardship of management and 
make informed decisions about the valuation, ownership and voting of shares. 130 A 
significant driver behind disclosure practice would be disclosure of concentrated control 
blocs within a company.131 This is to ensure that related party transactions are avoided or 
adequately disclosed. While not all related party transactions are harmful, abuse does 
occur.132 A pertinent example of a control bloc situation is family controlled public 
companies wherein policy and form are influenced by majority shareholders. As such 
explicit disclosure of shareholding is imperative. 133 
The idea then that infonnation and prompt, accurate disclosure of this information play a 
central role in our society is certainly not new and mechanisms are constantly being 
created to transfer this information to the public domain. 134 
Such periodic disclosure:, however, has at least two flaws. First, there is a time lag 
between the date as of when disclosure documents (typically the firm's financial 
statements) are prepared and when they are actually disclosed. For instance, an annual 
report must be prepared and become public after the closing of the company's fiscal year. 
129 C Himmelberg & RG Hubbard 'Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link 
between Ownership and Performance' (1999) 53 Journal of Financial Economics 353, 357. 
130 !bid 358. 
131 S Grossman & 0 Hart 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration' 1986 Journal of Political Economy 691,675. 
132 Section 226 of Act 61 of 1973 which requires disclosure of all loans to directors and properly authorised 
transactions to be replaced by Section 45 of Act 71 of 2008 which pertains to Loans or other Financial 
Assistance to Directors. This section applies not only to loans or financial assistance to directors or other 
officers or related parties, but also to 'a related or inter-related company or corporation' (section 45(2)). In 
terms of section 45(5) (a), certain disclosure requirements are triggered when specified loans to directors 
and other prescribed officials exceed 0.1 % of the company's 'net worth'. 
133 R LaPOlta et al 'Corporate Ownership Around the World' (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471, 517. 
134 A Florini The Coming Democracy: New Rulesfor Running a New World 2 ed (1980) 67. 
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There is a potential three to six month hiatus. 135 Second, there is no obligation for the 
company to update the information supplied in the fmancial statements even if something 
happens after they are prepared and become public. There is an exception that certain 
important events must be disclosed in a special report (known as an '8-K' report in the 
US)136 but this exception is not comprehensive. To rectify these flaws there must be a 
supp lemental scheme. In this vein, stock exchanges and other self-regulatory bodies 
usually require timely disclosure by which the company is required to divulge pertinent 
information more often and sometimes in more detail than is required by law. 137 
2.3 The nature and form of information that should be disclosed: mandatory versus 
vo luntary disclosure. 
From a corporate governance perspective, disclosure alone may not be enough. Other 
legal infrastructures are equally important for corporate governance to be pertinent. One 
must examine the mechanics behind the disclosure procedure, i.e., wholly voluntary, 
wholly mandatory disclosure or a compromise governance regime. 138 
Some commentators postulate that the most potent means of protecting investors is 
mandatory disclosure wherein a guarantee is elicited that companies will implement the 
reforms necessary to provide investors with adequate checks on shareholder Issues, 
directors and board control. 139 
135 RA Dye 'Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosures The cases of Financial Real Externalities' 65 (1990) 
Accounting Review 24,32. 
136 http://www.sec.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009) Form 8-K is a report required to be filed by 
public companies with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. After a significant event or change a public company generally must 
file a current report on Form 8-K within four business days to provide an update to previously filed 
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and/or Annual Reports on Form 10-K. Form 8-K is a very broad form used 
to notify investors of any unscheduled material event that is important to shareholders or the SEC. This is 
one of the most common types of forms filed with the SEC. 
137 Raghuram, R & Zingales, L 'Finance Dependence and Growth' (1998) 88 Economic Review 529,559. 
138 www.theeconomist.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009) 'World Investment Prospects Comparing 
Environments across the world' (2001). 
139 RA Dye 'Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosures The cases of Financial Real Externalities Accounting 
Review' (1990) 65 24, 28. 
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The optimal governance regime is perhaps a hybrid regime in which the adoption of best 
practice guidelines is vo luntary but disclosure of corporate governance practices is 
mandatory. Such a regime is optimal since it balances the benefits and costs to all 
stakeholders. 14o 
The South African regirne of corporate governance is self-regulatory. It may even be 
regarded as 'soft-law', as there is no legal basis for enforcement. The regime is 
underpinned by the philosophy of 'comply or explain,.141 Affected companies 142 are 
required to comply with the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. 143 Compliance 
with these guidelines is voluntary but companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange, South Africa (JSE) are required to include in their annual report a disclosure 
statement. 144 This statement explains how the public companies apply the principles of 
corporate governance or explain why it does not comply.145 King III and the new Act 
have not deviated from this principle but King III has increased the ambit and scope on 
what a company must report on in the form of the Integrated Report.146 King III has 
failed to provide defmitive guidelines on how this should be achieved 147 and the new Act 
has focused purely on mandating the disclosure of financial information. 148 
140 A Cornfield 'The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance' (1998) 10 
Bond Law Review 78, 85. 
141 King Report on Corporat{! Governance (2009) Page 5 introduces the wording change of 'apply or 
explain.' Commentators like Lindie Engelbrecht explain this as being less prescriptive and more 
commensurate with a voluntary regime and will hopefully encourage more expansive and substantive 
explanations as opposed to conformance based explanations. http://www.iodsa.co.za (Last visited on 29 
November 2009). 
142 Includes listed companies, banks, financial and insurance entities and public sector enterprises that fall 
under the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. See also Introduction and Background of King 
Report, 2002. 
143 T Mongalo 'South Africanising Company Law' (2004) 121 SAU 104, 106. While the Code is the 
document that companies must endeavour to comply with, the King Report assists in understanding the 
provisions of the Code. King III endorses this viewpoint. 
144 Section 3.84 JSE Listing Requirements. 
145 Section 8.63 (a) JSE Listing Requirements. 
146 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 9.1 prescribes the Integrated Report which 
seeks to present a holistic and integrated representation of a company's finances and sustainability. 
147 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 9 provides substantive recommendations. 
148 Sections 28, 29 and 30 of Act 71 of 2008. 
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The American Model has been criticised for being overly prescriptive but has in fact 
imposed a degree of extra-territorial harmonisation precisely because many off-shore 
companies are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). This is referred to as 'piggy 
backing' .149 Similarly, the principle of complying or explaining as embodied in the UK 
Combined Code has gained prominence as the code to emulate because companies from a 
host of countries are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Notwithstanding, this 
proclivity each country has its unique domestic requirements. 150 
While this concept may be construed as being progressIve nonetheless it does not 
supersede the domestic requirement for corporate governance developments. As 
highlighted in Chapter 1.6 the revised Combined Code remains subject to further review 
and consultation and has raised jurisprudential deliberations that could impact the 
'explain and comply' regime. 151 Developments in corporate governance have been 
included in the Financial Services Bill152 which seeks to entrench the Walker Review 
recommendations pertaining to disclosure of executive remuneration and risk mitigation 
strategy.153 This restates the trend towards a mandatory disclosure regime as an effort to 
enhance corporate governance and accountability. 
The mandatory system of disclosure has societal benefits largely due to the primary 
incentive of compliance which is the avoidance of penalties that are generally onerous. 
This is the so called 'command and control' structure. The main benefit alluded to above 
is that regimes with strong investor protection will lead to healthy capital markets. La 
149 G Garrett 'Globalization's missing middle' (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 84, 96. 
150 D Reed 'Corporate Governance Reforms in Developing Countries' (2002) 37 Journal of Business Ethics 
223,247. 
151 http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 7 December 2009) Final Report on the Review of the 
Combined Code (2009) and Consultation on the revised UK Corporate Governance Code (December 
2009). 
152 http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 27 November 2009) The Financial Services Bill and an 
impact analysis was released for commentary on 19 November 2009. 
153 Walker Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other fmancial industry entities 26 November 
2009 Recommendations 28,29 and 33. 
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Porta 154 has found that countries with better legal protection for investors have financial 
markets that are more developed. 
The other benefit to a command and control system is broad based compliance. 155 
Compliance is one of the most significant weaknesses of voluntary disclosure regimes. If 
the state establishes a set of guidelines or best practices to be followed there are no 
assurances that the market actors will abide by them since they are not mandatory and 
thus no penalty attaches to those who fail to comply. While voluntary regimes are less 
direct, they nevertheless can encourage compliance over time. As more and more 
companies and organizations adopt corporate governance practices over time, these 
voluntary practices will become the norm among a majority of firms. This can be termed 
the so-called' snowball effect. 156 
The regime in South Aflrica is to a large extent a hybrid model comprising voluntary 
compliance with King 11 (and King III as of 1 March 2010) and mandatory compliance 
with applicable legislation. However, good corporate governance practice will no doubt 
have an escalating snowball effect over the next few years accentuated by the enactment 
of the new Act. 157 The new Act is a step in the right direction as it adds significant 
governance requirements for public companies and it seeks to establish a commission to 
c. l' . h 1 158 enlorce comp lance WIt new governance ru es. 
154 R La Porta et al 'Corporate Ownership around the World' (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471,510. 
155 RLa Porta et al 'Legal Detenninants ofExtemal Finance' (1997) 52 Journal offinance 1131,1140. 
156 htpp://www.corporategovernancealliance.com (Last visited on 27 November 2009). 
157 Act 71 of2008. 
158 Section 203 of Act 71 of 2008. This was initially analysed in the Department of Trade and Industry 
Paper: South African Company Law for the 21 st Century - Guidelines for Corporate Law Refonn, (2004). 
The Draft Regulations of the Companies Act were released for public comment on 22 December 2009. 
Regulations 153 to 170 makes no mention of a regulator per se and as such has failed to initiate a 
regulatory body of any substance. Regulation 143 does afford the Commission the right to commence 
investigations and has supporting Regulations in the fonn of Regulations 139 to 141 to assist with these 
investigations which are tantamount to the powers afforded to the SEC. This will no doubt be the basis of 
much debate and commentary as there is not recommended formulation as to how this will be implemented 
in practice. It is nevertheless a step in the right direction to initiate a mandatory regime of compliance. 
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· b'b . h f d' 1 159 The latter will thus compel companIes to su scn e to a stncter et os 0 ISC osure. 
There is a lucid movement to more mandatory disclosure to ensure compliance and 
competitiveness in a global arena. This is a commendable feature as developing 
economies and countries require as much global clout as they can muster and this is 
clearly in the form of international standardized corporate governance norms.
160 
The optimal governance structure is a partially mandatory regime in which compliance 
with a code of governance practices is voluntary but disclosure regarding the extent of 
compliance is mandatory. Of course, optimality, in the corporate governance context is 
an elusive term with precision about costs and benefits impossible to achieve. However, 
despite a certain level of ambiguity and possibly equivocation from some companies, we 
can say that an optimal regime is one that balances the benefits and costs to all 
stakeholders particularly firms and investors. 161 
The United Kingdom's (UK) Combined Code places some responsibility for good 
corporate governance on institutional shareholders by devoting a section to them. 162 The 
Combined Code suggests that shareho lders must evaluate the company's statements and 
urge them to do so carefully with common sense and by giving due consideration to all 
relevant circumstances. The Combined Code also warns shareholders that while they 
'have every right to challenge companies' explanations if they are unconvincing, they 
should not be evaluated in a mechanistic way and departures from the code should not be 
automatically treated as a breach' .163 In having a section devoted to shareholder 
responsibility in the Combined Code, as well as warnings of this sort, it presents a fine 
balance between investor objectives and the interests of a firm in governance matters. 
While good governance is surely a matter of responsibility for the board and management 
there may be valid explanations for their departures from voluntary governance practices. 
159 A West 'Theorising South Africa's Corporate Governance' (2006) 68 Journal of Business 433, 448. 
160 !bid 446. 
161 M Vaughn & L R Verstegen (2006). Corporate Governance in South Africa: A bellwether for the 
continent? (2006) 14 Corporate Governance 504, 512. 
162 The Combined Code (2008) Section D Relations with Shareholders. See also Rule 12.43 A (b) of UK 
Listing Rules. 
163 The Combined Code (2008) Section D Relations with Shareholders. 
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In the absence of a highly vigilant board and stringent internal controls as is evidenced in 
the English regime this governance model would be vulnerable to abuse. 
The South African system is in stark contrast to the corporate governance regime in the 
United States (US). In the US, disclosure is mandatory save for disclosure as to whether 
the company has a code of ethics for senior financial officers. If there is no compliance 
with the latter, detailed explanation must be provided for the waiver of the code of 
ethics. l64 In addition disclosure of whether there is a fmancial expert on the audit 
committee must be provided alternatively a suitable explanation must be provided for 
explicit non compliance rnust be made. 165 
The last two elements contain the 'if not, why not' approach of the English and South 
African regime. However, their presence does not permit the American regime to be 
classified as partially mandatory. The majority of elements of SOX in conjunction with 
the NYSE rules justify the US regime as being described as purely mandatory. 
The new rules added to the existing NYSE governance regime include the following: 
- majority of independent directors; 
-disclosure of determinations of director independence; 
-regularly scheduled executive sessions of non-management directors of each 
company; 
-nominating committee and compensation committee composed entirely of 
independent directors, with a written charter addressing purpose and 
164 htpp:llwww.nyse.com (Last Visited on 5 December 2009) NYSE Listing Rules, Section 303A 10. Note 
corporate governance rules of the New York Stock Exchange approved by the SEC on November 4, 2003, 
and amended on November 3, 2004, other than Section 303A.08, which was filed separately and approved 
by the SEC on June 30, 2003. These rules are codified in Section 303A of the NYSE's Listed Company 
Manual. 
165 !bid Section 303 A 06. 
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responsibilities of each committee and an annual performance evaluation of each 
of the committees that meets the requirements of Rule lOA-3 of the SEC;166 
. . . I 167 d d t d .shareholder votlng to approve equIty compensatlon pans an a op an 
disclose corporate governance guidelines and a code of business conduct and 
ethics for directors and officers and employees. 168 
Commentators on SOX and the American model of governance have criticized its 
implementation as rendering the US market uncompetitive, costly and prescriptive. The 
cumulative result is a counterproductive model of governance. 169 The efficacy of any 
model of governance should be evaluated on a cost and conferred benefits basis but 
should also be tempered with long term gains. The costs to avert wide scale economic 
failure far outweigh the implementation costs of regulation. This fortifies the opinion that 
mandatory disclosure is required as market influences are insufficient to encourage 
vo luntary action. 
As such jurisdictions are moving towards some form of mandatory disclosure. 17o Thus 
the seeming popularity of the mandatory structure leads one to question why jurisdictions 
166 htpp://www.sec.gov (Last visited on 17 November 2009) Sec Rule 10A-3 relates to the audit committee 
members meeting a heightened standard for independence. The rule implements the requirements of 
Section 10A(m)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of2002. 
167 Ibid. The Securities and Exchange Commission SEC's proxy rules require that domestic public 
companies prepare a 'compensation discussion and analysis' (CD&A) including extensive tabular and 
narrative disclosure of compensation paid to their most senior and highly compensated executives. This is 
filed with the SEC which means officer liability for material errors and omissions. The CD&A covers the 
basis, motivations and relevant information considering for remuneration including that of Non Executive 
Directors. Once the compensation committee recommends to the Board of Directors that the CD&A be 
included in Form 10-K and proxy statement it is as mentioned filed with the SEC. 
168 htpp://www.nyse.com Section 303 A 02-05. The NYSE Rules do exempt the following types of 
companies from specific requirements: controlled companies limited partnerships and companies in 
bankruptcy closed-end and open- end funds, passive business organizations in the form of trusts derivatives 
and special purpose securities and foreign private issuers. The exemptions from which these types of 
companies benefit usually reflect the already onerous requirements that the companies face from other 
regulators. 
169 D F Vagts 'Extraterritoriality and Corporate governance Law' (2003) 97 American Journal 0/ 
International Law 289,294. 
170 F Easterbrook & D Fischel The Economic Structure o/Corporate Law led (1991) 156. 
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have adopted a hybrid corporate governance regime and, in particular, the benefits of 
such a regime. 171 
A latent assumption in academic literature is that there is a causal relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. l72 However recent research belies this 
theory. For example, Dalton 173 has found little evidence to support any relationship 
between governance and performance. Why then do regulators, investors and public 
interest groups lobby for higher standards of corporate governance? There are reasons 
other than positive effects on firm performance as to why investors advocate and 
regulators support enhancements to corporate governance rules or practices. The received 
benefits of a comprehensive governance regime include greater accountability to 
investors by such mechanisms as an independent board, an independent and fmancially 
literate audit committee and increased disclosure. 174 
Research also shows that investors from all over the world indicate that they will pay 
large premiums for companies with effective corporate governance. One such study 
conducted by The McKinsey Quarterly 175 found that institutional investors in emerging 
market companies would be willing to pay as much as 30 percent more for shares in 
companies with good governance. Furthermore, it showed that companies with better 
corporate governance had higher price-to-book ratios, demonstrating that investors do 
indeed reward good governance. 176 
The regulatory view is that greater accountability is necessary in order to inspire and 
maintain investor confidence and to ensure the efficacy of disclosed information. 
171 LD Brown & RN Higgins 'Managing Earning Surprises in US versus 12 other countries' (1999) 20 , 
Journal of Accounting Public Policy 373, 398. 
172 JE Core & RW Holthausen 'Corporate governance and Chief Executive officer compensation and Finn 
performance' (2000) 51 Journal of Finance 371,375. 
173 DR Dalton et al 'Meta-Analytical reviews of Board Composition Leadership Structure and Financial 
Performance' Strategic Management Journal (1998) 19269,272. 
174 LL Eng & YT Mak 2003 'Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure' (2003) 22 Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy 325, 327. 
175 http://www.mckinseyquarte:rly.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
176 Ibid. (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
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Investors care about governance regardless of a firm's ultimate performance; they want to 
make sure that they are not disadvantaged by a ftrm's corporate governance structure.
l77 
To try and reconcile all the differences in the various markets around the world in the 
search for a global set of rules is fraught with difficulty. But the principle of 'comply or 
explain' has been gathering increasing acceptance as a flexible, evolutionary way for 
governance practices to develop. Ifbusiness leaders prefer to comply or explain, it will be 
essential to ensure that every explanation is articulated in a full and convincing manner to 
ensure investor confidence. 
As such it would be more beneficial to focus on developing adherence to international 
accounting standards to promote global literacy of financial information. This would 
enhance the accessibility and efficacy of information. Moreover, it would be of vital 
importance to embrace the imperative role disclosure plays in corporate governance 
which in turn is a prerequisite to a vigorous equity market. Furthermore, transparency and 
disclosure are essential and critical cogs of corporate governance. Whether these 
mechanics are voluntary or by way of mandatory prescription remains an ineluctable and 
necessary condition to accountability. 
2.4 Conclusion 
According to a report compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA)178 pertaining 
to the latest emerging markets survey South Africa ranked in the top eleven emerging 
markets in terms of corporate governance, but it ranked poorly in terms of disclosure and 
transparency which indicates the 'comply or explain' regime encompassed by King 11 
(and the less prescriptive 'apply or explain' regime of King 111)179 although laudatory has 
not been completely successful. To ensure that South Africa is internationally 
competitive it must visibly demonstrate impeccable governance standards in all sectors of 
177 S Elgazzar & P Finn 'An empirical Investigation Of Multinational Finns Compliance with International 
Standards' (1999) 32 The International Journal of Accounting 239, 243. 
178 htpp://www.clsa.com (Last visited on 17 November 2009). 
179 King Code on Corporate Governance (2002) and King Report on Corporate Governance (2009). 
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commercial activity, not only in principle but in practice as well. The question posed is 
whether this would be best achieved via a mandatory regime as opposed to a voluntary 
governance model. The mandatory American model of governance has been examined 
and it has garnered significant criticism based firstly on the costs associated with its 
implementation
180 
which is simply not commensurate with an emerging economy and a 
company law regime analogous to English Law. 181 Also the 'comply or else' regime has 
illustrated that disclosure for the sake of compliance (as evidenced by the financial crisis) 
does not guarantee transparency and accountable governance compounded by the fact 
that it is devoid of the 'principles based' mould that characterizes King II and King I1L 182 
The alternate English model and the accrued benefits of the 'comply and explain' regime 
to South Africa have also been examined. This is certainly not an ideal regime and can 
result in disparate disclosure. 
This has initiated a complete review of the Combined Code and has been the catalyst of 
governance legislation in the UK which denotes a deviation from a pure vo luntary 
perspective of governance to a hybrid model. 183 The hybrid model denotes a coupling of 
'apply or explain' principles with legislative assistance. King III read with the new Act184 
will seek to embody this model. King III cautions against additional legislation185 this 
assertion is partly correct if the mandatory model considered is the American option for 
the reasons stated above but the South African corporate landscape would be best served 
by definitive disclosure provisions as it relates to non financial information and the risk 
strategies adopted by boards. 186 The Walker Review states that increased disclosure will 
180 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 6 which highlights the fact that the total cost to the 
American economy of complying with its 'comply or else' regime is considered to amount to more than the 
total write-off of Enron, Worldcom and Tyco combined. 
181 Department of Trade and Industry Paper: South African Company Law for the 21 st Century - Guidelines 
for Corporate Law Reform, (2004). 
182 King Code on Corporate Governance (2002) and King Report on Corporate Governance (2009). 
183 Financial Services Bill (2009) down loaded from htpp://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 21 
November 2009). 
184 Section (7) (b) (iii), 92 and 94 of Act 71 of2008. 
185 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Page 9. 
186 Section 76 and 77 of Act 71 of 2008 has amplified the importance of directors applying their minds and 
voicing their opinions to ensure their discordance with potentially negative decision taking is minuted to 
avoid personal liability but remains silent on integrated reporting, sustainability and risk strategy which if 
viewed holistically will ensure accountable corporate governance and negate the effect of devastating 
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not guarantee the recurrence of governance failures but seeks to render them less likely 
and less devastating as the failure of regulation will be mitigated by principled and 
controlled decision making of directors. I87 Thus corporate abuse in South Africa would 
be best curbed by a mandatory regime of disclosure mirroring UK governance 
developments as opposed to the hybrid model proposed for implementation in 2010. The 
key issues underpinning the enhanced disclosure relates to the 'corporate conscience' 
which is cognizant of social imperatives as opposed to short term economic gain. This 
speaks squarely to the stakeholder theory and sustainability initiatives which remain 
unlegislated and which is considered in the foregoing chapter as a key disclosure 
imperative in improving governance, accountability and ethical leadership. 
CHAPTER 3: A LEGISLATIVE SURVEY OF APPLICABLE DISCLOSURE 
PROVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF KING 11, KING III (FROM A 
SHAREHOLDER VERSUS STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE) AND 
AN ANALYSIS OF DISCLOSURE PRACTICE IN RELATION TO 
COPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Modern corporate governance has as its central theme the commitment to corporate social 
responsibility.188 The competing classical view is that the focus of a corporate entity is 
the interests of its shareholders. The merits of these divergent schools of thought will be 
considered in this chapter but the recognition that companies interact with stakeholders 
and not just shareholders has heightened the accountability problem. 189 
decisions based solely on short tenn gains. Note see also Section 64 A of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 which 
introduces standalone risk committees. 
187 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries (26 November 2009) 
Page 10. 
188 R 0 Kuras 'Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada-US Comparitive Analysis' (1997) 18 Manitoba 
Law Journal 313, 313. 
189 L Moir 'What Do We Mean by Corporate Social Responsibility?' (2001) 1 Corporate Governance 16 
22. ' 
43 
This chapter seeks to analyze these competing rights in respect of disclosure and the issue 
of accountability. In respect to shareholders, accountability is analyzed in respect of 
disclosure of financial information and incumbent positive results are a testament of good 
govemance.
190 
This is a very insular perception which chapter 3.2 will seek to amplify. 
The interests of stakeholders are analyzed with particular emphasis on legal compliance 
with stakeholder legislation, corporate citizenship, transformation and sustainability.191 
Disclosure in respect of each of these facets is of central importance primarily in terms of 
the annual report but preferably in terms of tangible delivery. Critical to the stakeholder 
theory of governance is 'whether such disclosure is best procured on a mandatory or a 
vo luntary basis. 
In summary the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the competing disclosure 
requirements of stakeholders and shareholders and whether the current disclosure regime 
contributes to strengthening corporate governance and accountability for their individual 
and joint betterment. 
3.2 Shareholder The01Y of Corporate Practice and Disclosure 
The history of the social responsibility of a company was articulated by Lionel Hodes192 
who proposed the following principle: that if a company is desirous to pursue a charitable 
purpose it could be purported to extend its mandate beyond its primary obligation of 
profit maximization and its purpose as outlined in its articles of association and 
memorandum. 193 Such conduct, notwithstanding its charitable intent, would be deemed as 
ultra vires in terms of section 36 of the Companies ACt. 194 
190 T Donaldson & L E Preston 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implications' (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 65, 91. 
191 E Garriga & D Mele 'Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory' (2004) 53 
Journal of Business Ethics 51, 52. 
192 L Hodes 'Corporate Social Responsibility of a Company' (1983) 121 SAL! 468,485. 
193 Section 59 of Act 61 of 1973. 
194 Act 61 of 1973. Section 15 (1) (b) of Act 71 of2008 is the equivalent section and has not deviated from 
the position outlined in Act 61 of 1973. 
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This is consistent with the common law as enunciated in the English case of Hutton v 
West Cork Railway that directors are under an obligation to act in the best interests of the 
company as a whole, with no ulterior motives. Consequently any corporate activity, 
whether charitable or otherwise, must be incidental to the execution of the company's 
business for benefit of the company. 195 This dictum was confirmed in the American case 
of Dodge v Ford Motor Co l96 which pertained to the retention of a shareholder dividend 
with the intent of directing the retained funds into the construction of a hospital for the 
benefit of Ford employees. This constituted an act, although commendable, that was 
firstly not incidental to the business of the company and secondly not in the best interests 
of the company which was to promote future profits. It could also have been argued that 
the retention of the dividend was ultra vires. 
Thus the traditional concepts of corporate governance had to be relied upon in 
ascertaining a company's social responsibility, namely: the company's memorandum, 
articles of association as outlined in Section 59 of the Companies Act l97 and the common 
law. These were the fundamental tenets of disclosure. The interests of various parties 
cumulatively referred as 'stakeholders' could only be taken into account by the directors 
to ensure that the company would prosper. The interests of stakeholders were therefore 
not recognized as a standalone objective. Decisions affecting them would simply be an 
incidental by-product of advancing the interests of shareholders. 198 
It is self-evident that shareholder interests, directed towards profit maximization 199 have 
historically been prioritized over and above other stakeholders including for example 
195 Hutton v West Cork Railway (1883) 23 Ch D 654 See also HR Hahlo Company Law through the Cases 6 
ed (1999) 279. 
196 Dodge v Ford Motor Co (1919) 204 Mich 459170 NW 668. 
197 Act 61 of 1973. Section 15 of Act 71 of2008 addresses the Memorandum of Incorporation (which is the 
new cumulative reference to Memorandum and Articles of Association). 
198 H Butler 'The Contractual Theory of the Corporation' (1989) 11 George Mason Law Review 455,567. 
This is consistent with the contractarian theory of law expounded by R Coase in his seminal article 'The 
Nature of the Firm' (1937) Economica 390. 
199 Coronation Syndicate v Lillenfeld and the New Fortuna Co. Ltd (1903) TS 489. 
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employees. This position was succinctly confrrmed in Hall Parke v Daily News Lld 200 
wherein the court held that: 
'ex gratia payments of corporate funds by sympathetic directors to redundant 
employees without taking into account the interest of shareholders was an 
exercise in philanthropy which was unlawful, being ultra vires and a breach of a 
directors fiduciary duty. ,201 
There are additional theoretical assertions that support this theory. The most sagacious 
and practically sound conceptualization is the importance of the economic success of a 
company, which by its presence alone will confer social benefits to various stakeholders 
which would not be delivered if the company was a financial failure. Milton Friedman's 
sentimene02 was confinned by academics like Professor Adolf Berle who stated 
emphatically that 'all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a 
corporation are necessarily and at all times exercisable for the rateable benefit of all 
shareholders. ,203 
A commensurate rationale was perpetuated by the Hampel Committee when it concluded 
that: 
'the single overriding objective shared by all listed companies, whatever their 
size or type of business, is the preservation of and greatest practicable 
enhancement over time of their shareholder's investment. ,204 
200 Hall Parke v Daily News Ltd (1962) Ch 927. 
201 !bid 927. Also mentioned in L Wedderbum 'Employees, Partnership and Company Law' 2002 
Industrial Law lournal39. 
202 M Friedman Capitalism and Freedom 4ed (1962) 98. 
203 A A Berle & GC Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 3ed (1932) 56. 
204 Hampel Committee (1998) on Corporate Governance (Final Report). 
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The monitoring and disclosure of a shareholder-centric commitment translates practically 
to the filing of glowing fmancials. The previous chapter outlined that this is not always 
simple or accurate and in fact could be the source ofmanipulation.
205 
Shareholders do have to rely on financials, the duties of directors and the provisions of 
the Companies Act206 quite extensively. In terms of the Companies Act it is a legal 
requirement for every company in South Africa to appoint an auditor.207 The primary role 
of an external auditor is to report to shareho lders on whether the company's financial 
statements fairly represent the company's fmancial position and the results of its 
operations in all material respects. 208 In addition, the Public Finance Management Act 
prescribes more stringent provisions for reporting and accountability by adopting an 
approach to financial management in government that focuses on outputs and 
responsibilities rather than the rule driven approach under previous legislation. The ambit 
and operation of the Act seeks to secure transparent, accountable and sound management 
f bl· 209 o pu IC revenue. 
Disclosure of financials notwithstanding statutory provisions can be manipulated often 
emanating from management's self serving behaviour?10 Disclosures of this nature 
weaken corporate governance and clouds accountability issues as such regulations should 
be enacted to counter such unethical conduct. King Il has advocated the internal audit 
function211 and audit committees.212 The latter seeks to ensure and safeguard shareholders 
and company interests by advocating communication between the board and the external 
auditor. King III has enhanced the function of the audit committee function by proposing 
an effective and independent audit committee.213 King III augments the function of the 
205 h See C apter 2.2. 
206 Act 61 of 1973 and See Chapter 4.2 and Chapter 4.3. 
207 Section 279 of Act 61 of 1973. Section 90 of Act 71 of2008 is the equivalent section. 
~~: Section 301 of Act 61 of 1973. Section 93 of Act 71 of2008 is the equivalent section. 
Section 1 of Act 1 of 1999. 
210 PM Healy 'The effect of bonus schemes on Accounting Decisions' (2006) 7 Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 85, 87. See also Chapter 4.2. 
211 King Report (2002) Section 3 Chapter 2 Paragraph 1. 
212 King Report (2002) Section 5 Chapter 1 Paragraph 5.8. 
213 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 3.1. 
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internal audit committee in terms of a practice note that ensures internal audit assurance 
is provided (applying the Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing and 
the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Internal Auditors).214 The combined assurance 
model outlined in King IlI2l5 requires assurance coverage to be obtained from 
management and internal assurance providers on risk areas facing the company. This 
process is fortified by section 94 of the new ACt. 216 
Studies by McMullen217 have found that companies with an audit committee are less 
likely to experience errors, irregularities and other indicators of unreliable financial 
reporting. Financial reporting is also enhanced by audit committee independence218 
which is consistent with the recommendations 0 f King Il and King Ill. 219 Cumulatively 
these are efforts to safeguard a shareholder-centric means of disclosure as a mechanism 
to strengthen corporate governance for their benefit. 
This has been enhanced by the Corporate Laws Amendment220 which has amended the 
Companies Act221 by promulgating the rotation of the designated auditors (individual 
partner as opposed to the actual firm) every five years as well the right of the auditor to 
access all company and accounting records. 222 The rotation of auditors remains a key 
feature in King IlI223 and the new Act. 224 
In addition, the audit committee must be satisfied with the auditor's independence. 225 The 
auditor's rights also extend to the right to: receive notification of and attend shareholders' 
214 Ibid Internal Audit Charter Practice Note. 
215 Ibid Principle 3.5. 
216 Act 71 of2008. 
217 DA McMullen 'Audit Committee Performance: An investigation of the consequences associated with 
Audit committees' (2001) 3 A Journal o/Practice and Theory 17, 17. 
218 WG Lewellen et al (1996) ' Self Serving Behaviour in Manager's Discretionary Information Disclosure 
Decisions' 21 (1996) Journal qf Accounting and Finance 227. 
219 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 3.2. 
220 Act 24 of 2006. 
22 1 Act 61 of 1973. 
222 Insertion of Section 270 (A) into Act 61 of1973. 
223 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 3.9 Recommendation 77. 
224 Section 92 of Act 71 of 2008. 
225 Insertion of Section 270 (A) into Act 61 of 1973 which advocates an independence test. Section 94 (b) 
of Act 71 of2008 is the equivalent section. 
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meetings. To ensure proper preparation the auditor has the right to interview and meet 
with parties like the company secretary, chairman and investor relations prior to the 
meeting to ensure that any potential risk to shareholders is properly managed. The 
auditor's function is further supplemented by their right to approach a court for an order 
that is just and reasonable in the event that the auditor's duties are wilfully and 
intentionally frustrated by a director.226 
Thus the Corporate Laws Amendment Ace27 has given effect to, inter alia, the corporate 
governance principles formulated in King II by the implementation of a uniform set of 
accounting standards and the imposition of various obligations on companies aimed at 
ensuring auditor independence and greater regulation of the auditing profession. This is 
analogous to the legislative imports made by the Auditing Professions Act. 228 The 
position advocated by King III229 and the new Act230 does not deviate from this 
standpoint and in fact mirrors this position. 
The historic nature of financials perpetuates inherent inaccuracies in implementing share 
value as the sole means of valuing a company or to ascertain whether best practice is 
being employed by a corporation. The recent spate of market flexes and share price 
depreciation is a clear indication of this anomaly and the fact that the shareholder theory 
has not prevented directors from acting in their self interest. Furthermore, the disclosure 
practice endorsed by shareholder theory protagonists in fact erode their profits from a 
compliance costs perspective and thus runs counter to the argument of profit 
maximisation. 
226 Insertion of Section 270 (A) into Act 61 of 1973. Section 93 (2) of Act 71 of 2008 is the equivalent 
section. 
227 Insertion of Sections 270 A and Section 275 A into Act 61 of 1973. 
228 Act 26 of 2005. 
229 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 3.9 Recommendation 81 which advocates that 
the board should develop a process to ensure that the audit committee receives notice of reportable 
irregularities (as defined in the Auditing Professions Act 26 of 2005) that have been reported by the 
external auditor to the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors. When the auditor's report has been 
modified as a result of a reportable irregularity, the audit committee should review the completeness and 
accuracy of the disclosure of such matters in the financial statements. 
230 Section 94 of Act 71 of 2008. 
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S440AA (1) ofSarbanes-Oxley231 states that: 
'Any person who has reason to believe that a financial report of a widely held 
company failed to comply with a fmancial reporting standard may refer the matter 
to the executive o:fficer of the Panel for investigation.' 
The effect of this enactment has had far reaching cost implications and a source of 
discourse for mandatory reporting protagonists.232 The new Act233 however, has assumed 
a more progressive codified approach to corporate governance in terms of its purpose 
clause234 and the key governance provision that 'the business and affairs of a company 
must be managed by and under the direction of its board.235 This is consistent with the 
inclusive approach envisioned by King H. This is a balanced approach to governance 
which would curb the imposition of onerous costs associated with rigorous reporting. 
King IH requires additional reporting in the form of integrated reporting236 and a 
combined assurance model237 which the new Act238 remains silent on. The new Act239 has 
failed to incorporate a 'principles based' mandatory reporting system and is therefore 
short sighted in its approach. 
The audit committee240 requirement of a designated number of independent directors241 
with prescribed financial qualifications coupled with an auditor firm (designated partner) 
rotation every five years242 will prove more problematic in the South African context 
given the shortage of auditing skills. Thus the importation of these Anglo-American 
231 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
232L Sneller & H Langendijk 'Sarbanes-Oxley Oxley Section 404 Costs of Compliance: a case study' 
(2007) 15 Corporate Governance 101, 111. 
233 Act 71 of 2008 which based its drafting on King II recommendations and global company law reform to 
collate company law practice with internationally accepted standards of corporate governance. 
234Section 7 (b) (iii) of Act 71 of2008. 
235 Act 66 of Section 71 of 2008. 
236 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 9.1. 
237 Ibid Principle 3.5. 
238 Act 71 of2008. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid Section 94. 
241 Ibid Section 66. 
242 Ibid Section 92. 
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rationales will align South Africa to international nonns but will prove a costly and a 
practically rigorous exercise. 
Contrary to previous practice endorsed by King 11 and the JSE Listing Requirements the 
audit committee will no longer be reported on in the corporate governance insert of the 
annual report but will constitute a separate report for inclusion in the financial statements 
describing the audit committee function and the manner and means in which it carried out 
its delegated duties. 243 
This would include a report on accounting policies, financial controls and any other 
related matter to the governance of the company, and would include the endorsement of 
the appointment of an independent auditor and could potentially include stakeholder 
related infonnation. A further extension of the audit committee's powers, which was once 
reserved for that of the board, is the procurement of external independent advice which 
would be paid for by the company to the extent that it is reasonable. 244 
Conferring such powers and duties on the audit committee245 raises the perception that 
the audit committee seems more powerful than the board. The amendments are indicative 
of the importance of accurate verifiable disclosures to the viability of companies. As 
aforementioned the Integrated Report246 the integrity of which must be signed off by the 
board and the audit committee further escalates the function of the audit committee. 
The Corporate Laws Amendment247 mirrored by amendments in the new Act248 pays 
homage to corporate governance initiatives by expanding on the accountability and the 
reporting requirements of companies. Collectively these legislative instruments represent 
disclosure requirements that are shareholder centric. The mandatory disclosure provisions 
243 Ibid Section 100. 
244 Kin R g eport on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 4. 
245 Ibid Section 94 (4). 
246 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 9.1. 
247 Act 24 of2006. 
248 Act 71 of 2008. 
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will constitute credible governance efforts and the penalties that flow from non 
compliance enhance accountability. This is coupled with auditors who now have a greater 
ambit of powers which hopefully they will adumbrate to fulfil their functions. 
It is accordingly self evident that the traditional purist shareholder theory is supported by 
the common law and nlandated disclosure practice. This is theoretically sound but 
unbalanced as a contractarian model of disclosure is inherently oblivious of stakeholder 
concerns and thus not commensurate with modern corporate governance. The new Act 
has enhanced and confrrnl1ed this position but249 has failed to legislate extensively on the 
stakeholder imperative as endorsed by King III?50 
3.3 Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Practice and Disclosure 
Shareholder-centric practice was criticised by a stakeholder-centric publication which 
outlined an academic analysis of the logic of obliging directors to act exclusively for the 
benefit of the shareholders. 251 It also sought to answer the vexed question of whether 
directors were in fact obliged to act in the interests of other stakeholders that were 
affected by the activities of the company.252 
This was the nub of corporate governance reforms and debates which in turn promulgated 
the stakeholder-centric view of business that highlights modern corporate governance. 
Corporate governance recommendations have since supported a wider scope of corporate 
responsibility than was previously the custom or allowed by law.253 This is consistent 
249 See also Chapter 2.3 and Chapter 2.4. 
250 Sections 20(4) of Act 71 of2008 which restrains the company from doing anything inconsistent with the 
Act, Section 31 (3) of Act 71 of2008 states that though the commission, trade unions must be given access 
to financial statements for purposes of initiating business rescue proceedings, Section 130 (1) of Act 71 of 
2008 entitles an affected person to apply to court to challenge the board's commencement of business 
rescue proceedings. Act 71 of 2008 is cognizant of stakeholder interests but not to the extent required to 
enhance disclosure and governance to the benefit of all stakeholders. 
251 EM Dodd 'For Whom are the Corporate Managers Trustees' 1932 Harvard Law Review 1148. 
252 !bid 1148. 
253 A Cheh 'A Communitarian Note on Stakeholder Theory' (1998) 8 Business Ethics Quarterly 4. 
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with the approach endorsed by King 11 and King III which champions the practice of 
coupling social and economic goals in running a company. 254 
The stakeholder theory has been described as a matter of 'taming the harsher aspects of 
capitalism,.255 It is far too simplistic in the modern corporate world to reduce the success 
of a company to the short term nature of profit maximisation.256 This is in fact the 
antithesis of the principles enunciated by King 11 and King 111.
257 
It is apparent that the 
operation of the modern company has a direct impact beyond shareholder wealth and 
must exercise this far reaching effect in a responsible and effective manner to benefit the 
common concern of both stakeholders and shareholders. This will inevitably result in the 
holistic prosperity of the company which would include a burgeoning bottom line?58 
The issue then arises: Does a company via its directors have a mandatory obligation to 
consider the interests of stakeholders in conducting the affairs of the company? 
Cognisance should be taken of stakeholders on a holistic basis however; the radical 
model mandates a primary concern for stakeholders. This would translate to negative 
implications for the accountability of directors as it would infer that directors would be 
accountable to all stakeholders. This must be rejected for the simple reason that to ask the 
254 The King Report (2002) Introduction and Background Paragraph 17 Section 5 Chapter 1 Paragraph 8. It 
illustrates the triple bottom line reporting in the following manner: The economic aspects involve the well 
known fmancial aspects as well as the non-financial ones relevant to a company's business. The 
environmental aspects include the effect on the environment of the product or services produced by the 
company. The social aspects embrace values, ethics and the reciprocal relationships with stakeholders other 
than just shareholders. King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) reiterates this assertion in tenns of 
Principle 8.1, 8.2 and 8.4 to ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders and to proactively manage 
stakeholder relationships. This is further amplified by the proposed integrated report which should assert 
the company's sustainability initiatives and the fact that the company is to employ alternate dispute 
resolution as a means to enhance its relationships with stakeholders. 
255 J Dean 'Stakeholding and Company Law' 2001 The Company Lawyer 66,69. 
256 See Footnote 254. 
257 Ibid. 
258 http://www.adlittle.co.uk/insights (Last visited 19 November 2009) which outlines the detailed research 
conducted to support the business case for corporate citizenship. It cites a host of factors that are enhanced 
like reputational management which is critical to corporate success, the fact that investor relations are 
driven by a company's social investment programme and that a company's competitiveness and market 
positioning is enhanced by sustainable procurement as is its operational efficiency and profitability. 
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board to be accountable to everyone would result in it being accountable to no one.259 
This ultimately envisages a situation where the interests of the shareholders would be 
sacrificed in favour of the interests of other stakeholders. This is considered an 
unbalanced approach and one that would be untenable to shareholders. 
The stakeholder theory would certainly broaden the ambit of accountability and 
disclosure of a company to a wider constituency. This is certainly the current trend as 
embodied in the pervasive sustainability provisions of King III coupled with the 
proposals that govern stakeholder relationships.26o This would entitle stakeholders to a 
right of action if they can establish prejudice due to poor decisions by the board of 
directors.
261 
In Anglo-American jurisdictions stakeholders are more accustomed to 
asserting their rights than stakeholders in other jurisdictions.262 Currently stakeholders 
would have to rely on the common law principles of delict to assert their rights or any 
contractual obligations they may have with the company. From a statutory perspective 
the Consumer Protection Act263 which is an effort to protect consumers against unfair 
business practice, will enable stakeholders to test their rights with further authority as 
opposed to relying on the common law which is clearly in favour of stakeho lders. 264 
The stakeholder-centric dictum of King Il and King III is not instructive but merely 
advisory and is supported by limited mandatory disclosure requirements. Companies 
committed to the stakeholder model of governance would have to ensure that the 
decisions of their directors are suitably ring-fenced and do not inadvertently cause harm 
to their related stakeholders. This will change albeit not significantly pursuant to the 
259 T Mongalo Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings in 
South Africa 1 ed (2003) 289. 
260 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 8. 
261 P Buri & T Borak 'Employees as Corporate Stakeholders' (2002) 8 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 
45,57. See also section 218 of Act 71 of2008. 
262 D Milton 'Communitarians., Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law' (1993) 50 Washington and 
Lee Law Review. 
263 Act 68 of 2008. 
264 Section 218 of Act 71 of 2008. This section allows any party (therefore stakeholder) to initiate a civil 
action should the new Act be contravened. There is no immediate remedial action for stakeholders nor are 
there general disclosure provisions in favour of stakeholders as such nonnal court process will have to be 
followed nevertheless this section is progressive and will provide interesting test cases. 
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enactment of the new Act.265 The new Act266 simply requires directors to 'attempt within 
the law to maximise the interests of shareholders' which is analogous to the Revlon 
Standard which expressly forbids management from protecting stakeholder interests at 
the expense of shareholder interests. Rather any management action benefiting 
stakeholders must have ancillary shareholder benefits.267 Thus notwithstanding 
significant corporate governance reform in the US, very little progress has in made in 
favour of stakeholders since Dodge v Ford Motor CO. 268 Sarbanes-Oxley269 has not 
changed the common law and this confirms the assertion that the mandatory model of 
corporate governance typified by American jurisprudence is not suitable for the South 
African corporate landscape as it is devoid of stakeholder centric norms. Moreover the 
new Act270 has failed to adequately legislate on stakeholder interests and mirror the 
progressive recommendations of King III.271 
Corporate governance is about the fme balance between stakeholder and shareholder 
theories which is intrinsic to implementing a holistic form of governance. Being 
cognisant of sociological and ethical notions will complement existing governance 
structure but not in a manner in which share value is not seen as the most important 
interest. It supports the legal argument and business model that meaningful disclosure 
and commitment to stakeholder interests can lead to profitability. 272 
265 Ibid. 
266 Section 7 of Act 71 of 2008 which focuses the purpose of the new Act on promoting compliance with 
the Bill of Rights. 
267 Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews and Forbes Holding Inc, (2007) 506 A.2d 182. 
268 Dodge v Ford Motor Co (1919) 204 Mich 459170 NW 668. 
269 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
270 Act 71 of 2008. 
271 King Report of Corporate Governance 2009 Chapter 9 which is a holistic approach to governance as 
opposed to Sarbanes-Oxley which is purely focused on financial information. It is interesting and 
noteworthy that the Draft Companies Act Regulations issued for comment and review on 22 December 
2009 specifically proposes in terms of Regulation 50 (12) (ii) that the social and ethic committee has the 
function of promoting good corporate citizenship including but not limited to charitable giving and related 
stakeholder centric issues. This is a pronounced advancement from the current position. 
272 http://www.adlittle.co.ukIinsights (Last visited 19 November 2009) which outlines the detailed research 
conducted to support the business case for corporate citizenship. It cites a host of factors that are enhanced 
like reputational management which is critical to corporate success, the fact that investor relations are 
driven by a company's social investment programme and that a company's competitiveness and market 
positioning is enhanced by sustainable procurement as is its operational efficiency. 
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3.4 Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship 
Central to the stakeholder theory of corporate governance is the much popularised issue 
of corporate social responsibility, as it attempts to broaden the traditional shareholder 
primacy approach. Practically it translates to the expenditure of corporate funds and thus 
the sacrifice of profits either by spending money or incurring costs in the manifest belief 
that the cumulative spending will produce results that are superior to pure profit 
maximisation. 273 
Thus corporate governance recommendations have since exposed the country's chief 
executives to a wider range of corporate responsibility than was previously their 
custom.274 
King II defines corporate social responsibility (CSR) as follows: 
'A well managed company will be aware of, and respond to, social issues, placing 
a high priority on ethical standards. A good corporate citizen is increasingly seen 
as one that is non··discriminatory, non exploitative, and responsible with regard to 
environmental and human rights issues. A company is likely to experience 
indirect economic benefits such as improved productivity and corporate 
reputation by taking those factors into consideration. ,275 
This can be referred to as the inclusive approach to corporate governance which IS 
advocated as the cornerstone of socially responsible business practice. 276 
273 BJ McCabe 'Are Corporations socially responsible? Is Corporate Social Responsibility Desirable' 
(1992) 4 Bond Law Review 2. 
274 A Freemantle & N Rockey 'The Good Corporate Citizen: pursuing sustainable business in South Africa' 
(2004) 2 Trialogue 17. 
275 King Report 11 (2002) Section 5 Chapter 2. 
276 Ibid. 
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King III has expanded on this concept by advocating the concept of sustainable business 
and the inclusion of corporate initiatives in this regard in terms of the Integrated 
Report.277 This is enhanced by the burgeoning spectrum of initiatives geared towards 
governments and corporations to embrace sustainability to ensure future profitability 
which is the central tenet of integrated reporting. 278 
This global shift in attitude is indicative of modern corporate governance which has 
expanded on the pronouncement of the US judgement AP Smith Manufacturing v 
Barlow279 which held that modem conditions require companies to acknowledge and 
practise socially responsible behaviour. In the absence of statutory direction and the 
dictum of the Revlon Standard280 there remains no legally entrenched penalties for 
companies who fail to implement CSR initiatives.28t 
The JSE has however endorsed CSR with the promulgation of the JSE Socially 
Responsibility Index (SRI), which hopes to encourage further participation by listed 
companies in disclosure of their efforts which meets the base line recommendation of 
King H.282 There should be reporting in some form or another on their sustainability 
policies and practices as per King HI.283 King H states that every company should report 
annually on the nature and extent of its social,284 transformation, ethical, safety, health 
and environmental management policies and practices.285 A reiteration of the 
aforementioned argument is that companies suffer no punitive measures if they do not 
277 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 9.1. 
278 G Terry Green 1 ed (2008) 115, 139. See also the Carbon Credits Programme and the Summit en 
Climate Change to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
279 AP Smith Manufacturing v Barlow (1953) 39 ALR 2d. 
280 Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews and Forbes Holding Inc (2007) 506 A.2d 182. 
281 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 only provides punitive measures for non-disclosure and misstatement of 
accounting information. 
282 King Report II (2002) Section 5 Chapter 2. 
283 Kin R g eport on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 9. 
284 htpp://www.beeonline.co.za (Last visited March 2009) The reference to 'social' would also include 
empowerment initiatives which is governed strictly by its own industry specific charters, DTI codes and 
legislation being Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 and Employment Equity Act 
200 of 1993. 
285 The King Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) Paragraph 5.1.1. 
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participate in this index as such non compelled and non accountable disclosure does not 
strengthen corporate governance. 
Moreover organisations equate good CSR with in-depth sustainability reports, believing 
disclosure on this basis is one and the same thing. Delving into what an organisation 
does once a year and conling up with a comprehensive report is not of itself, evidence of 
CSR practice. This is the incorrect approach. In addition there is no verification of 
disclosure in the annual reports of CSR commitments. It is tantamount to declaring that 
an organisation is financially sound simply on the basis that it produces a financial 
report. 286 
This has nevertheless been a prevalent trend by listed companies. The London Stock 
Exchange has made efforts to make corporate responsibility more transparent and 
accessible. This led to the launch of an online CSR reporting portal. It consists of a single 
survey designed to allow companies to maintain and disclose the most influential codes 
and rating systems. 287 These moves have been motivated by the growing body of 
empirical research that demonstrates the bottom line benefits of socially responsible 
behaviour. Klaasen and McLaughlin288 indicate that good environmental conduct 
significantly enhances a company's performance. So efforts by a company to improve its 
commitment to stakeholders is ultimately a testament to the shareholder-centric theory, or 
better stated 'the enlightened shareholder value approach' which implies that stakeholder 
interests may only be achieved if shareholder concerns remain the primary objective.289 
It is also motivated by addressing the legal, ethical, commercial and other expectations 
society has for business and in making decisions that fairly balances the claims of all key 
stakeholders. Acting in a company's best interests would also warrant safeguarding its 
286 CM Slaughter 'Corporate Social Responsibility a New Perspective' (1997) 18 The Company Lawyer 
321, 321. 
287 International Guidelines consist of FTSE4GOOD Index, Dow Jones Sustainability Index, Global 
Reporting Initiative, Sigma Guidelines, AA 1000 Series, SA 100 Series and Global Impact. 
288 R Klaasen & C McLaughlin 'The Impact of Environmental Management on Firm Performance' (1996) 
42 (8) Management Science 1199, 1201. 
289 R Shulze 'Can this Marriage be Saved: Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance 
Laws' (1997) 28 Stanford Law Review 106, 109. 
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reputation. Reputational risk and the incumbent costs could be devastating to a 
company's bottom line. In the global environment there are many jurisdictions that 
companies can employ to best advantage in terms of relaxed environmental and labour 
laws. Those companies that ignore the bugle call for sound corporate governance and the 
need for sustainable development do so at their own peril. Claims in delict against listed 
companies like Exxon, Mo bile and Shell regarding the forced labour on pipelines in 
Myanmar is a good example of this. 29o The diminished effect it can have on its brand 
value291 is a key component in the success of a company. The cumulative effect of 
corporate social responsibility is to fortify the ethical conduct of directors in running a 
business which is integral to a principles based model of governance. However, corporate 
governance codes and legislation have failed to address CSR and related stakeho lder 
issues substantively so what other recourse do stakeholders have? This question is 
addressed in Chapter 3.5 below. 
3.5 Applicable Legislation 
In July 2000, the Pension Funds Act 1995 in the UK was amended, significantly affecting 
the world of investment. Pension fund trustees must now state the extent to which they 
take social, environmental and ethical considerations into account when they invest 
money. 292 
There is a clear reconciliation of the shareholder centric view with that of the shareholder 
view to the extent that amendments to foreign jurisdiction company law statutes have 
been made to facilitate directors to formally take cognisance of stakeholders. This was 
290 http://www.corporatewatch.org (Last visited on 24 November 2009). ' 
291 G Terry Green led (2008) 147 which confirms that a brand is that intangible, but valuable mixture of 
associations and expectations that all successful products carry. Nike brand image was diminished due to 
its negative labour practices. This can be juxtaposed against Coca Cola whose brand was further fortified 
due it efforts to replenish water supplies which enhanced its commitment to the environment. 
292 A public company on the London Stock Exchange, Prudential Assurance Company, announced that it 
was introducing a review of all companies invested in to ensure that they met minimum environmental and 
social policies. 
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also confIrmed in State Tax Commission v Aldrich293 which held that the 'classical theory 
of the director's duty must yield to modern life in considering the interests of employees 
it cannot be said that they have not considered the bona fIde interests of the shareholders.' 
Cognitive awareness is not enough; there must be a direct compulsion by way of 
legislative enactment for companies to act in the interests of all stakeholders which would 
include shareholders, failing which the threshold for compliance and disclosure is too low 
as such stakeholders have to rely on alternate legislation to procure compliance. 294 The 
following discussion of 'stakeholder' legislation underscores this assertion. 
Reference can be made to the Securities Services Act295 which is aimed at shareholder 
protection. It protects the shareholder (and indirectly stakeholders) from insider trading 
by prohibiting inappropriate disclosure and tipping off 296 
The Labour Relations Act297 prevents companIes from flagrantly disregarding 
employees' rights and needs in conducting the business of the company. The latter 
ensures accountability of the company and is supplemented by the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Ace98 the cumulative effect of which addresses empowerment, fair labour 
practices, development of human capital and the impact of Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus / Acquired ImmunodefIciency Syndrome (HIV/Aids) on any company. Accurate 
verifiable disclosure must be provided in terms of the aforementioned Acts. 
Thus the far reaching recommendations of King I and King II have in large been 
superseded and expanded by the promulgation of legislation that requires mandatory 
compliance and disclosure. 299 This is evidenced by the National Environmental 
293 State Tax Commission v Aldrich et al (1942) 316 U.S 174 at 192 (U.S. Sup Ct). 
294 M Havenga 'Fiduciary duties under our new corporate law regime' 1997 SA Merc U 310. 
295 Act 36 of2004. 
296 Ibid Sections 2, 20 and 71. 
297 Act 66 of 1995. 
298 Act 66 of 1965. 
299 M Painter-Morland 'Triple Bottom-line Reporting as Social Grammar: Integrating Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Codes of Conduct' (2006) 15 Business Ethics: A European Review 352,364. 
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Management Act300 imposes strict liability on directors of companies who perpetrate 
offences by non compliance with its provisions.30l King III reinforces this notion in terms 
of Chapter 6 which requires the board to ensure that companies are compliant with all 
I d d ·· I 302 aws, co es an pnnClp es. 
Environmental sustainability recognizes that South Africa has a rich and critical resource 
base which should be wisely used if it is to provide sustainable support to the 
development of South Africa, its people and its resources. As such companies need to 
measure and monitor their environmental impact and implement mechanisms ensuring 
sustainable uses of resources. The cumulative efforts of the National Water Act303 and 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act304 underscore good environmental practice and 
stewardship pertaining to advancement of environmental sustainability. 
It is interesting to the note that the majority of legislation related to this contention was 
enacted post the first King Report. This legislation seeks to supplement the 
recommendations of King 11 and King 111.305 The stakeholder specific legislation is an 
endorsement of the mandatory system of disclosure and compliance and should have 
provided the motivation for stricter covenants in the new Act. 306 The new Act307 has 
failed in entrenching disclosure provisions relating to sustainability and therefore cannot 
be viewed as an inclusive legislative vehicle for corporate governance. It has however 
included a requirement that boards constitute ethics and social committees.308 The Draft 
Regulations on the Companies Act309 has introduced Regulation 50 which addresses the 
function and constitution of these ethics and social committees. It prescribes the reference 
300 Act 107 of 1998. 
301 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, Section 37. 
302 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 6.1. 
303 Act 36 of 1998. 
304 Act 85 of 1993. 
305 King Code on Corporate Governance (2002) and King Report on Corporate Governance (2009). 
306 Act 71 of 2008. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Section 72 (4) of Act 71 of2008. 
309 P " f ertammg to Act 71 0 2008 released for comment and review on 22 December 2009. 
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to international codes of best practice like the OEeD/ lo the monitoring of company 
activity with regard to good corporate citizenship311 and designated stakeholders.312 
Although in draft it is a commendable step in the right direction of safeguarding 
stakeholders and epitornising the values inculcated by King III albeit in a monitoring as 
opposed to a mandatory function. The vacuous aspect of Regulation 50 is that it fails to 
entrench and or advance the reform required for ethical disclosure by directors. 
There are still practical difficulties associated with the stakeholder theory and its 
implementation. Of fundamental relevance is the issue of accountability which is a 
pivotal tenet of any corporate governance system. The key problem is the broadened 
scope of a director's duties to a company and the concomitant justification to follow a 
particular course of action, namely, stakeholder interests. This is commonly referred to as 
the 'multiple master debate' which has resulted in the stakeholder theory being viewed 
with a degree of scepticism. 313 
King Il has drawn the distinction between accountable and responsible: 314 
'One is liable to render an account when one is accountable and one is liable to be 
called to account 'when one is responsible. In governance terms one is accountable 
at common law and by statute to the company if a director, and one is responsible 
to the stakeholders identified as relevant to the business of the company' 
In ascertaining the most productive modus operandi one can argue that accountability and 
responsibility are ultimately in the best interests of the company. This will always fall at 
the feet of the board of directors.315 
310 Regulation 50 (12) (bb) of Draft Regulations of Companies Act 22 December 2009. The OECD has had 
a history of progressive inclusive regulations that remain focused and geared towards sustainable economic 
growth and responsible corporate behaviour see: htpp:/ /www.oecd.org (Last visited on 18 January 2010). 
311 Ibid Regulation 50 (12) (ii). 
312 Ibid Regulation 50 (12) (iii) and (iv) and (v). 
313 M Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility 2 ed (1993) 67. 
314 King 11 (2002) Introduction Paragraph 5. 
315 See Chapter 4.3. 
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In running a company directors have been privy to the traditional shareholder model, the 
stakeholder model and finally the pluralist views which postulate that stakeholder 
interests should be balanced against the interests of shareholders. 316 The corollary of this 
theory could present the practical situation when shareholder interests and thus 
profitability could be a secondary pursuit as companies focus their efforts on 
stakeholders' welfare. This altruistic view is not commensurate with best business 
practice and presents an unfounded argument against formally legislating on 
sustainability and CSR. 317 
In furtherance of this assertion it is evident that CSR and environmental reporting by a 
clique of companies is being seen less and less as voluntary initiatives or as an endeavour 
to comply with the ethos and spirit of the King II and King III as it is an effort on the part 
of the company to be compliant with stakeholder related regulation. 
The punitive measures incumbent on directors and companIes for non-compliance 
specifically in relation to environmental issues is particularly onerous. So disclosure of 
their compliance is most critica1. 318 For example, mining houses run the risk of having 
their mining licences revoked in addition to strict liability of directors as such 
environmental reports are filed and are synonymous with all and every listing 
document.319 This position will be solidified if more punitive measures were 
implemented against companies who misrepresented their CSR initiatives in annual 
reports and failed to exhibit tangible evidence ofCSR initiatives alluded to. 
316 J Dean 'Stakeholding and Company Law' (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 66,67. 
317 J Dawkins & S Lowis 'CSR in Stakeholder Expectations: and Their hnplications for Company Strategy' 
(2003) 44 Journal of Business Ethics, 185, 185. 
318 J. Maltby 'Setting Its Own Standards and Meeting Those Standards: Voluntarism Versus Regulation in 
Environmental Reporting' (1997) 6 Business Strate(1 ) and the Environment 83 88. 
319 07,
Section 103 of Act 71 of 2008. 
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In furtherance of the debate of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure it is clear from the 
polemics that the South African corporate governance regime is best suited to one of 
mandatory disclosure. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In the wake of King In there is an optimistic sense that new measures pertaining to 
disclosure will be made specifically in relation to corporate citizenship which will seek to 
further entrench the stakeholder inclusive approach. The integrated report exemplifies 
this sentiment.32o This is supported by the board's obligation to report to its shareholders 
and other stakeholders on the company's economic, social and environmental 
performance in a transparent fashion. 321 The disclosure provisions of King In take 
cognizance of stakeholders and prescribe disclosure in every instance. It has a 
commensurate approach to shareholders322 but their position is fortified by the new 
Act.323 This mandatory approach towards disclosure has strengthened corporate 
governance. It has however failed to entrench mandatory disclosure and adherence to 
corporate social responsibility by companies which is integral to strengthening corporate 
governance. 324 As such it has failed to fortify the definition of corporate citizenship as 
advocated by Mervyn King: 325 
320 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 9 Paragraph 5. An integrated report conveys 
adequate infonnation about the operations of the company and its integrated sustainability and financial 
reporting. 
32 !bid Chapter I and Chapter 8 which deals with stakeholder relationships. 
322 !bid Chapter 2 and 4. 
323 Act 71 of 2008 which is further advanced by Regulation 50 of the Draft Regulations of the Companies 
Act issued for review and comment on 22 December 2009. 
324 This is amplified by Regulation 50 of the Draft Regulations of Companies Act issued for review and 
comment on 22 December 2009 but not to the extent required to ensure mandatory compliance as it 
encompasses a monitoring function. 
325 M King Corporate Citizen 1 ed (2006) 8. Note Regulation 50 (12) of the Draft Regulations of 
Companies Act issued for review and comment on 22 December 2009 requires monitoring and cognizance 
of good corporate citizenship issues and as such remains non mandatory. 
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'companies today affect all aspects of our lives, they in fact link us to the 
communities in which we live and create mutual rights and obligations in society 
to the extent that a company is as much a citizen as an individual. ' 
This stresses the holistic and integrated approach a company must adopt in respect of its 
conduct to ensure sustainable development. This is the crux of CSR, the tangible actions 
of a company as opposed to pontificating in a report, which creates the perception of 
what a company will be doing or should be doing.326 Good corporate citizenship is the 
raison d' etre of authentic disclosure as it reflects the pillars of accountability and 
transparency as the company delivers on its promises. The aforementioned statement is 
made in context of the fact that sustainability reporting is prone to corporate 'green 
washing' and public relations 'spin' as companies have a tendency to over inflate 
corporate achievements and are often not part of the company reports that are verifiable 
by the company's auditors.327 
The current disclosure regime in the South African context albeit effective clearly favour 
shareholders as opposed to stake holders. 328 
The holistic approach should be adopted by directors wherein they understand the 
rationale that ethical compliance with applicable rules pertaining to both stakeholders and 
shareholders can positively contribute to their bottom line. 329 This draws the attention to 
the key role player in governance: directors, their roles, responsibilities and interactions 
with shareholders which are considered in the following chapter. 
326 R V Aguilera et al 'Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparitive Analysis of the US 
and UK' (2006) 14 Corporate Governance 147, 148. 
327 A Freemantle & N Rockey 'The Good Corporate Citizen: pursuing sustainable business in South Africa' 
(2004) 2 Trialogue 24. 
328 A Freemantle & N Rockey 'The Good Corporate Citizen: pursuing sustainable business in South Africa' 
(2004) 2 Trialogue 20. 
329 J. Maltby 'Setting Its Own Standards and Meeting Those Standards: Voluntarism Versus Regulation in 
Environmental Reporting' (1997) 6 Business Strategy and the Environment 83, 88. 
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CHAPTER 4: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VEHICLES FOR DISCLOSURE 
AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS TO ENSURE 
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECTORS 
4.1 Introduction 
The effectiveness of boards of directors and their obligations to shareholders has been a 
global concern. The board is meant to oversee the management and check for any wrong 
doings. It is the engine room of a company and the architect of governance policies. All 
disclosure pertaining to a company flows from the board.330 The diminished quality of 
disclosure erodes the strength of a company's corporate governance policies and 
director's accountability to shareholders. Thus there must be a collaborative effort 
between shareho lders and directors underlined by increased accountability and 
transparency.331 
Legal reform has been initiated to enhance duties and obligations of directors to 
shareholders. This will be critically analysed in chapter 4.2 to determine whether such 
reform positively contributes to disclosure, accountability and strengthened corporate 
governance. With regards to shareholders an examination of the remedies available to 
shareholders to ensure directors' accountability pursuant to poor disclosure and 
concomitant losses is warranted. The elementary principle of the composition of a 
company board is one that is balanced, comprising both executive and non-executive 
directors.332 Shareholders depend on non-executive directors to ensure credible disclosure 
and cement governance practice. This necessitates a critical evaluation of the role of non 
executive directors. 
330 King Code on Corporate Governance (2002) Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
331 D R Dalton et al 'Meta-Analytical reviews of Board Composition leadership structure and financial 
performance' Strategic Management Journal (1998) 19269,272. 
332 R Brusser 'The Role and Liability of the Non-Executive Director' (1983) 7 SA Company Law Journal. 
See also Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) Final Report Paragraph 3.14.7. 
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Shareholders should and can also use their rights to ensure that the remuneration 
committee333 and the like are properly constituted in terms of statutory recommendations 
and codes of good practice. 334 This level of pro activeness is often referred to as 
shareholder activism. It can be argued to be traversing the role and ambit of director's 
duties but any interested party including a shareholder should have the right to examine 
and question the information disclosed. Shareholder activism is a symptom of the malady 
of director accountability and the self interested unmonitored behaviour of directors. This 
has been the impetus for the statutory reform pertaining to executive remuneration and 
the legal duties and obligations pertaining to directors. These topics will be analysed to 
determine whether shareholders can rely on directors to disclose information voluntarily 
or are they best served by a mandatory regime of disclosure fortified by explicit duties 
and obligations. 
4.2 What are the information needs of a shareholder and what remedies are open to 
shareholders to safeguard these rights. 
Shareholders are providers of capital to a company and possess the right to participate in 
a dividend. 335 As such shareholders require reliable, relevant and timely disclosure of 
financial information to help them make informed investment decisions linked to the 
company's future income streams. 336 
Their information needs are of a financial nature and would include annual financial 
statements that satisfy the prescribed financial standards, the maintenance of accurate and 
333 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 2.25 requires the board (with the assistance of 
the remuneration committee) to put forward a policy of remuneration to shareholders for their approval in 
general meetings. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Bligh v Brent (1837) 2Y and C Ex. 268. 
336 P Ireland 'Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership'(1999) 62 Modern Law Review 41 
45. ' 
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complete accounting records by directors, auditor's reports, director's report on the state 
of business and profit of a company and disclosure on director's remuneration. 337 
Shareholders rely on directors and the board to deliver these information requirements 
and the nature of the relationship between shareholders and directors remains the 
foundation of modern day practice of corporate governance as it has a direct influence on 
accountability. 338 
Accurate disclosure of information stems from diligent management of a company and 
shareholders rely on directors in running their companies as citizens rely on government 
in running their country.339 In terms of recent trends shareholders would be well advised 
to take note of company's risk oversight and investment strategy. 340 
However, directors and shareholders do not have the same interest and incentives341 
which directly influences the flow of information made by directors to shareholders. This 
is what is referred to as the 'agency costs' problem342 imposed by directors on companies 
for example, their remuneration343 which if implemented in a self serving manner can 
erode shareholders' returns on their investments.344 To counter this erosion it is essential 
337 Section 30, 31, 32 and 33 of Act 71 of 2008. Note in term of King III there is also the issue of the 
integrated report which covers the involvement of companies in non-fmancial issues in terms of it asserting 
its role and footprint as a good corporate citizen but traditionally shareholder's primary information needs 
have always been of a financial nature. 
338 A Berle & G Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 3ed (1932) 56 encapsulated the 
seminal study on the concept of separation of ownership and management (shareholders and directors) as 
they have competing needs and is central to the examination of corporate governance. 
339 T Mongalo Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings in 
South Africa led (2003) 91. 
340 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries (26 November 2009) 
Page 9. 
341 AG Monks & N Minow Corporate Governance 2ed (2003) 2. 
342 M Jensen & W Meckling 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, agency costs and ownership' 
(1993) 48 Journal of Finance 831, 839. 
343 Section 30 (4) and Section 30 (6) of Act 71 of 2008 which requires enhanced disclosure of executive 
remuneration dealt with extensively in Chapter 4.2. This provision is analogous to the current Section 297 
of Act 61 of 1973. 
344 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries (26 November 2009) 
Page 15 which has asserted that the exorbitant pay packages of executives were the contributing factor to 
the financial crisis by sparking high risk business decisions for personal short term gain. The global 
imperative is to ensure adequate disclosure of executive remuneration is enclosed in fmancial statements 
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that directors make accurate and meaningful disclosure to shareholders specifically in 
. . f t gth . t 345 relation to executIve remuneratIon as a means 0 s ren enlng corpora e governance. 
Executive remuneration remains a contentious issue and is a debate that shareholders and 
directors engage in with mixed success.346 The principle motivating executive 
remuneration reform is that there should be an alignment between remuneration and 
performance-based incentives. 347 Shareholders react adversely when they perceive that 
such incentives are not commensurate with the company's performance and their 
returns. 348 
The unhealthy preoccupation with short-term profit and excessive risk taking in pursuit of 
better remuneration leads to value destruction. As such shareholders are demanding more 
disclosure and accountability from directors in respect of remuneration packages as 
evidenced by the recommendations of the Walker Review. 349 Shareholders require 
confirmation that companies implement Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). This strategic 
plan ensures that executives are rewarded after several years rather than simply on a year 
on year basis. It is not devoid of its deficiencies as LTIP entitles participation after 
designated periods350 without linking the long term performance of the director to the 
company.351 This can be countered by 'claw back' provisions as contained in the Walker 
Review352 which has been supported by legislative proposals in the form of the Financial 
made available to shareholders as contained in Section 30 (4) and 30 (6) of Act 71 of 2008 and the 
proposed UK Financial Services Bill 2009. 
345 Strait Times 31 December 2009. 'Deferred Payout will only delay Outcry' 
346 A McNulty 'Executive Packages' 2003 Institute of Directorship 20, 22. See also A McNulty 'CEO 
Salaries Rich Rewards' 2 September 2004 Financial Mail 21, 22. 
347 S Bartholomeusz 'After Enron the New Law Reform' (2002) UNSW Law Joumal 580, 586. 
348 http://www.finweek.co.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
349 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries (26 November 2009) 
Recommendations 29,30 and 3l. 
350 R Stovin 'Mine is bigger than yours' Sunday Times 6 May 200l. 
351 Ibid. 
352 A Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industries (26 November 2009) 
Recommendation 33. ('Claw backs' should be used as the means to reclaim amounts in limited 
circumstances of misstatement and misconduct post vesting of an incentive based remuneration). Strait 
Times 31 December 2009. 'Deferred Payout will only delay Outcry' is a recent reported article that outlines 
the implementation of Claw Back practice at banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley which 
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S . B'll 353 Th A 354 . d' . . ervIces I. e new ct requIres Isclosure of remuneratIon mcluding salaries, 
bonuses and performance related schemes. 355 
The South African model is clearly endorsing a mandatory regime of disclosure in terms 
of company law reforrn which enhances disclosure but does not obviate convoluted 
remuneration packages designed to benefit executives whilst remaining technically 
compliant with applicable rules. 356 
There is referred to as 'stealth compensation' a term postulated by Harvard law academic, 
Lucien Berchuk. 357 It refers to pension and retirement packages, the design and process 
of which are intentionally not transparent. It is against this background of negative 
perceptions that the SEC voted unanimously to change the rules for reporting executive 
remuneration through compensation committees. 358 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not address compensation committees.359 The SEC advocates a 
'compensation discussion and analysis,360 pertaining to compensation paid to executives. 
imposes the repayments of bonuses of high level executives pursuant to the poor performance of the cited 
banks. 
353 Financial Services Bill (2009) published for comment on 19 November 2009. It includes an impact 
analysis and the proposed incorporation of the Walker review recommendations in relation to executive 
remuneration. 
354 Act 71 of 2008. 
355 Section 30 ( 6) (b) of Act 71 of 2008. 
356 B Whitfield 'Inflated Executive Pay, is the bubble going to burst' (2008) Finweek 16, 18. This cites the 
concern about minimalist disclosure of executive pay. 
357 L Bebchuk & J F Boston 'Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Pay' (2005) 
Harvard University Press 425, 428. 
358 htpp://www.nyse.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009). Form 10 K read with NYSE listing 
requirements. The compensation committee must be required to produce a compensation committee report 
as required by SEC rules, to be included in the company's annual report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC. 
359 Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 does not address compensation committees. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission SEC's proxy rules require that domestic public companies prepare a 'compensation 
discussion and analysis' (CD&A) including extensive tabular and narrative disclosure of compensation 
paid to their most senior and highly compensated executives. This is filed with the SEC which means 
officer liability for material errors and omissions. The CD&A covers the basis, motivations and relevant 
information considering for remuneration including that of NED's. Once the compensation committee 
recommends to the Board of Directors that the CD&A be included in Form 10-K and proxy statement it is 
as mentioned filed with the SEC. 
360 !bid See also http://www.sec.gov (Last visited in 27 November 2009). 
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It marks a significant progression from its common law position
361 
but the disclosure 
prescribed is sufficient to secure and safe guard shareholder interests. In fact failure to 
reflect information accurately in the compensation discussion and analysis statement 
could attract liability by directors.362 The Walker Review has questioned the legitimacy 
of incentivisation and has made the most progressive recommendations on executive 
remuneration disclosure regimes to date. This approach has endorsed the mandatory 
model of disclosure and has in principle been approved by the FSA and its chairman 
Christopher Hogg who stated that to protect shareholders and "progress disclosure on 
. h k· d ,,3 63 remuneratIon you ave to ma e It man atory. 
It is evident that disclosure of a remuneration package in terms of a voluntary regime is 
less efficient in safeguarding the interests of shareholders than a mandatory regime and 
the latter must be supplemented by provisions requiring a detailed analysis of 
remuneration packages by directors to effectively strengthen corporate governance. 
Shareholders have recourse to other remedies but in terms of the current dispensation 
these are limited. Reference can be made to section 32 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa364 and the Promotion of Access to Information.365 A shareholder tested 
these provisions specifically in terms of section 78 (2) (d) of the latter statute in Davis v 
Clutchco. 366 The case went on appeal and the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa 
decisively stated that: 
361 Guinness Plc v Saunders (1990) 2 AC 663. This case addressed exorbitant executive remuneration on 
technical compliance as opposed to shareholder interests the plaintiff raised the defence that due process 
and procedure was not followed by the board of directors. The court held that directors' remuneration was 
to be made by the board of directors and not an ancillary committee intimating that the board could not 
delegate its powers without proper resolution and as such the executive remuneration was invalid Levin v 
Field and Tweeds Ltd (1951) 2 SA 401 (A) 414 it is not part of the business of a court of Justice to 
determine the wisdom of a course adopted by a company in the management of its own affairs. 
362 See Footnote 359. 
363 http://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/ (Last visited on 1 December 2009). Note Section 66 (9) of Act 
71 of 2008 mandates a special shareholder resolution at annual general meetings to approve compensation 
plans offered to executives and non-executives, this is pronounced endorsement of shareholder activism. 
364 Act 108 of 1996. 
365 Act 2 of 2000 Section 78 (2) d. 
366 Davis v Clutchco (Pty) Ltd (2004) (1) SA 74 (C). 
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'company law provided shareholders with extensive protection with regard to 
accounting records and annual fmancial statements. This included the important 
role played by auditors. Parliament could not have intended that the books of a 
company, great or small, should be thrown open to members on a whiff of 
impropriety or on the ground that relatively minor errors or irregularities have 
occurred. ,367 
The attitude is that despite supplementary legislation shareholders should have immediate 
recourse to the rights afforded to them in terms of the Companies Act. 368 
The principal remedy available to South African (minority) shareholders is known as the 
derivative action as enshrined in section 266 of the Companies Act. 369 The common law 
has had a much less sympathetic view in the form of Foss v Harbottle370 wherein the 
court held that only a company by 'its proper organ' can initiate proceedings for a wrong 
done to the company. The so called 'proper organ' the court was referring to applied to a 
company's board of directors. 
Thus the majority rule sentiment of Foss v Harbottle in essence obviated the rights of 
minority shareholders to bring actions against alleged misconduct if that misconduct was 
in law capable of ratification by an ordinary resolution of the company. This presented a 
manifestly unfair situation which left minority shareholders at the mercy of majority 
shareholders. The majority of shareholders could in fact bring an action but this in itself 
was a practical hurdle to overcome if there is disparate ownership. 371 
The so called derivative action by way of the common law arose as an exception to the 
dictum of Foss v Harbottle372 and could be evoked if a wrong was perpetuated against the 
367 Ibid. 
368 Act 61 of 1973. (or Act 71 of2008 when effective). 
369 Act 61 of 1973. 
370 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 46l. 
371 With concentrated ownership comes the danger of managerial entrenchment or the expropriation of 
minority investors, since large shareholders have the ability to select directors and resist proxy contests and 
tender holders. 
372Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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company and the company would not or could not pursue a remedy against the 
perpetrator. This common law right is deficient and ineffectual as confirmed in the Van 
Wyk De Vries Commission373 due largely to the fact that the minority shareholder must 
prove that the wrongdoers are in control of the company. Moreover the minority 
shareholder runs the risk of bearing the costs of the application which is a discouraging 
factor. Statutory relief is found in the form of section 266 read with sections 267 and 268 
of the Companies Act.374 
The latter sections can be evoked where a company has suffered a delict or a breach of 
trust committed by a director or past director and where the company has not instituted 
action to redress the wrong. However according to Henochsberg and in terms of practical 
implementation the provisions are 'circumscribed and of limited operation. ,375 
The reasons advanced for this are as follows: the losses contemplated are that caused by 
the directors specifically and does not contemplate any wrongdoing by an outsider. It has 
been criticized as a difficult provision to implement, offering little comfort to 
shareholders and remedying none of the uncertainties and deficiencies caused by the 
common law derivative action. 376 
The new Act377 attempts to do away with the common law derivative action and the 
vacuous operation of the current section 266.378 It states that: 
'any right at common law of a person other than a company to bring or prosecute 
any legal proceedings on behalf of that company is abolished, and the rights in 
this section are in substitution for any such abolished right,379 
373 C Freeman 'Remedying Shareholder Remedies ' 2008 Without Prejudice 7. 
374 Act 61 of 1973. 
375 P M Meskin et at Henochsberg on the Companies Act 4ed (1999) 511. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Section 165 of Act 71 of2008. 
378 Act 61 of 1973. 
379 Ibid. 
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The ambit of this section is clearly wider without limiting the action to who must have 
committed the act causing the loss to the company. The new Ace80 provides a more 
streamlined process of derivative actions and thus confirms the corporate governance 
reforms geared towards enhancing shareholder activism. It is anticipated that the revised 
legislation will procure greater accountability to shareholders by directors.381 
One of the most significant avenues open to shareholders is to initiate steps to procure the 
removal of a director who is guilty of misconduct. Section 220 of the Companies Act382 
enables a company to remove directors by ordinary resolution before the expiry of their 
term of office. While the process afforded to shareholders in terms of this provision is of 
comfort it is often necessary to remove directors on far shorter periods of time. 383 
The equivalent prOVISIon m the new Act is section 162384 which promulgated the 
maintenance of a register of delinquent directors. The new Act also protects shareholders 
by ensuring that corruption and collusion between companies, directors and shareholders 
is minimised. Section 2. (1 ) (d) of the new Act, however, casts the net widely.385 As a 
result persons far removed from one another may be considered related parties. If this 
provision is read with section 75 (6) of the new Act386 which compels a director to 
disclose the fact that a person 'related' to him/her has acquired a fmancial interest in the 
company of which he/she is a director it is clear that the concept of independence and 
380 Act 71 of 2008 
381 Viener v Jacobs (2003) 834 A 2d 546 is an American case that examined this issued and stated that 'it is 
axiomatic that majority shareholders have a duty not to use their power in such a way to exclude minority 
shareholders from their proper share of benefits accruing from the enterprise' asserting further that while it 
is understandable that they will act in their own interests, it must also be in the best interests of all 
shareholders and the corporation. Furthermore, the business judgement rule was rejected as a means of 
insulating the defendant from liability, as the court reasoned quite correctly that the rule only applies to 
decisions made in good faith and where the director is not interested in the subject matter of the business 
judgement rule A foreign law concept incorporated into South African law through Section 76 (3) of Act 71 
of 2008 and which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.3. 
382 Act 61 of 1973. 
383 D Walker 'The Revival of Shareholder Democracy' 2006 Institute of Directorship 20, 22. 
384 Section 162 of Act 71 of2008. 
385 Act 71 of2008. 
386 Ibid. 
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arms length transacting is endorsed which is a very commendable feature of the new 
Act.387 
This assertion is sustained by Section 161 of the new Act388 which entitles shareholders 
to apply to court for an order to protect their rights and rectify any harm stemming from a 
contravention which coupled with Section 164389 affords shareholders relief from 
oppressive conduct. Another feature of the new Act is the introduction of 'appraisal 
rights,390 for shareholders. Appraisal rights ensure that dissenting shareholders can 
require the company to repurchase the dissenting shareho lder' s share at fair value 
irrespective of the majority percentage approval obtained by the company. The collective 
impacts of these provisions are increased rights for shareholders which should translate to 
greater accountability and transparency by directors and other entities with which they 
interact. 391 It is also a clear endorsement of mandatory provisions designed to enhance the 
South African corporate governance model and will be far more efficient in ensuring the 
information and governance needs of shareholders are met. 
Shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, impact corporate governance practices 
as they become more active in monitoring performance of companies they invest in. They 
are also exerting enormous pressure on boards for performance, transparency, 
accountability, safeguarding of company assets and increase in return on shareholder 
investments. The most obvious example of how the complexion of corporate boards has 
been influenced by shareholder activism has been by one of the largest institutional 
investors in the US called the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS). CalPERS publishes an annual list of target usually non-performing listed 




390 Ibid Section 164. 
39 1 Th Ki R ~ ~g eport on ~~orate Governance (2009) endorses the implementation of alternate dispute 
resolutIOn m terms of Prmclple 8.6 Recommendation 39 which will enhance the remedies available to 
stakeholders and shareholders. 
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CalPERS has invested, have been forced to make major corporate governance changes. 
This has become known as the 'CaIPERS effect' in US.392 
In terms of the Combined Code393 the main principle underlying the relationships with 
shareholders is a mutual understanding of objectives. The board has the responsibility to 
ensure that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place. This dialogue must be 
substantiated by access to information if and when required. The latest review394 on 
corporate governance in the UK also postulated more active shareholder engagement 
supported by a meaningful disclosure of the company's business model. The Financial 
Services Bill395 will seek to entrench this principle. 
There is clearly a changing ideology and practice of shareholders from a passive state to a 
more active state. Shareholders bolster the efficacy of all corporate governance reform as 
a practical means of strengthening accountability as it closes the gap between ownership 
and managerial control. 396 Their activism is also instrumental in mandating more 
disclosure from directors which ultimately strengthens corporate governance. It cements 
the notion that the threat of accountability will always mandate better disclosure because 
if directors are not monitored, there is a risk that they may act in pursuit of their own 
interests to the detriment of the company. 397 If shareholders adopt a more robust 
approach of monitoring the board and the directors it will definitely enhance the quality 
of disclosure. Shareholders who have exercised their rights to claim transparency of 
processes have contributed to the strengthening of corporate governance and the 
392 E P Davis 'Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and the Performance of the Corporate Sector' 
(2002) 26 Economic Systems 203, 220. 
393 Combined Code (June 2008) Section Dl Page 19. 
394 Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other fmancial industry entities 26 November 2009 
Page 10. 
395 Financial Services Bill. (Released for comment on 19 November 2009) Downloaded from 
htpp://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk (Last visited on 24 November 2009). 
396 T Wixley & G Everingham Corporate Governance 2ed (2005) 22. 
397 H McPheson 'Duties of directors and Powers of Shareholders' (1977) 51 All 460, 462. 
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disclosure procedures and practice directors use.398 It is clear that these rights are best 
served by mandatory and legislatively entrenched provisions. 
The rights of shareholders are enhanced by the presence of independent directors?99 
Globally, reforms have elevated the issue of 'independence' to the forefront of the 
corporate governance debate. At the core of reforms worldwide is the focus on increasing 
independence within the boards of publicly listed companies.40o In practical terms 
independence suggests that directors are free of inappropriate entanglements with the 
management of the companies on whose boards they serve so they monitor matters 
objectively and will deter fraud, arbitrariness and misappropriation of funds. 401 This has 
been confirmed in terms of CLAA 402 and the new Act.403 
The law makes no distinction between executive and non-executive directors in far as 
principles of liability are concerned.404 Once persons accept an appointment as directors 
(including independent non-executive positions) they become fiduciary in relation to the 
company and are obliged to display the utmost good faith towards the company and in 
their dealings on its behalf. Furthermore non-involvement in the company's affairs forms 
the basis of attaching liability for a breach of their duty of skill and care.405 Nevertheless 
director's independence is eroded by the insidious problem of 'back scratching,406 and 
the empathy and collegiality shared by directors. So independence which understandably 
398 SL Gillan & LT Starks 'Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of 
Institutional Investors' (2000) 57 Journal of Financial Economic 275, 280. 
399 The Higgs review (2003) was a report on corporate governance that reviewed the role and effectiveness 
of non-executive directors and of the audit committee, aiming at improving and strengthening the existing 
Combined Code. In terms of the Combined Code A.3.1 the definition of independence is asserted and the 
role of independent directors highlighted. Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley Oxley imposes the independent 
requirement on audit committees and the definition of 'independent' excludes any affiliation to the board of 
directors or role as a professional advisor. Regulation 104 (5) of the Draft Companies Act Regulations 
issued for comment and review on 22 December 2009 seeks to clarify the conduct of non-independent 
directors by insisting that there is a recusal from deliberations of the board of directors. 
400 Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) Final Report. 
401 H Hirt 'Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non Executive Directors: A Critical Assessment with 
Emphasis on the German Two Tier Board' (2003) International Company and Commercial Law Review 
261,272. 
402 Insertion of Section 270A into Act 61 of 1973. 
403 Section 94(4) (b) of Act 71 of2008. 
404 Howard v Herrigel and Another (1991) 2 SA 660. 
405 Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing (1989) BCLC 489. 
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should be a fundamentally objective criterion becomes in fact a subjective one in terms of 
disclosure and accountability. The case Beam ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia 
Inc v Stewart
407 
questioned the ability of independent directors to fulfil their fiduciary 
duties when a structural bias existed as a result of the director's friendship and 
interaction. This case restated the importance of adequate disclosure, as disclosure 
stemming from a board that lacks independence is worthless and has proved repeatedly 
that it obviates credible governance.408 
The board is ultimately the focal point and custodian for corporate governance. 409 The 
aforementioned discussion on shareholders, remedies, and shareholder activism ensure 
that the board always acts in the best interests of the company. This factor has been 
statutorily entrenched in terms of the new Act410 which states that the business and affairs 
of the company must be managed by and under the direction of its board. The current 
legislative reform in South Africa is commensurate with global reforms to diminish 
unhealthy board room practice by firstly holding directors accountable for their corporate 
actions, secondly ensuring that they actively question management,411 thereby taking a 
less benign approach to business proposals412 and thirdly to ensure they remain cognizant 
of shareholder and stakeholder interests. 413 
4.3 Role and Responsibilities of Directors 
407 Beam ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc v Stewart (2003) 845 A 2d 1040, 1044. 
408 E Annour 'How Boards can Improve the odds off Merger and Acquisition Success' (2002) 30 Strategy 
and Leadership 55, 59. See also Regulation 104 (5) of the Draft Companies Act Regulations issued for 
comment and review on 22 December 2009. 
409 The King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 2.1. 
410 Section 66 of Act 71 of2008. 
411 J LVan Dorsten Rights, Powers & Duties of directors led (2002) 15. 
412M King The Corporate Citizen led (2006) 12. 
413 T Wixley & G Everingham Corporate Governance 2ed (2005) 32. 
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As Monks and Minow414 averred, corporate law provides the legal basis for one of the 
most important institutions organizing global economies, indeed company law is central 
to a country's economy and its prosperity for wealth creation and social renewa1.415 When 
issues of corporate governance are considered, the emphasis is on the role played by 
executive directors since they make managerial decisions. The reason why they are being 
subjected to increasingly exacting and assiduous scrutiny is that companies contribute 
enormously to the economic and social well-being of our society. It is therefore 
inconceivable to ignore the way and manner in which they are managed. 
Directors are the persons who direct the affairs of the company.416 
Section 208 of the Companies Act417 provides for the appointment of directors and 
requires every public company to have at least two directors and every private company 
to have at least one director. A director is defined in the Companies Act as follows: 
'Director' includes any person occupying the position of director or alternate director of a 
company by whatever name he may be designated. ,418 
The new Act defines a director
419 
as a person being a member of the board of a company, 
as contemplated in section 66420 or an alternate director of a company and includes any 
person occupying the position of a director or alternate director. 
The latter defmition seeks to remedy the concept of a 'shadow director' which could see 
a person escaping liability as a director if he or she was not formally appointed as a 
414 AG Monks & N Minow Corporate Governance 2ed (2003) 17. 
415 Ibid 17. 
416 HR Hahlo South African Company Law Through the Cases 6 ed (1999) 327. See also section 66 of Act 
710f2008. 
417 Act 61 of 1973. 
418 Section 1 of Act 61 of 1973. 
419 Section 1 of Act 71 of2008. 
420 Act 71 of 2008. 
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member of the board.
42 1 
This could be implemented with minimum success under the 
d · . 66422 c. propose regIme as sectIon accounts tor management who may not be formally 
appointed as directors but who control and direct the business affairs of the company.423 
However, due to the broad drafting of this clause it could also imply that senior 
management who were involved in high level business decisions could also face 
shareholder and stakeholder wrath should those business decisions be found to be 
financially detrimental. 424 
In South Africa, director's duties may be imposed contractually, or in terms of the 
company's Articles of Association and Memorandum. 425 In addition, directors have 
statutory and common law imposed obligations. However, the Companies Act426 is silent 
on the explicit duties and responsibilities of directors. 427 
How do shareholders and stakeholders ensure that directors act responsibly, make 
credible disclosure and remain accountable for their actions? The duty of directors, 
individually and collectively, to exercise their powers in the best interests of the company 
is of defining importance.428 This is commonly referred to as a fiduciary duty towards the 
company. Fiduciary duties are imposed on directors to ensure that they exercise their 
powers for the purposes for which they are given and are enforced by statute and by the 
courts. Likewise directors have a duty to act in good faith and in the interests of the 
company. 429 
A director may not place himself in a position in which there is a personal interest or a 
421 This is the case individuals prohibited in tenns of Act 61 of 1973 of being appointed as a director still 
managed and directed companies but did not fonnalise the process by completing CM27 and CM 29 forms. 
This perpetuated negative and often fraudulent practice but were never charged or sued as it was the 
corporate entity that was contracting thereby manipulating the legal concept of the' corporate veil'. 
422 Act 71 of 2008. 
423 Ibid Section 66 read with Se:ction 77. 
424 Section 20 and Section 218 of Act 71 of2008. 
425 Act 610f 1973 Section 59. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Section 75, 76 and 77 of Act 71 of 2008 is direct contrast to Act 61 of 1973 by legislating on the duties 
and responsibilities of directors thereby codifying the common law duties and responsibilities of directors 
428 Treasure Trove Diamond Ltd v Hyman (1928) AD 464. 
429 M Havenga 'Fiduciary duties under our new corporate law regime' (1997) SA Mere U 31 O. 
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duty which conflicts with duties to the company. Directors of companies are precluded 
from dealing on behalf of the company with themselves and from entering into contracts 
in which they have a personal interest conflicting with the interests of the company. This 
rule was endorsed in Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros430 and is strictly relevant to the 
issues pertaining to conflict of interests and related party transactions. It is explicit in its 
directive that no extraneous evidence will be entertained. 
A company is also entitled to the independent and unbiased judgement of each of its 
directors.43 1 Directors should always apply their mind to the issues at hand using such 
skill and judgement that they possesses. They should never be a puppet or at the will and 
mercy of others as they would be breaching their fiduciary duty. Moreover if directors 
follow the knowledge of another who is acting illegally they too will be shrouded in the 
legal knowledge and shall accordingly be liable. 432 
Although a director may lawfully be elected by a shareholder to represent shareholder 
interest and may even be a servant or agent of the shareholder, they may not blindly 
follow that shareholder's instructions.433 Nor should a director remain inactive when the 
interest of the company conflicts with the interest of that shareholder.434 
The common law thus endorses the idea that the director owes a duty to the company as a 
whole and not to individual members435 as the common law does not endorse a 
stakeholder view of director's duties. This is an evolving concept which was recognised 
in Lonrho Limited v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd 436 Lord Diplock recognised more expansive 
duties where the obligation or prohibition was imposed for the benefit or protection of a 
430 Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461. 
431 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) 163. 
432 Gray v Lewis (1873) 8 Ch App 1033. 
433 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) 163. 
434 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer (1959) AC 324. 
435 Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421. 
436 Lonrho Limited v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (1981) All ER 456. This case is an exception to dictum of 
Lord Tenterden CJ in Doe d Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1831) 1 B&Ad 847, 859 which laid down the 
general rule that 'where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specified manner 
that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner.' 
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particular class of individuals, or where the statute creates a public right and an individual 
member of the public suffers 'particular damage'. This argument can be extrapolated to 
the financial damages lost by shareholders and societa1 damage in the form of 
stakeho1ders if they are affected by the poor management and conduct of directors in 
running a company. This could be construed as casting the net of liability too far. This is 
probably the reason for the circumscribed approach of the new Act437 towards 
stakeholders
438 
whereas a more progressive approach was adopted towards shareholders. 
It is nevertheless a progressive approach but not to the extent mandated by King III.439 
The duty of care and skill was also limited and circumscribed as outlined in the Fisheries 
case
440 
and in the In re City Equitable Fire case441 which stated emphatically that 
directors are not liable for mere errors of judgement 442 nor are they bound to examine 
entries in the company's books. This position has changed significantly as corporate 
governance reforms demand that directors give continuous attention to the affairs of the 
company and failure to do so renders directors liable to a breach of their duty of care and 
skill which would include irresponsible disclosure or reliance on information that has not 
been verified. 443 
In the event that directors breach their common law duties they run the risk of personal 
liability for losses incurred by the company as a result of such breach. This could 
encompass the obligation to restore to the company the property lost or to account to the 
company for profits lost. Concerned parties can rely on select company law provisions to 
437 Act 71 of 2008. 
438 Section 31 (3) Act 71 of 2008 whereby trade unions are entitled to financial statements so as to initiate 
business rescue provisions and Section 162 wherein an interested party can apply to court to declare a 
director a delinquent. Section 20 (4) restrains the company from doing anything inconsistent with the Act 
and affords shareholders a right of action. Section 159 (4) as it pertains to whistle blowers provisions (This 
is more expansively addressed in terms of Chapter 5.2 and Chapter 5.3) See also King Report on Corporate 
Governance (2009) Chapter 8. 
439 King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) which addresses the importance of the board in 
interacting with stakeholders as outlined in terms of Chapter 8 and by employing alternate dispute 
resolution as a means of resolving disputes with shareholders. 
440 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) 163. 
441 In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company (1925) 1 Ch 407. 
442 !bid 460. 
443 Section 77 (3) (d) of Act 71 of 2008. 
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redress aberrant behaviour. Such relief may be evoked in terms of section 424444 which 
establishes a punitive remedy in which a director can be held personally liable for all of 
the liabilities of the company for reckless and negligent conduct.
445 
The import of this 
section was considered by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the matter of Philotex (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others 446 In its ordinary meaning, 'recklessly' does not 
connote mere negligence but, at the very least, gross negligence. The test for recklessness 
is objective insofar as the directors' actions are measured against the standard of conduct 
of the notional reasonable person, but subjective insofar as one has to postulate that 
notional being as belonging to the same group or class as a director, moving in the same 
circles, and having the same know ledge or means to acquire know ledge. 
The case of Kalinko v Nisbert,447 is of relevance, wherein the presiding judge stated that 
directors who drive companies into liquidation through reckless and or fraudulent trading 
may soon be forced to reimburse shareholders for losses. Kalinko was afforded leave to 
sue the directors for losses. This would indeed prevent directors from evoking the 
corporate veil to avoid fiduciary accountability and liability to shareholders.448 This is 
consistent with Anglo-American jurisprudence and highlights the role of disclosure 
coupled with shareholder activism in strengthening corporate governance. Shareholders 
will curb nefarious conduct by actively seeking information and disclosure. 
The criticisms leveled at the practical problems with these sections have been widespread 
and have prompted a call for greater accountability of directors who transgress their 
fiduciary duties. The Leisurenet case449 was a pertinent example of corporate aberrancy 
where due to the mismanagement of the company it was rendered insolvent with 
liabilities in excess of one billion rand. Notwithstanding, the overwhelming evidence of 
mala fides and poor governance the applicants withdrew their application in terms of 
444 Act 61 of 1973. 
445 Cooper v SA Mutual Life Ass Society and Others 2001 (1) SA 967 (SCA). 
446 Philotex (pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA). 
447 Kalinko v Nisbert 2002 (5) SA 766 (W). 
448 S I a omon v Salomon and Co Ltd (1897) AC 22 HL. 
449 http://www.wbs.ac.za (Last visited on 18 November 2009). 
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section 424 of the Companies45o and instead settled in terms of the director's insurance 
company as per section 247 of the Companies Act. 451 
Directors are increasingly coming under pressure with regard to the manner in which they 
exercise their fiduciary responsibilities. Shareholders are also becoming more demanding 
of directors as are stakeholders. The cumulative effect consequently would require that 
the net of liability of directors be spread a lot further when corporate decision-making is 
done. 
The new Act452 seeks to ensure a more accountable and disclosure orientated governance 
regime that remains commensurate with international best practice, whilst enabling 
management's ability to run companies profitably.453 This is the basis of governance as 
advocated by King 11: a balanced board both in representation and in terms of 
. c. c. 454 commItment to perlormance versus conlormance. 
Legislation need not curb performance by a commitment to conformance and in fact 
states that performance and accountability is enhanced by supporting regulation. The very 
nature of accountability is implementing penalties for poorly considered actions and the 
foregoing discussion on codified duties of directors supports this assertion. The 
codification of duties enhances disclosure as mandatory disclosure is intrinsically more 
credible than voluntary disclosure. Section 76 of the new Act455 seeks to codify the 
common law duties with specific reference to director's fiduciary duty and the duty of 
reasonable care and skills. The section does not exclude the common law; therefore the 
common law duties as discussed are not expressly amended.456 In dealing with the duty 
of good faith the new A~ct provides that a director has a 'second fiduciary duty to act 
450 Act 71 of2008. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Ibid. 
453 D Davies 'Codifying Directors Duties' 2007 Institute a/Directorship 15. 
454 Ibid 15. 
455 Act 71 of2008. 
456 P Delport New Companies Act Manualled (2009) 59. 
84 
honestly and in good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believes to be in 
the best interests of and for the benefit of the company. ,457 
The proposed codification has met with a contentious reception. The proponents of a 
voluntary regime and the existing common law framework of disclosure have castigated 
the proposed amendments, stating that the three conjunctives used in section 76 (3) of the 
new Act 458 are instructive and thus denote a highly prescriptive and limiting regime. It 
has also been criticized for being vague as 'acting in the best interests of the company' is 
different to acting for 'the benefit of the company'. 459 The import and intent of the clause 
seeks to introduce a broader band of ethics to the duties of directors which is turn will 
enhance the quality of disclosure made and should be commended. 460 Another important 
provision is found in section 76 (2) of the new ACt.461 The director is under obligation to 
communicate any information of materiality to the board. This disclosure is of paramount 
importance in strengthening corporate governance and was intended to enhance previous 
disclosure practice. However it remains a very broadly drafted provision in terms of the 
information that should be disseminated and therefore susceptible to manipulation and 
circumvention. 462 
The director must make disclosure of a personal financial interest in a matter before the 
board and to the shareholders (if prescribed)463 and should not participate in the meeting 
following disclosure.464 This is relevant and consistent with global reform that proposes a 
change in director conduct and behaviour of boards. This is amplified by section 77 (3) 
(d)465 which requires a director to minute and vote against conduct in contravention of the 
457 Section 76 (3) (b) of Act 71 of 2008. 
458 Ibid. 
459 E Van de Vyver & S Shandu 'Company Duties' 2007 Without Prejudice 34. 
460 Companies Bill, 2007 discussion forum. 
461 Act 71 of2008. 
462 P Delport New Companies Act Manual 1 ed (2009) 60. (Note that the Draft Regulations of the 
Companies Act released for public comment on 22 December 2009 have not offered any further clarity on 
this issue and in fact Regulation 46 and 104 makes no reference to this issue at all. This will no doubt form 
the basis of public commentary to supplement and amend the relevant regulations). 
463 Section 75 (3) of Act 71 of 2008. 





so as to lnitigate their personal liability. Therefore directors must diligently 
apply their minds to a matter. Section 77 of the new Act467 is deemed to enhance the 
operation of governance principles as it renders a director statutory liable 'should a 
director breach his fiduciary duty and for any loss, damages and costs sustained by the 
company as a consequence of such breach'. 468 Disclosure as a means of strengthening 
corporate governance is fortified by the new Act469 as it renders a director liable for 
financial statements that were false and/or misleading in a material aspect.470 
This section IS further enhanced by section 218471 which relates to the right of 
shareholders and stakeholders to evoke a civil action (in addition to any other remedy 
they may have) against the directors for loss and damage suffered by said shareholder or 
stakeholder as a result of a contravention by a director.472 It is not necessary for the 
contravention or conduct to be fraudulent or carried out with gross negligence. This 
enhances the rights of shareholders and affords them a better form of recourse against 
directors.473 
The most progressive provision in the new Act474 is section 76 (3) (read in conjunction 
with Section 76 (4) and 76 (5)) commonly referred to as the 'business judgement rule'. 
The means and mechanisms of strengthening corporate governance are presented with a 
double edged sword in the form of this provision. It seeks to ensure more disclosure to 
the board and shareholders as a whole, thereby embracing a holistic practice of 
governance. The more onerous argument is that the business judgement rule can be 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid Section 77 (2) (a). 
469 Ibid Section 77 (3) (d). 
470 This is of relevance in tenns of corporate failures due to directors colluding with auditors in terms of 
misrepresenting their profitability to shareholders and to future investors and is of relevance to shareholders 
and stakeholders. 
471 Act 71 of2008. 
472 Ibid Section 218 (2). 
473 Note in terms of Section 20 (6) where shareholders have a claim against directors (or managers) who act 
in contravention of the Act due to their fraudulent conduct or gross negligence thereby remedying the 
problems associated with Section 424 of Act 61 of 1973. 
474 Act 71 of 2008. 
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implemented to erode accountability by making qualified disclosure to defend 
detrimental corporate action on the basis that at the time of making the decision it was in 
'the best interests of the company'. This will cause a tandem diminishment of corporate 
governance, accordingly interpretation and consistent implementation of this rule is of 
·d·· 475 overn lng Importance. 
It is argued that this rule constitutes a licence to directors to perpetrate various forms of 
self-enrichment to the detriment of the company and their shareholders and stakeholders 
at large provided the director when making his decision relied on the competent 
employees, legal counsel accountants or other professional persons. 476 It is a provision 
that has been imported from American jurisprudence and in terms of section 5 (2)477 a 
court may have recourse to foreign law in interpreting provisions of the new Act.478 
Delaware judgements have misinterpreted the business judgement rule as 'indemnifying' 
directors rather than recognising its original impetus479 which is exercising a duty of care 
and skill.480 However, the rule can be abused to exonerate directors from monetary 
liability flowing from a breach of their duties if the board can prove they reasonably 
delegated their authority and relied on competent persons which renders this provision 
ripe for abuse as disclosure made by directors in terms of the business judgement rule can 
negate corporate governance practice and secure minimal accountability of directors. 481 
475 S M Kennedy & L Coetzee 'Business Judgement Rule' (2006) 27 Obiter 62, 65. 
476 Section 76 (5) (b) of Act 71 of2008. Also it can be argued that it will obviate the effects of Section 77. 
477 Act 71 of2008. 
478 Ibid. 
479 M M McMurray 'An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business 
Judgement Rule' (1987) 40 Vand. L. Rev 605, 611. 
480 Smith v Gorkom (1985) 488 A2d 858 Del. The directors were held liable for a breach of duty of care as 
they failed to obtain all the reasonably available information before voting on a merger which proceeded to 
have disastrous financial consequences as a direct result of their flagrant disregard of their duty of care and 
skill. See also Litwin v Allen (1940) 25 N.Y.S 2d 667 N.Y Sup. Ct. Litwin v Allen in which Judge Shientag 
expressed the two legs of duties owed by directors to companies, namely, the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty. Failure to meet these standards would result in legal liability, but as a general rule the court will not 
impose liability if the business judgement exercised by the directors turned out to be wrong or to have 
caused the company to incur an unforeseeable cost. See also Re Wait Disney Company Derivative 
Litigation (2004) WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10,2004). 
481 S R Cohn 'Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions 
Through the Business Judgement Rule'(1983) 62 Tex. L. Rev 591,605. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The role of disclosure in strengthening corporate governance involves a panoramIC 
approach that extends across the landscape of shareholder activism to director's duties 
and obligations. Company law reform has solidified the legislative support offered to 
shareholders to access information and disclosure by the company thereby strengthening 
corporate governance. This position is further enhanced by the obligations imposed on 
directors in terms of the new ACt.482 
This chapter also analysed the global and local trends to fortify disclosure regarding 
remuneration and the verification of 'independence' of non executive directors which 
emphasises the governance imperative directing reform towards shareholder safeguards. 
It also confIrms that shareholders are best served by a mandatory regime of governance 
directed by legislation. 
Any criticism levelled at codifying director's duties, obligations and entrenching 
shareholder imperatives should be directed to one of the best models of governance and 
the precursors to current company law reform namely the Banks Act.483 The new Act484 
has mirrored the basic tenets of the Banks Act485 namely: more disclosure, stakeholder 
concerns and a higher standard of stewardship by directors thereby fortifying the 
foundation of corporate governance. It surpasses the efficacy of the new Act486 by its 
487 mandatory adherence to corporate governance. 
In addition the existing banking regulations seek to elaborate on the duty owed by the 
directors of a bank to its depositors. Regulation 39 (1) of the Banks Act488 requires every 
482 Act 71 of2008. 
483 Act 94 of 1990. 
484 Act 71 of2008. 
485 Act 94 of 1990. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Ibid Section 60B. 
488 Ibid. 
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director of a bank or controlling company to 'acquire a basic knowledge and 
understanding of the conduct of the business of a bank and the laws and customs that 
govern the activities of such institution' .489 Thus, regulations set a specific standard of 
skill that is required of all directors whether executive or non-executive. 490 
The nature of banking requires a broader view of corporate governance. This incorporates 
the pluralist vantage of stakeholders being not just the shareholders but the depositors as 
well. 491 
The Banks Act also inhibits the short fall associated with disclosure in terms of its 
heightened internal auditing and risk mitigation function 492 thereby all disclosure is 
verified. 493 It also represents an astute model of a director-shareholder relationship that is 
enhanced by the presence of a Regulator.494 It is a prolific model of corporate governance 
that has rendered it immune to the fmancial crisis and governance collapse and draws 
attention to the efficacy and value of a mandatory disclosure regime that best serves 
shareholder interests and enhances directors' duties.
495 
Chapter 5: DOES DISCLOSURE LEAD TO THE EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES? 
5.1 Introduction 
489 !bid Regulation 39 (1). 
490 S Bhattacharya 'The Economic of Banking Regulation' (1998) 30 Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 745, 759. 
491 A Shleifer & R Vishny 'A Survey of Corporate Governance' (1993) 52 Journal of Finance 743,755 
492 Section 64 and 64A of Act 94 of 1990. 
493 !bid Section 60. 
494 Ibid Section 4 and Section 6. See also http://www.reservebank.co.za (Last Visited on 26 November 
2009). Also note penalties for non adherence in terms of Section 22 and Section 25 of Act 94 of 1990. 
495 The Draft Regulations of the Companies Act released for public comment on 22 December 2009 
advocates Regulations 153 to 170. These Regulations makes no mention of a regulator per se and as such 
has failed to initiate a regulatory body of any substance. Regulation 143 does afford the Commission the 
right to commence investigations and has supporting Regulations in the form of Regulations 139 to 141 to 
assist with these investigations which are tantamount to the powers afforded to the SEC. This will no doubt 
be the basis of much debate and commentary as there is not recommended formulation as to how this will 
be implemented in practice. It is nevertheless a step in the right direction to initiate a mandatory regime of 
compliance. 
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In critically analysing the role of disclosure in strengthening corporate governance an 
evaluation of corporate governance principles has been done and current corporate 
governance reform considered. The majority of corporate governance reforms and current 
regimes have been enacted in the wake of corporate governance failures. The thread of 
similarity tying these corporate collapses together is the magnitude and scope of failure, 
the loss of vast sums of money and the fact that all the checks and balances failed 
collectively. These corporate collapses were also characterized by the convoluted 
mechanisms used to avoid correct disclosure. 
Globally the corporate governance framework496 has been built on a reactive rather than 
pre-emptive mindset. The issue is whether the current reforms being considered have 
succeeded in securing a dependable and reliable disclosure regime to diminish the 
magnitude of failures. 497 In evaluating whether current governance reforms and 
mandatory disclosure as a mechanism of facilitating reform is as important as the 
proponents of diligent governance profess it to be, a practical evaluation of the 
governance shortcomings prevalent in key corporate governance failures would be 
valuable. This appraisal is to determine the governance standards (or lack thereof) in 
place and how such standards can be best supplemented. The analysis is indispensable in 
determining whether disclosure and the means to ensure disclosure either through a 
voluntary or a mandatory regime has been adequately addressed. 
5.2 Fidentia 
A trio of companIes: Fidentia Asset Management (Proprietary) Limited, Fidentia 
Holdings (Proprietary) Limited and Bramber Alternative (Proprietary) Limited 
(collectively referred to as Fidentia) came under scrutiny as a result of the 
mismanagement of an aIIlount in excess of one billion rand of investments of numerous 
496 See Chapter 1.5 (Background to Corporate Governance which addresses a snapshot of corporate 
governance regimes: 2009). 
497 See Chapter 1.6 (Current Trends in Corporate Governance which addresses reforms earmarked for 
2010). 
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clients.498 The biggest investment was a billion rand investment from the Living Hands 
Umbrella Trust, which pays out money from the mineworkers' provident fund to widows 
and orphans of workers killed in mining related accidents.
499 
In the case of Fidentia the 
level of independence of the financial officers and the accountability of the board was 
seen to be highly dubious. 50o 
This prompted the Financial Services Board Registrar to apply to the High Court in terms 
of section 5 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act501 to have Fidentia 
placed under curatorship. The issue is how in the face of the stringent legal framework 
that governs South Africa's corporate and finance sector could this have occurred not to 
mention the various watchdog bodies peculiar to this industry including but not limited to 
the South African Reserve Bank, 502 South African Revenue Service,503 Financial 
Intelligence Centre,504 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Service Ombudsman,505 the 
Long Term Insurance Ombudsman,506 the Pension Funds Adjudicator,507 the Short-term 
Insurance Ombudsman,508 the Securities Regulation Panel509 and the Financial Reporting 
Standards Council. 510 Hence, notwithstanding all the checks and balances and provisions 
of disclosure and transparency, the aforementioned regulatory safety net seems to have 
developed gaping ho les. 
With regard to Fidentia one of the key pillars of good corporate governance, namely, 
independent auditing, appear to have in fact been vacuous from both an internal and 
external perspective. It is the role of the board of directors to question the fmancials filed. 
To commit fraud of this magnitude one has to ask the questions: What was the role of the 
498 htpp://www.fsb.co.za (Last visited on 26 November 2009). 
499 htpp://www.persfin.co.za (Last visited on 26 November 2009). 
500 B . 2 usmess Report February 2007. 
501 Act 28 of2001. 
502 htpp://www.reservebank.co.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
503 htpp://www.sars.gov.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
504 htpp://www.fic.gov.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
505 htpp://www.faisombud.co.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
506 htpp://www.ombud.co.za (Last visited in 21 November 2009). 
507 htpp://www.pfa.org.za (Last visited in 21 November 2009). 
508 htpp://www.osti.co.za (Last visited in 21 November 2009). 
509 htpp://www.srpanel.co.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
510 htpp://www.saica.co.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
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risk committee, the audit committee and was there a simile of independence exhibited by 
the non-executive directors? 
Fidentia clearly possessed all the prescribed requirements of governance in the form of 
the aforementioned cornmittees and in fact bragged about the credentials of some of their 
high flying independent directors. 511 What is self evident is that disclosure of credentials 
and prescribed requirements does not guarantee efficient governance or accountability. 
The efficacy of governance hinges on the effective monitoring of these committees and 
on the palpable independence of directors. The independent directors are supposed to 
bring objectivity to the oversight function of the board and improve its effectiveness. 512 
Stakeholders and shareholders place high expectations on them, such expectations were 
clearly misplaced with the Fidentia board. It is sincerely hoped that disclosure of 
independent directors will be accompanied by actual independence on their part. Third 
party verification of independence is elementary in establishing independence 
alternatively unambiguous disclosure of relationships between directors on the board or 
sub committees. Disclosure of this nature should be recorded in formal minutes and 
annual reports. This would be vital in implementing corporate governance policies and 
cementing accountability. 513 
In terms of the new Act514 it will be far more difficult given the stricter reporting 
requirements to perpetuate such fraud. 515 It is also hoped that the extended ambit of 
liability associated with dereliction of duties by directors would be a deterrent to such 
conduct. 516 In addition it will present an integrated strategy across the board to monitor 
checks and balances. Furthermore it is anticipated that the revised legislation will remedy 
the lack of communication between the various role-players. The Fidentia case parallels 
the detracted uninformed role of non-executive directors in Masterbond and the 
511 M King 'Corporate Citizen' 1 ed (2006) 51. 
512 Section 94 (4) of Act 71 of2008. Insertion of Section 270 A into Act 61 of 1973. Combined Code A3.1 
(2008). King Code on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 2.18. 
513 Section 77 of Act 71 of2008 advocates this conduct to avoid personal liability. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid Section 30 and Section 94. 
516 Ibid Section 77. 
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Leisurenet fiascos. 517 However, considering the Fidentia saga was played out in the wake 
of King II and extensive company law reform locally and abroad it is indeed a 
disheartening disregard of corporate governance.
518 
In support of this statement an evaluation of the desideratum that encapsulated the gaping 
fissures in the governance system of Fidentia shall be considered in the following 
discussion. Fidentia's accounts were not initially audited and financial statements were 
filed with the Financial Services Board late and only upon written demand to comply 
with filing requirements. 519 Invested funds were allegedly distributed through an 
accountant's trust account to directors, shareholders and others. 52o This completely 
obviates the independence requirements of external auditors.
521 
There were material conflicts of interest that were not disclosed by board members in 
terms of holding positions on both the Fidentia Board and related companies. This is a 
patently obvious weakness in maintaining the sacrosanct rule of independent non-
executive directors and non-conflicted executive directors. 522 
The Fidentia study may be deemed to be the antithesis of best practices. It also exhibits 
how poor, non verified disclosure practice erodes corporate governance. Apart from the 
aforementioned weaknesses in disclosure corporate South Africa also stands exposed in a 
number of other areas as postulated in the Price Waterhouse Coopers study: 'Survey of 
Effective Management of South African Retirement Funds'. 523 The survey found that at 
least two out of five retirement funds have failed to formally confrrm whether the trustees 
517 htpp://www.moneyweb.co.za (Last visited on 21 November 2009). 
518 Note in terms of King III the internal audit function as per Chapter 3 is far more regimental and the 
guidelines stricter in terms of the internal audit practice note coupled with the combined assurance model. 
This is amplified by Principles 3.1 and 3.5. It has enhanced support from Act 71 of 2008 in terms of 
Section 94 and the independence of external auditors in addition it is underpinned by the ethics regime 
proposed by the King Code on Corporate Governance (2009) as per Principle1.1. 
519 htpp://www.fsb.co.za (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
520 http://www.pmg.org.za (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
521 See current reform in terms of Section 94 of Act 71 of2008 and King Report on Corporate Governance 
(2009) Chapter 4. 
522 The King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) has refined and amplified the requirements for 
independence. Principle 2.18 Recommendations 76 and 77. 
523 http://www.seshego.co.za (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
93 
of the funds have the required knowledge to effectively manage the interests of their 
members.
524 
Unlike the UK in terms of the Myners Report 2001 525 which evaluated 
pension funds and institutional investors there is no legislation in South Africa to enforce 
satisfactory knowledge levels. Among other issues that beg attention are matters like 
conflict of interest,526 the number of directorships one individual can hold,527 enforcing 
asset declarations by directors and the ability of unskilled and inexperienced trustees to 
make decisions regarding billions of rand of other people's money. Disclosure of this 
information was eletnentary in determining whether non-executive directors are 
appointed to serve the interests of the company and stakeholders or their fellow executive 
directors.528 
It is therefore essential that the recommendations of the Myner Report are translated into 
future reform on the South African landscape. The induction, ongoing training and 
development of directors on an ongoing basis is a key principle of King Ill. 529 It is also 
supported by recommendations of mentorship, industry specific training and the 
amplification of the role of the company secretary.530 Directors should also be able to 
source external advice if so required within reasonable parameters coupled with the right 
to delegate their responsibilities to properly constituted committees. 531 
The issue then is whether we remedy the conduct evidenced in Fidentia with further 
regulation demanding more disclosure or is it a bigger endemic problem. It is an endemic 
problem of excess, greed and a complete lack of ethics.532 Notwithstanding the series of 
524 Ibid. 
525 Myners Report (2001) http://www.corporategovernance.uk (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
526 King Code on Corporate Governance (2009) Paragraph 88.7. With specific reference to the disclosure 
requirements analysis published by Price Waterhouse Coopers downloaded from htpp:llwww.pwc.com 
(Last visited on 22 November 2009). 
527 Ibid Paragraph 88.6. 
528 Note there is a global trend to appoint directors with industry specific knowledge and skills to enhance 
the meting out of board and director duties as outlined in latest governance codes. 
529 King Code on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 2.20. 
530 Ibid Principle 2.20 Recommendations 91, 92 and Principle 2.21 See also Section 85 of Act 71 of2008. 
531 Ibid Principle 2.23. 
532 Ibid Principle 1.1. See also Section 72 (4) of Act 71 of 2008. In relation to ethics and the importance of 
an ethical foundation in directing the behaviour of boards. This is a global sentiment re-iterated in the 
Walker Review and the latest review and consultation documents on the Combined Code. Note the Draft 
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progressive and ambitious laws South Africa has sought to enact, this endemic problem 
coupled with a poor enforcement regime renders disclosure of any kind dubious. 
Accountability is also eroded by an excruciating slow legal system; this was evidenced in 
the delayed appointment of a curator for Fidentia which enabled the Fidentia directors 
under investigation to shift funds beyond recovery. 
Thus, all future regulation must be supported by a stronger regulatory regime to ensure 
that disclosure enables meaningful accountability so as to improve audit committee 
performance and independence. Various studies and empirical research has focused on 
the relationship between these codes and better corporate governance. Wild
533 
purports 
that the firms that establish an audit committee experience an increase in their earnings 
stressing the notion that companies with such independent, well governed committees 
will no doubt have improved fmancial reporting. 534 
It was self-evident that in Fidentia none of these aforementioned principles were 
implemented to best advantage. In fact auditor reports and financials were manipulated 
with the assistance of a fraudulent auditor. There is a therefore a positive correlation 
between audit committee independence and financial reporting quality.535 This in turn 
underpins the importance of the independence of key committees like remuneration, risk 
and audit committees and its influence on credible disclosure. 
Regulations of the Companies Act was released for public comments and review on 22 December 2009. 
Regulation 50 has addressed the scope operation and mandate of the proposed social and ethics committee 
in detail. Of relevance if Regulation 50 (12) which focuses on the function of the committee which refers to 
international dispensations like the OECD and corporate social investment opportunities. It is silent on the 
actual ethical conduct and development highlighted by the King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) 
Principle 1.1. This is grounds for commentary and proposed amendments. It does ensure that shareholder 
engagement is considered. 
533 J J Wild (1996) 'The Audit Committee and Earnings Quality' (1996) 11 Journal of Accounting, Auditing 
and Finance 247, 278. 
534 Section 64A of Banks Act 84 of 1990. Section 94 of Act 71 of2008. 
535 WG Lewellen 'Self Serving Behaviour in Manager' s Discretionary Information Disclosure Decisions' 
(1996) 21 Journal of Accounting and Finance 227, 229. 
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This was not evidenced to best advantage by Fidentia but one of the recommendations by 
King II as confrrmed by King III536 to deal with ethics and fraud is encouraging whistle-
blowing which is an effective form of regulation. If we inculcate a culture of whistle-
blowing the devastating effects of Fidentia could have been diminished. Although 
legislation has been enacted to protect whistle-blowers in the form of the Protected 
Disclosures Act.537 The implementation of this Act in a responsible and accountable 
fashion is key to its success as protection will not be afforded to persons who maliciously 
make untrue and unfounded disclosures. This Act promotes good corporate governance 
and exemplifies the manner in which disclosure can be implemented to ensure effective 
corporate governance policies. In addition the Act is a testament to the institutional 
activism the King Reports advocates. The new Act has also legislated on this issue to 
underpin the functioning of disclosure and anti fraud initiatives. 538 
The greater transparency brought by democracy not only offers opportunities to deal with 
corruption but offers a sharper focus on the constraints that corruption imposes on 
development and the quality of governance. This is due to the fact that such conduct runs 
contrary to accountability and the rule of law. 539 
Sarbanes-Oxley540 provides for whistle-blowing by way of section 806
541 whereby a 
whistle-blower is protected if he or she partakes in 'protected activity' which would 
include providing infonnation concerning a protected subject matter. As such retaliation 
against such an individual on any basis whatsoever is prohibited. This is amplified by 
section 1107542 which ilmposed criminal penalties on any individual who engages in 
retaliation tactics. 
536 The King Report on Corporate Governance (2009) Principle 1.1. 
537 Act 26 of2000. 
538 Section 159 (4) of Act 71 of2008 contains whistle blower provisions. 
539 R Pillay 'Corruption - the challenge to good governance' A South African perspective' (2004) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 586, 589. 




It is further supplemented by section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley543 which requires audit 
committees to set up whistle-blowing procedures whereby employees can anonymously 
submit issues of concern regarding questionable accounting or auditing issues. 
Blowing the whistle has become a topical issue in corporate governance as companies 
seek to curb corruption, abuse of company assets, fmancial crime and other criminal 
activities. Whistle-blowing is designed to strengthen internal control mechanisms of a 
company, is central to the internal auditing function and is the most productive form of 
disclosure. Companies are taking whistle-blowing seriously and are putting in place 
infrastructures to ensure that employees report information on suspected criminal 
activities, violation of company procedures and internal controls, cases of misconduct, 
abuse of company assets and so on. The idea to whistle-blowing is to stop misconduct 
before damage is done to the company. It's a deterrent as well as a preventative measure. 
For whistle-blowing to be effective, they have to be mechanisms within the company for 
reporting misconduct and violation without fear of being identified or harassed by 
management. Measures should also be put in place to investigate such matters and for 
appropriate follow up action. Companies have invested in systems such as hotlines and 
secured websites in order to facilitate whistle-blowing. 544 
To date there is no such mechanism for public fund managers, which is indeed 
disconcerting that the principles are in place but practically it has not been implemented 
to the full extent. In a country plagued by corruption, fraud of gargantuan proportions it 
seems erroneous and irresponsible not to be implementing whistle-blowing to the fullest 
extent. This is a reiteration of an earlier assertion that our theoretic framework of 
corporate governance laws is sound but all disclosure that flows from it requires the 
assistance of a meaningful regulatory system545 to ensure accountability. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Ki R ng eport on Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 8 and Section 159 (4) of Act 71 of 2008 
recognise the importance of these provisions in enhancing the internal audit function. 
545 Se~tions 191 and ~ection 19~ an~ Section 194 of Act 71 of 2008 refers to the establishment of specialist 
commIttees and a tnbunal WhICh If regulated and staffed appropriately could assist in the proposed 
regulatory process. 
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5.3 Enron and Worldcom 
Enron and Worldcom were the world's leading electricity, natural gas, and 
communications companies respectively. At the end of 2001 and 2002 it was 
consecutively revealed that the cataclysmic fmancial condition of both companies were 
the cumulative result of accounting fraud and corporate mismanagement. 546 Their 
financial condition was the culmination of creatively planned accounting records 
attributed to another common element between the companies, their auditors, Arthur 
Anderson. It ultimately led to the demise of Arthur Andersen and both companies have 
become a global symbol of willful corporate fraud, corruption and poor corporate 
governance. 547 
Both Enron and W orleom successively filed for bankruptcy protection and as such 
constituted the largest such filings in United States history, this has since been overtaken 
by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 in the wake of the financial 
. . 548 cnsIs. 
Enron and Worldcom provided the impetus of corporate governance reform in the US as 
encapsulated in Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC amendments. 549 However, both Enron and 
WOrldCOITI portrayed the veneer of commendable corporate governance and endeavoured 
to make periodic disclosure of such attributes. For example both companies had 
independent directors on their financial committee and in both instances a financial 
expert served as chairperson. Despite compliance with a rule that was subsequently 
entrenched in Sarbanes-Oxley the audit committees failed to identify and act on financial 
statements that contained material misstatements. 55o Clearly being independent in name 
and acting independently in practice are two key aspects in ensuring compliance and 
546 M Blair ' Directors duties in a Post Enron World: Why Language matters' (2003) Wake Forest Law 
Review 38. 
547 Ibid. 
548 http://www.corporatewatch.org (Last visited on 27 November 2009). 
549 http://www.sec.gov (Last visited on 27 November 2009). 
550 Section 404 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
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transparency. O'Kelly noted the importance of being independent m thought and 
action. 551 
If management is being dishonest it is still going to be hard to root out the deception 
notwithstanding the disclosure and filing requirements. 552 The theoretical discourse on 
corporate governance is bewildered by the magnitude and scope of the corporate fraud. 
Analysts lay the blame squarely on the lack of independence of non-executive 
directors.553 
A recent corporate governance scandal to undermine India's corporate landscape is in the 
form of Sat yam Computer Services Limited (Sat yam) , a software company that has 
global presence. 554 The company has fallen foul of misrepresenting its balance sheet and 
is in fact on the brink of bankruptcy. Its share price has plummeted rendering investors 
irate. The off balance sheet shenanigans by Sat yam parallel the conduct of Enron. Once 
again all fingers are pointing at India's weak law enforcement regime, failure of the 
independent directors to act independently and poor transparency. 555 
The recurrmg theme of a lack of independence presents a dichotomy of policing 
independent directors while maintaining the independent confidential preserve of the 
boardroom. This can be achieved by firstly, more clarified disclosure of interests, 
secondly adequate monetary incentives,556 which is to compensate independent directors 
adequately and lastly the threat of prosecution and the concomitant loss of reputation. 
551 E 0' Kelley 'The changing roles of audit committees' (2003) 27 Directors Monthly 4, 7. 
552 C Hymowitz & J Lubin 'Corporate Reform: the fIrst year: boardrooms under renovation scandals 
prompted changes, but critics say more is needed to prevent another Enron' 2003 Wall Street Journal 78, 
79. 
553 M Blair 'Directors' duties in a Post Enron World: Why Language matters' (2003) 38. Wake Forest Law 
Review 34,45. 
554 http://www.comoratewatch.org (Last visited on 27 November 2009). 
555 Ibid 
556 Combined Code (2008) Section B.1.1 Non Executive remuneration in the form of director's fees is a 
recognized and acceptable reward. Share options and performance related bonuses are not acceptable. 
There is a fine line between rewarding a highly qualified and skilled party for their time versus obviating 
their independence. 
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The aforementioned examples confirm the fact that corporate governance is about 
constant vigilance. Each corporate catastrophe highlights a gaping hole in governance 
that requires a concrete response. The regimental disclosure requirements expected by the 
American auditors in terms of Sarbanes-Oxley557 and in term of South Africa's Auditing 
Professions558 are a significant deterrent to such conduct and are an imperative support to 
corporate governance in both regimes. 
Another remedial effect evidenced in Sarbanes-Oxley as highlighted in previous chapter 
is the prohibition of loans to directors. 559 This prohibitive clause would have prevented 
the advance of a loan in excess of four hundred million US dollars to the CEO of 
Worldcom. 56o This was done to circumvent his sale of shares in the company and which 
ultimately resulted in the company's downward spiral into bankruptcy. 
The issue is that notwithstanding the appearance and disclosure of normalcy, fraud is 
perpetuated and corporate governance principles obviated. The only means of enforcing 
accurate disclosure and policing such disclosure are punitive measures and dogged 
enforcements of regulations. In addition the objective evaluation of board performance, 
constant evaluation and declaration of independence and whistle-blowing remain 
essential cogs of a regulatory process. 
Time Magazine in 2003 named 'the whistle-blowers' as its person of the year and praised 
Cynthia Cooper, an employee of Worldcom, and Sherron Watkins, an employee of 
Enron, for their courageous role in reporting the fraudulent and underhanded activities of 
the companies in the absence of protective legislation.561 In terms of the practical and 
factual correlation of the two corporate disasters the much belaboured reforms would 
have in fact curbed management from perpetuating poor corporate governance and 
557 Sarbanes-Oxely Act 2002 Section 404AA. 
558 Act 26 of 2005. 
559 Section 226 of Act 61 of 1973. Section 45 (5) of Act 71 of 2008. Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002. 
560 L W Jeter Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at Worldcom led (2003) 156. 
561 http://www.time.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
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disclosing incorrect results. This is of course supposition but better regulated disclosure is 
an effective means of implementing corporate governance polices. This underpins the 
contention that disclosure alone does not guarantee accountable governance if it is not 
accompanied by rigorous enforcement. 
This argument is affrrmed by an analysis of one of the cornerstones of good corporate 
governance namely the remuneration of audit committees which must be limited to 
director's fees only. One of Enron's audit committee members was paid a consulting fee 
which would be disallowed under current regulation. 562 Disclosure of this would have 
indicated disparate treatment or the so-called self-serving behaviour pronounced upon by 
Healy.563 
What is also of significance is the operation of the compensation and the nomination 
committees of these companies. In terms of the compensation committee both Enron and 
Worldcom had independent directors serving on their compensation committees. In both 
corporate misdemeanants the compensation committees recommended exorbitant 
bonuses based on the attainment of targeted revenue goals that were later proved to be 
grossly misstated by management. This ultimately leads back to the incorrect disclosure 
of fmancial statements which was the result of accounting fraud. But more importantly it 
also points to the committee's failure to question the reported revenue figure on which 
the performance bonuses were based, despite the fact that independent directors and 
financial experts were represented on the relevant committees. 
Accordingly the issue is whether the reforms contained in American corporate 
governance legislation would in fact have prevented the CEO' s from receiving their large 
overstated bonuses. Sarbanes-Oxley is silent on remuneration committees but the SEC 
has stated564 the importance of correlating compensation and performance and the ambit 
562 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
563 PM Healy 'The effect of bonus schemes on Accounting Decisions' (2006) 7 Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 85, 87. 
564 Th S . . d E h C .. e ecuntIes an xc ange ommlSSlOn SEC's proxy rules require that domestic public companies 
prepare a 'compensation discussion and analysis' (CD&A) including extensive tabular and narrative 
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of director's liability for reckless conduct has been significantly expanded. As a result it 
can be inferred that the directors would not have blindly endorsed the payment 
additionally the role of independent directors have been elucidated to the extent that this 
conduct would have been prevented. The issue of independent impartial and unbiased 
directors is of paramount importance. In all examples cited it was later established that 
notwithstanding citation of independence all directors in fact had interpersonal 
relationships that contributed materially to the corrupt decisions perpetuated. The 
inclusion of independent directors on the board to comply with legislation and the 
concomitant disclosure of this fact does not contribute to strengthening corporate 
governance and accountability. It must be accompanied by independent directors who 
exercise due diligence in meting out their duties and are able to identify signals that 
indicate unacceptable corporate practice. 565 
5.4 Financial Crisis 
A panoramic analysis of the current financial crisis indicates that the current period of 
gross uncertainty in which the global economy fmds itself in is not new. 
The current financial crisis is a culmination of factors, frrstly the nature of sub-prime566 
loans are characterized by excessive leverage as loans are advanced to people and entities 
disclosure of compensation paid to their most senior and highly compensated executives. This is filed with 
the SEC which means officer liability for material errors and omissions. The CD&A covers the basis, 
motivations and relevant information considering for remuneration including that of Non Executive 
Directors. Once the compensation committee recommends to the Board of Directors that the CD&A be 
included in Form 10-K and proxy statement it is filed with the SEC. 
565 See Chapter 4.2. 
566 The subprime crisis is an ongoing real estate crisis and financial crisis triggered by a dramatic rise in 
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in the United States, with major adverse consequences for banks 
and financial markets around the globe. The crisis, which has its roots in the closing years of the 20th 
century, became apparent in 2007 and has exposed pervasive weaknesses in financial industry regulation 
and the global financial system. 
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with unstable incomes or low creditworthiness. In South Africa the National Credit Act
567 
was enacted with the primary objective to curb reckless indebtedness and has been 
accredited with minimizing our exposure to the current fmancial crisis. Thus disclosure 
mandated by this Act is a key mechanism of strengthening the South African corporate 
governance regIme. 
Secondly, there were clear gaps in regulatory and accounting standards regarding the 
treatment of 'off-balance sheet' financial vehicles and lending practices. Save for 
publicly listed and traded banks, the operation of Sarbanes-Oxley568 and the SEC569 did 
not apply and thus the incumbent rigorous checks associated with audit control were 
absent. In terms of the South African regime all banks are subject to the regimental 
checks and balances encapsulated in the Banks Act570 and the Auditing Professions 
ACt. 571 
Thirdly, the opaque and complex nature of the securitization process exacerbated risky 
sub-prime loans into riskier securities like collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits and so on. This highlights the complete lack of transparency 
and disclosure of the mechanics of securitizations which has since highlighted the 
creatively incorporated special purpose vehicles that in fact perpetuated synthesized 
transactions. 572 South Africa's under developed securitization market and strict exchange 
control regulations prevented South African banks from trading in such entities. Banks 
thus benefited from a highly regularized system of control. 
567 Act 34 of2005. 
568 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. 
569 htpp://www.sec.gov (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
570 Act 94 of 1990. See also Section 165 of Act 71 of 2008 which curbs off balance sheet transactions 
without shareholder approval. 
571 Act 26 of2005. 
572 A Blundell- Wignall 'The Sub-Prime Crisis: Size, De1everaging and some Policy Options' (2008) 94 
Financial Market Trends 121, 123. 
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The KPMG audit cOmInittee review indicated a clear failure in corporate governance as a 
precipitating factor in this financial crisis and it is patently obvious that it was a common 
element in issues discussed above. 573 
The elevated standard of duties and obligations of directors of a bank have been 
adumbrated in Chapter 4.4.574 As discussed this is due to the fact that banks play a 
fundamental role in the flow of capital within global economies. As such the business of 
banking has a number of intrinsic risks that may jeopardise the entire fmancial system of 
an economy. Simply stated the success or failure of banks has more significant external 
consequences than the success or failure of most other types of fmns. This statement has 
epitomises the global crisis the financial markets are currently embroiled in. 575 This can 
be attributed to the disregard of capital and liquidity requirements prescribed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements in terms of 
the Basel 11 Capital Accord (Basel 11) of 2005.576 The seminal purpose of this document 
is to assist banks globally and their supervisors in the implementation and enforcement of 
sound corporate governance. 577 It also seeks to prescribe minimum capital requirements 
and enhance transparency and public disclosures by banks. Basel 11 has been formally 
incorporated into the South African banking sector in terms of the Banks Amendment 
Act. 578 
Basel 11 fervently advocated adequate disclosure of critical information to ensure market 
discipline. This was completely and utterly ignored. This highlights the role disclosure (in 
terms of diligently monitored regulation) can play in strengthening the implementation of 
corporate governance safeguards. This also places us squarely before the following 
enquiry: what was the role and responsibility of the board of directors of these banking 
and financial institutions? This inquiry is ultimately the litmus test of the business 
573 http://www.kpmg.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
574 Regulation 39 of Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
575 http://www.oecd.org (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
576 http://www.bis.org (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
577 Ibid. 
578 Act 20 2007. 
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judgement rule579 so as to determine whether directors applied their mind to the 
assumption of risk or whether the end result was in fact a dereliction of their duties. This 
has been confrrmed by both the Turner Review580 and the Walker Review
581 
which have 
cited stringent disclosure of adherence capital and liquidity requirements as a key risk 
mitigation strategy of banks and other fmancial institutions. 
Two recent Singapore cases582 suggest that the financial crisis as evidenced in that 
jurisdiction was in fact the result of poor disclosure and an attendant dereliction of 
director's duties. 
Both cases involve a negligence suit against the auditors for failing to detect and prevent 
fraud. The defendant audit firms successfully argued that the amount of damages should 
be reduced as a result of the negligence of the respective boards in failing themselves to 
spot the warning signs evident in the accounts of the companies. Damages were reduced 
by fifty percent in both cases. The Singapore Supreme Court of Appeal slated the 
directors for submitting evidence that they relied on the advice of management and 
auditors reports. They stated that directors could not dispense with their own duty of 
stewardship to the company by wholesale delegation.583 
579 See also Chapter 4.3. 
580 Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009). 
The Turner Review has advised greater regulation of the Banking Sector in the UK and the EU and 
proposed a central regulator, this recommendation has fallen away but it has supported the assumption of 
more power for the FSA. 
581 Walker Review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities (26 
November 2009). Walker asserts that the financial crisis and the collapse of banks has been the result of 
exorbitant remuneration policies of top end employees which encouraged excessive risk taking. As such the 
recommendations are risk mitigation focused with expansive disclosure on the bank's risk plan and risk 
committees being formed. The other key issue is the recommendation that remuneration policies and the 
manner in which they are structured should be legislated underpinning the importance of mandatory 
provisions governing disclosure on key governance issues. As a practical example reference can be made to 
the financial products unit of American International Group (AIG) which sought to allocate a portion of 
government aid to pay executive bonuses. These exorbitant bonuses were a key contributor to the insurer's 
loss and the potential failure of the company. The Straits Time 31 December 2009. Page B18. 
582 JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofongwongcloong (2007) SGCA 40 and PlanAssure PAC v Gaelic Innes 
Pte Ltd (2007) SGCA 41. 
583 JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofongwongcloong (2007) SGCA 40 and PlanAssure P A C v Gaelic Innes 
Pte Ltd( 2007) SGCA 
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In both cases the court seemed to view the fraud evidenced in the proposed securitization 
transactions as readily apparent and would have leapt out at anyone making even a 
cursory examination of the accounts. The two cases suggest a trend by the courts to 
impose stricter duties of supervision on management by directors and the expectation of 
such directors to apply their minds more independently. In the Plan Assure case584 the 
court stated that the non-executive directors were not entitled to rely solely on the finance 
manager to ensure that the accounts and business model were in order and it was 
irrelevant that they (non-executive directors) lacked accounting expertise. 585 
These cases illustrate the importance of directors to ask the requisite questions and to 
properly consider the risks associated with each new project. In the case of the sub-prime 
loan crisis and the complexity of the derivative instruments there was a perceived ability 
to gloss over the risk of default in pursuit of short-term gains. A robust reporting system 
to monitor whether the projected risk and benefits of projects presented to the board for 
approval should have been followed in addition to adherence to the various disclosure 
and verification requirements of Basel H.586 
The boards of the affected companies should have kept appraised of updated information 
and disclosed incumbent risks to shareholders. This would have enabled them to take the 
appropriate measures to reduce exposure in good time. In many cases, although the 
reasons for this may be complex, banks and financial institutions continued increasing 
their exposure to sub-prime mortgages which undermined the principles of board 
responsibility towards proper disclosure. The repercussions of this governance 
catastrophe will be felt for some time to come. The most palpable has been the failure of 
the American banking system. It flagrantly disregarded Basel H requirements which 
manifested in its operational and governance failure. It has also sparked the recent 
584 PlanAssure PAC v Gaelic Innes Pte Ltd 2007 SGCA. 
585 This supports the assertions by the Turner Review, Walker Review and King III regarding the training, 
induction and procurement of directors with specialized skills and knowledge. . 
586 Examples of poor disclosure and the far reaching ramifications of such practice can be found in the form 
of Bank of Am eri caIMerri 11 Lynch case wherein a Federal Court Judge rejected the settlement arrangement 
between Merrill Lynch and the Bank of America based on the SEC's claims that Merrill Lynch misled 
shareholders about bonuses and contravened liquidity and capital requirements. 
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controversial call by President Obama to imposed banking taxes and penalties to ensure 
the expedient recovery ofT ARP funds 587 and stricter regulations to govern large banks. 
5.5 Conclusion 
It is clear that the corporate miscreants examined above, did surprisingly have a large 
number of corporate governance reforms in place. It is common cause that these were 
properly disclosed but were in fact not implemented in an accountable and meaningful 
fashion. 
It is naIve to think that disclosure leads to the effective implementation of corporate 
governance policies yet every policy maker has reiterated the following pronouncements 
in light of the latest financial crisis that corporations are to be subject to greater 
disclosure and increased transparency. 
It must be accompanied by meaningful regulation so as to assess the performance of the 
board of directors on a regular basis, albeit indirectly through scrutiny of filings 
especially if it is a public listed company. It addition law enforcement agencies must 
endeavour to penalize errant independent and executive directors, if not the present 
corporate governance structure notwithstanding stricter disclosure mechanisms will 
remain ineffective. This is clearly evidenced by the planned initiatives of President 
Obama. 588 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
587 Cohen T 'Proposed new Bank Rules could hurt SA' 21 January 2010 Business Day. The Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) which established the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
commonly referred to as T ARP a program of the United States government to purchase assets and equity 
from financial institutions to strengthen its financial sector. It is the largest component of the government's 
measures in 2008 to address the financial crisis. It is a reactive measure to a corporate governance crisis 
rather than corporate governance reform per se and has since been replaced by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of2009 (ARRA). South Africa can distinguish itself from this unenviable position due to 




6.1 Recommendations as to how corporate governance practices can be improved in 
respect of disclosure 
It is self evident £rOIn the research presented and literature reVIew that corporate 
governance remains an increasingly crucial area of modern legal development. In the 
wake of the corporate meltdowns, frauds and criminal investigations researchers have 
signalled the need for 'new theoretical perspectives and models of governance' .589 
Also emanating from the research it is clear that disclosure does not unequivocally lead to 
the strengthening of governance and accountability. This bold statement is based on the 
analysis that a mandatory regulatory approach, although astute and the most effective 
means of securing governance, is not a cure all for credible disclosure. The basis for this 
contention is that, notwithstanding a plethora of legislation, credible disclosure is still not 
guaranteed as an effectilve means of strengthening corporate governance and ensuring 
accountability. The rationale for this is best encapsulated by Groucho Marx who 
humorously stated that 'The secret of success is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake 
these, you've got it made'. 590 Ironically this outlines the greatest failing in governance 
practice which is the appearance of conformance as opposed to a real tangible 
commitment to meaningful disclosure. 
The veneer of compliance precedes corporate collapses consistently: entities are doomed 
by a combination of employees' greed, lack of oversight and an entrenched and 
aggressive culture of creative accounting because disclosure also explicitly reinforces the 
quintessential elements of ethical considerations or lack thereo£591 
In amplification of this voluntary disclosure and compliance with laws diminishes 
accountability and is a system of governance that would not be commensurate with an 
589 R Monks and N Minow Corporate Governance 3ed (2004) 7. 
590 S Tulloch (Editor) Complete Word Finder Sed (1993) 67. 
591 D Reed Corporate Governance Reforms in Developing Countries' (2002) 37 Journal of Business 223, 
247. 
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emerging economy like South Africa. 592 Therefore a mandatory regulatory regime of 
disclosure is advocated but one that is honed and enhanced to secure further efficacy. The 
enhancement is that mandatory compliance should not be implemented mindlessly and 
implementation should be done in conjunction with alternative measures.
593 
The alternative measures would extend beyond the regulatory and administrative 
framework to a more holistic approach. This would involve the adoption of internal and 
macro perspectives or glo bal perspectives across legal, regulatory, ethical and 
sociological frameworks to ascertain with greater understandings of why governance 
failures occur and how best to curb that occurrence. 594 
Macro perspectives involve the comparative study of different governance systems to 
assist in the international standardization of minimum standards without the disregard for 
local practice and requirements. South Africa exemplifies this example by basing its 
initial governance model on the Cadbury Code. King 111595 will precede the 
commencement of the new Act596 which is by no means faultless in its proposed 
enactment of a mandatory system and should take heed of the latest UK corporate 
governance developments. 597 This system could be further enhanced by the inclusion of 
more stringent disciplinary mechanisms for directors. It is proposed that these measures 
should not be reserved for registered directors alone but the ambit should extend to high 
profile executives who may not meet the definition of 'director' .598 This would include 
the CFO and the company secretary who advise the directors. The writer is in no way 
purporting that directors should not avail themselves of independent advice and fully 
592 !bid 230. 
593 This re-iterates the recommendations of the Combined Codes (2008) and its current review documents 
to avoid boiler plate reporting but rather endorse substantive reporting. 
594 S Young & V Thyil 'A Holistic Model of Corporate Governance: a New Research Framework' (2008) 8 
Corporate Governance 94, 96. 
595 Kin R g eport on Corporate Governance (2009). 
596 Act 71 of 2008. 
597 There is a detailed re-examination of the 'apply of explain' model which takes cognizance of the fact 
that certain provisions require legislative support to ensure compliance. 
598 P W Moerland 'Alternative Disciplinary Mechanisms in Different Corporate Systems' (1995) 26 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 17, 34. See also Section 66 of Act 71 of 2008 which 
extends the net of liability to senior management provided they direct, control and manage the business. 
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appraise themselves of the matters put before the board. Instead individuals who are 
material in developing and meting out the company's operational and financial strategy 
should be held accountable for any mala fides aligned with such strategy. The majority of 
fraud or negligent conduct is perpetuated with the assistance of middle rung employees 
who often avoid liability. 599 
Companies should be incentivized to implement prudent governance policies. From a 
South African perspective there are indirect economic benefits that flow from expediting 
transformation policies
6oo 
but sustainability, economic prudence and general CSR 
initiatives should be rew·arded. This will heighten brand development but also improve 
disclosure practice as more methods to verify disclosure would have to be implemented 
to ensure the incentivized benefit. The corollary of this is the publication of delinquency 
lists. 601 
The mandatory approach must be supported by a stringent regulatory body. To date the 
Companies Act
602 
has had the Registrar as its watchdog with little to no proactive 
powers. It was purely reactive in response to reported non compliance or technical 
shortcomings. The new Act603 must be characterized by a stringent body that ensures the 
requisite checks and balances in respect of accounting, auditing and legal frameworks are 
599 RN arisham Fraud in Banks 1 ed (2007) 92 An example is the collapse of Barrings Bank at the purported 
hands of one rogue trader, Nicholas Leeson when in fact a large portion of the failure and concomitant 
blame can be allotted to the senior management of the bank who failed to manage the risk and identify the 
potential disaster, often blindly endorsing the transactions. These senior managers would not constitute the 
directors that could be prosecuted under SOX or found liable in terms of Section 77 of the new Act 71 of 
2008. This is because they would not fall under the ambit and operation of Section 66 of Act 71 of 2008. 
Moreover although Section 218 is progressive it is not supported by an expedient court system. 
600 Note in terms of this South Africa this would extend to BEE initiatives as per Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act 532003. 
601 A Mardjano 'A Tale of Corporate Governance: Lessons why Firms Fail' (2005) 20 Managerial Auditing 
Journal 272, 283. 
602 Act 61 of 1973. 
603 Act 71 of2008. The Draft Regulations of the Companies Act have been released for comment and 
review on 22 December 2009. 'The Regulatory Agency function has been addressed but not to the extent 
anticipated. Moreover the Regulations 137-149 will only reach fruition if supported by an expedient court 
process. 
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complied with. 604 All these rules that elevate the importance of disclosure, openness and 
information will hopefully minimise the opportunistic behaviour of self interested 
directors. 
Trust and ethics should be the backbone of any potential director, but often these 
character traits are assumed, it is proposed that in addition to the technical training that 
should accompany the role of director,605 behavioural training or internal perspectives are 
endorsed. Directors should be inculcated with the concept of gatekeeper and or guardian 
roles to ensure they do not fall foul of a lapse in ethics.606 Also the role of reputation and 
business ethics, not just in terms of credible disclosure, but ethical conduct from a 
corporate social responsibility vantage should be highlighted as valuable endeavours and 
instilled in future directors.607 
The importance of these macro and internal perspectives has been globally endorsed 
specifically by the OEeD which has advocated pluralism and cultural diversity to reflect 
on boards and governance. 608 
If this ho listic approach is adopted then the qualitative element that is often lost in a 
prescriptive environment is curbed if not accounted for in total. This is the concern 
Mervyn King has periodically anguished over. He discusses the concept of intellectual 
honesty wherein he advocates a quantitative and qualitative endorsement of corporate 
governance as opposed to the mindless adherence to a set of principles for the sake of 
compliance and additional credits. 609 
604 King Code of Corporate Governance (2009) Chapter 6 which imposes the compliance with codes, laws 
and regulations and also underpins the importance of timely relevant and accurate reporting in terms of the 
IT Governance framework as per Chapter 5 Paragraph 9. 
605 A Lagan 'Ethics at Work' (2006) 76 In The Black, Melbourne edition 72, 74. 
606 G Wood' The Relevance to International Mergers of the Ethical Perspectives of Participants' (2005) 5 
Corporate Governance 39, 40. 
607 A Lagan 'Ethics at Work' (2006) 76 In The Black Melbourne edition 72 76. 
608 . . ' , 
htpp:llwww.oecd.org (Last VISIted on 19 November 2009). ' Improving Competitiveness and Access to 
Capital in Global Markets'. 
609 M King The Corporate Citizen 1 ed (2006) 12. 
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He has asserted that directors who belabour under extensive regulatory environments are 
too preoccupied with compliance to ensure qualitative outputs. The regulation 
accompanied by tighter punitive measures will safeguard the shareholder and stakeholder 
on a long term basis if directors act holistically and it will not be a mindless quantitative 
exercise. 61 0 
In view of research presented it can deduced that accountability and transparency are 
inextricably linked to the critical issue of 'trust'. As Alan Greenspan argues 'It is hard to 
overstate the importance of reputation in a market economy, rules cannot substitute for 
character. ,611 When the market loses confidence in the integrity and plausibility of 
information being produced by a fIrm, then the markets no longer trust a fIrm. The 
negative effects are likely to be dramatic. This is particularly the case for fInancial 
institutions for which the loss of reputation can mean the failure of the fIrm. This has 
never been more patently apparent than in the case of the fInancial crisis that has 
dominated the world stage. 
It is therefore advocated that the mandatory disclosure regime we are adopting must be 
tempered with a shift in attitude. The regulatory approach that has been portrayed by 
large accountancy firms is target driven and has achieved quantitative as opposed to 
qualitative compliance. The South African environment responds positively to stringent 
regulatory measures accompanied by penalties and specifIc punitive action. Rules 
pertaining to disclosure keep 'character' in check and ensure the strengthening of 
corporate governance failing which we will be left with nothing but toothless, utopian, 
corporate ideals dealing with moral niceties which are wholly unrelated to business 
reality. 
6.2 Recommendations for Public Policy Determinants: The Balance between 
Governmental Regylation and Market Based Regulation through Disclosure. 
610 Sections 20, 77 and 218 of Act 71 of 2008. 
611 htpp://www.bloomberg.com (Last visited on 19 November 2009). 
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It is evident that market regulation which is tantamount to self regulation or voluntary 
disclosure is simply not a model for the South African regime let alone the global market. 
It is archaic and simply not conducive to remedial intervention. In the wake of the 
financial crisis governmental regulation612 has embarked on heightened involvement, 
they will be part and parcel of future governance initiatives as opposed to simply enacting 
legislation. Regulators will look to well managed and transparent financial systems for 
blue prints of new regulation. The South African banking system is a prime example 
complete with an external regulator. This has been initiated already by way of the 
Alternate Investment Fund Managers Directive which is seeking to apply a banking 
model on investment managers. 613 
It is evident that market based regulation has had a track record of disasters and 
governmental regulation which is a 'bank system' of governance will parallel the 
mandatory system of disclosure discussed. 614 The FSA is expected to mandate the 
assumption of additional powers to increase its sanctions against individuals and firms 
guilty of market abuse or misconduct. 615 This is an attempt to refme monitoring assessing 
and mitigating systemic risks. 
As asserted in Chapter 4.4 regulation of governance is key in ensurmg disclosure 
strengthens corporate governance as illustrated by the banking industry.616 
In terms of the new Act617 there is mention of standalone reporting standards council 
which would require for maximum efficacy a company regulator. This has not been 
612Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009). Walker Review of 
corporate governance in UK banks and other fmancial industry entities (26 November 2009). Consultation 
on the Revised UK Corporate Governance Code (2009) Review of the Combined Code: Final Report 
(2009). Financial Services Bill (2009). 
613 S Krige 'The changing role of the Investment Funds Lawyer' (2009) 10 Without Prejudice 42 It raises 
the issue that effects will be less devastating if it is due to a failed regulator that failed regulation. 
614 Sections 60 and Section 60A of Act 94 of 1990. See also Chapter 4.4. 
615 Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009). Walker Review of 
corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities (26 November 2009). 
616 Section 60A, Sections 24 and Section 35 of Act 94 of 1990. http://www.reservebank.co.za (Last visited 
it on 6 December 2009) See also Chapter 4.4. 
617 Section 204 of Act 71 of2008. 
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addressed nor included in the Draft Companies Act Regulations released for comment 
and review on 22 December 2009. The Regulations which remain very much in draft 
form have been circumscribed in the powers assigned to the Commission and Tribunal. 618 
It has positively addressed the filing, formulation and management of complaints which 
in principle is a positive progress619 but in practice will need extensive clarification on 
how the Commission and Tribunal will be staffed and rendered operational. 
The latest development is the government backed, managed and designed rescue 
packages for banks and near bankrupt conglomerates.62o It encompasses a government 
regulated disclosure regime and a corporate governance system that fosters 'sustainable 
economic growth' which is more palatable and socially acceptable in the modern global 
corporate world. 621 It is also supportive of the stakeholder theory which will render the 
board more accountable: and disclosure will be more credible as opposed to the short 
term, shareho lder centric, market based system which has sent the global economy into 
cataclysmic shock. The governmental based system of regulation is underscored by good 
corporate citizenship and is also a testament to good ethical business practice the absence 
of which constitutes the very root of fraudulent self-serving conduct that has led to scores 
of corporate fmancial disasters.622 As such companies who adopt a negative, defensive 
stance in relation to corporate governance, and an unambiguous disclosure regime may 
find the global business goldfish bowl increasingly uninhabitable and unprofitable. 
618 Regulations 136-146. 
619 Regulations 147-150. 
620 A Blundell- Wignall 'The Sub-Prime Crisis: Size, Deleveraging and some Policy Options' (2008) 94 
Financial Market Trends 121, 123. See Footnote 587. 
621 L E Strine "Towards a true corporate republic a traditionalist response to Bebchuk's Solutions for 
improving Corporate America' (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1759, 1780. 





Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
Auditing Professions Act 26 of2005 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 
Banks Amendment Act 20 of2007 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 66 of 1965 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of2003 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Companies Act 71 of2008 
Companies Regulations 2010 (Draft Regulations of the Companies Act released for 
review and comment on 22 December 2009) 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2006 
Employment Equity Act 200 of 1993 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of2001 
JSE Listing Requirements 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 
115 
National Credit Act 34 of2005 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
National Water Act 36 of 1998 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 
Pension Funds Act No 24 of 1956 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 
Public Finance Managernent Act 1 of 1999 
Securities Services Act 36 of2004 
Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 
UK 
Financial Services Bi112009 
Pension Funds Act 1995 
us 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 
NYSE Rules 
N asdaq Rules 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
116 
7.2 Reports 
Blue Ribbon Commission (1999) 
Cadbury Report (1992) 
CLSA Report (1998) 
Combined Code (1998) (2003) (2008) 
Consultation on the Revised UK Corporate Governance Code (2009) 
DTI Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (2004) 
Dey Report (1994) 
Greenbury Report (1995) 
Hampel Report (1998) 
Higgs Review (2003) 
King Report (1994) 
King Report (2002) 
King Report (2009) 
Myners Report (2001) 
OECD Guidelines (1999) 
Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (2009) 
Smith Report (2003) 
Treasury Committee Fifth Report (2008) 
Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (2009) 




Allen F & Gale D Comparing Financial Systems 2ed (2000) 
Barron J B & Miranti P J A History of Corporate Finance 2ed (1997) 
Beauchamp T L & Bowie N E Theory of the Modern Corporation 6ed (2001) 
Berle A & Means G The Modern Corporation and Private Property 3ed (1932) 
Byong M A & Halligan J Reforming Public and Corporate Governance: Management 
and Market in Australia, Britain and Korea 2ed (2002) 
Davies P L Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 6 ed (1997) 
DeSimone D & Popoff F Eco-Efficiency the Business Link to Sustainable Development 
2ed (2000) 
Delport P The New Companies Act Manual led (2009) 
De Vos A S et al Research at Grassroots 2ed (2002) 
Easterbrook F & Fischel D The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 1 ed (1991) 
Florini A The coming Democracy: New rules for running a New World 2ed (1980) 
Jeter L W Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at Worldcom 1 ed (2003) 
Hahlo H R South African Company Law through cases. 6ed (1999) 
Hawley J P & AT Williams A T The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional 
Investors can make America more Democratic 2ed (2000) 
King M The Corporate Citizen 1 ed (2006) 
Meskin P M et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 4ed (1999) 
Mongalo T Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business 
Undertakings in South Africa led (2003) 
Monks A G & Minow N Corporate Governance 2ed (2003) 
Narisham R. Fraud in Banks led (2007) 
Parkinson ]\1 Corporate Power and Responsibility 2ed (1993) 
118 
Terry G Green led (2008) 
Tricker R I Corporate Governance 4ed (2000) 
Tulloch S (Editor) Complete Word Finder 5ed (1993) 
Van Dorsten L J Rights Powers & Duties of Directors 1 ed (2002) 
Wixley T & Everingham G Corporate Governance 2ed (2005) 
7.4 Puticles 
Aguilera R V et al 'Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative 
Analysis of the US and UK' (2006) 14 Corporate Governance 147 
Armour E 'How Boards can Improve the odds off Merger and Acquisition Success' 
(2002) 30 Strategy and Leadership 55 
Armstrong P 'Directorship, the way we govern now!' 2003 Institute of Directorship 46 
Bartholomeusz 'After Enron the New Law Reform' (2002) UNSW Law Journal 580 
Bebchuk L & Boston J F 'Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Pay' (2005) Harvard University Press 425 
Blair M 'Directors duties in a Post Enron World: Why Language matters' (2003) Wake 
Forest Law Review 38 
Blundell- Wignall A 'The Sub-Prime Crisis: Size, Deleveraging and some Policy 
Options' (2008) 94 Financial Market Trends 94 (2008) 121 
Bhattacharya S et al 'The Economics of Banking Regulation' (1998) 30 Journal of 
Money Credit and Banking 745 
Brickley J A et al 'Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board' (1997) 11 Journal of 
Corporate Finance 189 
Brown L D & Higgins H N 'Managing Earning Surprises In US versus 12 other 
countries' (1999) 20 Journal of Accounting Public Policy 373 
Brusser R 'The Role and Liability of the Non-Executive Director' (1983) 7 SA Company 
Law Journal 55 
119 
Buri P & Borak T 'Employees as Corporate Stakeholders' (2002) 8 Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship 45 
Butler H 'The Contraetual Theory of the Corporation' (1989) 11 George Mason Law 
Review 455 
Carcello J V & Neal T L 'Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting' (2000) 
75 The Accounting Review 453 
Cheffins BR 'Corporate Governance' (1999) 19 Legal Studies Journal 4 
Cheh A 'A Communitarian Note on Stakeholder Theory' (1998) 8 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 4 
Coase R 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) Economica 390 
Coffee J C 'Market failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors' (1 994) 70 Val L Rev 717 
Cohen T 'Proposed new Bank Rules could hurt SA' (2010-01-21) Business Day 
Cohn SR 'Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and 
Sanctions Through the Business Judgement Rule' (1983) 62 Tex. L. Rev 591 
Core J E & Holthausen R W 'Corporate governance and Chief Executive officer 
compensation and Firm performance' (2000) 51 Journal of Finance 371 
Cornfield A 'The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance' 
(1998) 10 Bond Law Review 78 
Dalton D R et al 'Meta··Analytical reviews of Board Composition leadership structure 
and financial performancce' Strategic Management Journal (1998) 19 269 
Davies D Codifying Directors Duties 2007 Institute of Directorship 15 
Davis E P 'Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and the Performance of the 
Corporate Sector' (2002) 26 Economic Systems 203 
Dawkins J & Lewis J 'CSR in Stakeholder Expectations: and Their Implications for 
Company Strategy' (2003) 44 Journal of Business Ethics, 185 
Dean J 'Stakeholding and Company Law' (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 66 
Dennis J 'The new numbers game in Accounting' 24 July 1989 Business Week 
Dodd E M 'For whom Corporate Managers are Trustees' (1932) 45 Harvard LR 1145 
120 
Donaldson T & Preston L E 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications' (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 65 
Dye R A 'Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosures The cases of Financial Real 
Externalities' Accounting Review (1990) 65 24 
Easterbrook F & Fischel D R'Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors' 
(1984) 70 Val. L Rev 669 
Editorial 'Deferred Payout will only delay outcry' 31 December 2009 The Strait Times 
B19 
Eichenwald K 'Corporate Governance' 28 May 2006 Business Times 23 
Elgazzar S & Finn P 'An empirical Investigation of Multinational Firms Compliance with 
International Standards' (1999) 32 The International Journal of Accounting 239 
Eng LL & Mak YT 2003 'Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure' (2003) 22 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 325 
Fama E & Jensen M C 'Separation of ownership and control' (1983) 26 Journal of Law 
and Economics 301 
Fischer P E & Stocken P C 'Imperfect Information and Credible Communication' (2002) 
39 Journal of Accounting Research 119 
Freeman C 'Remedying Shareholder Remedies' 2008 Without Prejudice 7 
Freemantle A & N Rockey N 'The Good Corporate Citizen: Pursuing Sustainable 
Business in South Africa' (2004) 2 Trialogue 1 
Garrett G 'Globalization's missing middle' (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 96 
Garriga E & Mele D 'Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory' 
(2004) 53 Journal of Business Ethics 51 
Gillan S L & Starks L T 'Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: 
The Role of Institutional Investors' (2000) 57 Journal of Financial Economic 275 
Grossman S & Hart 0 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and 
Lateral Integration' 1986 Journal of Political Economy 691 
Havenga M 'Fiduciary duties under our new corporate law regime' 1997 SA Mere LJ310 
121 
Healy P M 'The effect of bonus schemes on Accounting Decisions' (2006) 7 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 85 
Himmelberg H & Hubbard R G 'Understanding the determinants of managerial 
ownership and the link between ownership and performance' (1999) 53 Journal of 
Financial Economics 353 
Hirt H 'Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non Executive Directors: A Critical 
Assessment with Emphasis on the German Two Tier Board' 2003 International Company 
and Commercial Law Review 261 
Hodes Lionel. 'Corporate Social Responsibility of a Company' (1983) 121 SALJ 468 
Holmstrom B 'Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspective' (1999) 66 
Review of Economic Studies 169 
Hymowitz C & Lubin J 'Corporate Reform: the first year: boardrooms under renovation 
scandals prompted changes, but critics say more is needed to prevent another Enron' 
2003 Wall Street Journal 78 
Ireland P 'Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership' (1999) 62 Modern 
Law Review 41 
Johnson S 'Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis' (2000) 58 Journal of 
Financial Economics 141 
Keay A 'Directors Duties to Creditors: Concerns relating to the Efficiency and Over 
Protection of Creditors' 2000 Modern Law Review 98 
Kennedy S M & Coetzee L 'Business Judgement Rule' (2006) 27 Obiter 62 
Klaasen R & McLaughlin C 'The Impact of Environmental Management on Firm 
Performance' (1996) 42 (8) Management Science 1199, 1201 
Krige S 'The changing role of the Investment Funds Lawyer' (2009) 10 Without 
Prejudice 42 
Kuras R 0 'Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada-US Comparitive Analysis' (1997) 
18 Manitoba Law Journal 313 
Lagan A 'Ethics at Work' (2006) 76 In The Black, Melbourne edition 72 
La Porta R. et al 'Legal Determinants ofExtemal Finance' (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 
1131 
La Porta R et al 'Corporate Ownership around the World' (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 
510 
122 
Lewellen WG et al (1996) 'Self Serving Behaviour in Manager's Discretionary 
Information Disclosure Decisions' (1996) 21 Journal of Accounting and Finance 227 
Maltby J 'Setting Its Own Standards and Meeting Those Standards: Voluntarism Versus 
Regulation in Environmental Reporting' (1997) 6 Business Strategy and the Environment 
83 
Mardjano A 'A Tale of Corporate Governance: Lessons why firms fail' (2005) 20 
Managerial Auditing Journal 272 
McCabe B J 'Are Corporations socially responsible? Is Corporate Social Responsibility 
Desirable' (1992) 4 Bond Law Review 2 
McMurray M M 'An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, 
and the Business Judgement Rule' (1987) 40 Vand. L. Rev 605 
McPheson H. 'Duties of directors and Powers of Shareholders' (1997) 51 ALJ 460 
Milton D 'Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law' (1993) 50 
Washington and Lee Law Review 
Moerland P W 'Alternative Disciplinary Mechanisms in Different Corporate Systems' 
(1995) 26 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 17 
Moir L 'What Do We Mean by Corporate Social Responsibility?' (2001) 1 Corporate 
Governance 16. 
Mongalo T 'South Africanizing Company Law for a Modern Competitive Global 
Economy' (2004) 121 SALJ 104 
Mongalo T 'South Africa: Corporate Governance issues requiring urgent attention? An 
analysis' (2003) 24 The Company Lawyer 11 
0' Kelley E 'The changing roles of audit committees' (2003) 27 Directors Monthly 4 
Painter-Morland M 'Triple Bottom-line Reporting as Social Grammar: Integrating 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Codes of Conduct' (2006) 15 Business 
Ethics: A European Review 352 
Pillay R 'Corruption - the challenge to good governance' A South African perspective' 
(2004) International Journal of Public Sector Management 586 
Raghuram, R & Zingales, L 'Finance Dependence and Growth' (1998) 88 Economic 
Review 529, 559 
123 
Reed D 'Corporate governance reforms in developing countries' (2002) 37 Journal of 
Business Ethics 223 
Shleifer N & Vishny R 'A Survey of Corporate Governance' (1997) 52 Journal of 
Finance 743 
Shleifer A & Vishny Ft 'Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager Specific 
Assets' (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 123, 140 
Shulze R 'Can this Marriage be Saved: Reconciling Progressivism with Profits In 
Corporate Governance Laws' (1997) 28 Stanford Law Review 121 
Slaughter C M 'Corporate Social Responsibility a New Perspective' (1997) 18 The 
Company Lawyer 321 
Sneller L & Langendijk H 'Sarbanes-Oxley Oxley Section 404 Costs of Compliance: a 
case study' (2007) 15 Corporate Governance 101 
Stovin R 'Mine is Bigger than Yours' Sunday Times 6 May 2001 
Strine L E 'Towards a true corporate republic a traditionalist response to Bebchuk's 
Solutions for improving Corporate America' (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1759 
Young S & V Thyil V 'A holistic model of corporate governance: a new research 
framework' (2008) 8 Corporate Governance 94 
Vagts D F 'Extraterritoriality and the corporate governance law' (2003) 97 American 
Journal of International Law 289 
Van de V yver E & Shandu S' Company Duties' 2007 Without Prejudice 34 
Vaughn M & Verstegen R. L'Corporate governance in South Africa: A bellwether for the 
continent?' Corporate Governance (2006) 14 504 
Walker D 'The Revival of Shareholder Democracy' 2006 Institute of Directorship 20 
West A 'Theorising South Africa's Corporate Governance' (2006) 68 Journal of 
Business Ethics 433 
Whitfield B 'Inflated Executive Pay, is the Bubble Going to Burst' (2008) Fin Week 16 
Wild J J (1996) 'The Audit Committee and Earnings Quality' (1996) 11 Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance 247 
Wood G 'The Relevance to International Mergers of the Ethical Perspectives of 
Participants' (2005) 5 Corporate Governance 39 
124 
7.5 Case Law 
Aberdeen Rly Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461 
AP Smith Manufacturing v Barlow (1953) 39 ALR 2d 
Australia Daniels v Anderson (1995) A WA 27 N. S.W.L.R 438 
Bligh v Brent (1837) 2Y and C Ex. 268 
Cooper v SA Mutual Life Ass Society and Others 2001 (1) SA 967 (SCA) 
Coronation Syndicate v Lillenfeld and the New Fortuna Co. Ltd (1903) TS 489 
Beam ex rei Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc v Stewart (2003) 845 A 2d 1040, 
1044 
Davis v Clutchco (Pty) Ltd (2004) (1) SA 74 (C) 
Dodge v Ford Motor Co (1919) 204 Mich 459170 NW 668 
Doe d Bishop of Rochester v Bridges (1831) 1 B&Ad 847 
Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing (1989) BCLC 489 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) 163 
Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 
Gray v Lewis (1873) 8 Ch App 1033 
Guinness Plc v Saunders (1990) 2 AC 663 
Hall Parke v Daily News Ltd (1962) Ch 927 
Howard v Herrigel and Another (1991) 2 SA 660 
Hutton v West Cork Railway (1883) 23 Ch D 654 
In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company (1925) 1 Ch 407 
JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofongwongcloong (2007) SGCA 40 
Levin v Field and Tweeds Ltd (1951) 2 SA 401 (A) 414 
125 
Litwin v Alien (1940) 25 N.Y.S 2d 667 N.Y Sup. Ct 
Lonrho Limited v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (1981) All ER 456 
Percival v Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421 
Philotex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) 
PlanAssure PA C v Gaelic Innes Pte Ltd (2007) SGCA 41 
Re Wait Disney Company Derivative Litigation (2004) WL 2050138 Del. Ch 
Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews and Forbes Holding Inc, (2007) 506 A.2d 182 
State Tax Commission v Aldrich et al (1942) 316 V.S 174 at 192 V.S. Sup Ct 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer (1959) AC 324 
Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd (1897) AC 22 HL 
Smith v Gorkom (1985) 488 A2d 858 Del 
Treasure Trove Diamond Ltd v Hyman (1928) AD 464 
United Kingdom Official Receiver v Ireland (2001) 1 B.c.L.C 547 
Viener v Jacobs (2003) 834 A 2d 546 








































http://web. worldbank:. org 
128 
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to acknowledge the following people whose assistance was essential to the 
completion of this piece of work: 
My supervisor Chris Schembri whose patience has been sincerely appreciated but his 
valuable advice and comments were instrumental in directing this dissertation to a 
meaningful completion. 
Razia Amod, whose continuous support has been of immeasurable value. 
Last but not least my family. 
129 

